protect-mcp
Local policy enforcement and signed decision receipts for AI agent tool calls.

Developer page · Quickstart · Agent setup ·
Policy packs ·
Sample record ·
Integrations ·
Documentation · Contribute
Put the gateway between an MCP client and its tool server, or use its hooks in a
coding agent. Review a Cedar policy, enable
enforcement, and keep a signed record of the decisions. Local evaluation and
verification need no ScopeBlind account and send no decision telemetry.
- Enforce at the tool boundary. Cedar denies on missing policies, engine
errors or evaluation errors in fail-closed mode. Shadow mode is the default
for the MCP wrapper: use
--enforce when ready to block.
- Check what was signed. Ed25519 receipts include the decision and policy
digest. @veritasacta/verify checks the
bytes against the public key you trust.
- Start with existing tools. Use MCP stdio, the HTTP gateway or coding-agent
hooks. Optional hosted collaboration has its own
permissions and data flows.
A gateway covers calls routed through it. It is not an OS sandbox, and a signed
receipt does not establish that an action executed or that no action was omitted.
The security policy describes the boundary and reporting process.
See the result
A real local run: evaluate two proposed calls, sign the decisions, verify the
receipts, then change a signed decision and check it again.

Watch the 14-second walkthrough

Text walkthrough and reproduction ·
Captured results
Try it without an agent
Use Node.js 22 and npm in a new directory. Install the pinned gateway and verifier:
mkdir protect-mcp-demo
cd protect-mcp-demo
npm init -y
npm install --save-exact protect-mcp@0.32.4 @veritasacta/verify@0.11.0
This example evaluates two proposed calls and signs their decisions. It does not
execute either tool or run git push. Everything after installation is local.
npx --no-install protect-mcp init --starter
npx --no-install protect-mcp evaluate --policy ./protect.cedar --tool Read --input '{"path":"README.md"}'
npx --no-install protect-mcp evaluate --policy ./protect.cedar --tool Bash --input '{"command":"git push --force origin main"}' || test "$?" -eq 2
npx --no-install protect-mcp sign --cedar builtin:starter --tool Read --input '{"path":"README.md"}' --key ./protect-mcp.key --receipts ./receipts
npx --no-install protect-mcp sign --cedar builtin:starter --tool Bash --input '{"command":"git push --force origin main"}' --key ./protect-mcp.key --receipts ./receipts
PROTECT_MCP_PUBLIC_KEY=$(node -p 'JSON.parse(require("fs").readFileSync("protect-mcp.key", "utf8")).publicKey')
npx --no-install verify --replay-chain ./receipts/receipts.jsonl --key "$PROTECT_MCP_PUBLIC_KEY" --json
node -e 'const fs=require("fs");const r=JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync("receipts/receipts.jsonl","utf8").trim().split("\n")[1]);r.payload.decision="allow";fs.writeFileSync("tampered.json",JSON.stringify(r))'
npx --no-install verify tampered.json --key "$PROTECT_MCP_PUBLIC_KEY" --json || test "$?" -eq 1
Expected: allow, then deny; both original receipt signatures and their link
verify; the modified receipt reports invalid_signature. Keep protect-mcp.key
private. To verify someone else's record, obtain their expected public key
through an independent trusted channel.
Verifier exit codes are 0: valid, 1: invalid, 2: not checked/error.
An invalid result is not necessarily tampering: the wrong expected key can also
fail verification. Chain replay checks the supplied links; it does not establish
that you received the entire history.
CI runs this exact example against the packed candidate and the pinned published
verifier. See validation and releases.
Connect your agent
Choose the integration that matches your host and the coverage you need.
Installing guidance skills does not enable enforcement. doctor checks local
configuration; confirm the selected route with a real allowed and blocked call.
For the Claude Code plugin, first prepare and start the local gate,
then install it in your project (Claude Code 2.1.295 or later):
claude plugin install protect-mcp --marketplace ScopeBlind/scopeblind-gateway --scope project
The plugin blocks routed tool calls while its gate is unavailable. Choose the
plugin or standalone project hooks, so the same call is not recorded twice.
Host compatibility and release status separates
adapter tests from real-host validation. The Cursor and assistant packages are
previews, not public directory listings. The standalone hook-format fixes ship in
0.32.4; its changelog lists what changed for each format. A
format flag alone does not establish a working Codex, Gemini or Hermes integration.
For an existing MCP server, initialize its configuration in a separate directory
from the example above, then run the wrapper with your server command:
npx --yes protect-mcp@0.32.4 init
npx --yes protect-mcp@0.32.4 --policy ./protect-mcp.json -- node your-mcp-server.js
This starts in shadow mode. Review the observed calls and policy before
adding --enforce. wrap prints client configuration and exits; it is not the
launch command. Full setup instructions.
Starter shell rules inspect command text. They are useful guardrails, but can
miss alternate command spellings and can match harmless quoted text. Review the
starter policy's coverage and limits
before relying on it.
Integrations and contributions
| Project | Connection |
|---|
| Microsoft AI Agents for Beginners | Educational contribution. protect-mcp's maintainer authored Lesson 18 on signing, verifying and chaining agent receipts. |
| Cedar for Agents | Upstream contribution. Contributed the WASM bindings that expose Cedar's Rust MCP schema generator to JavaScript and TypeScript. |
| wshobson/agents | Downstream integration. Ships a protect-mcp plugin with Claude Code policy and receipt hooks. |
| TRACE | Interoperability checks. Publishes Acta decision-receipt fixtures; our verifier reports its results against a pinned snapshot. |
Sources, versions and check coverage.
Upgrading from 0.31
0.32.0 closes several ways around the gate. Some of them change how you start it:
--http listens on 127.0.0.1, and every request except GET /health needs
Authorization: Bearer <token>. Set the same PROTECT_MCP_HTTP_TOKEN (at
least 32 characters) for the gateway and for the client or ingress that calls
it. Use --host only when you mean to expose the port beyond this machine.
--enforce refuses to start when signing is configured but its key is
missing or unreadable, and refuses an allowed call whose receipt cannot be
signed.
--cedar with --policy applies both: a call needs a Cedar permit and must
also pass that file's block, require_approval, rate limits and min_tier.
Signing and credentials come from that file.
- The dashboard accepts a change only from its own page, which carries a
per-launch token.
- Signing keys are written 0600 in a 0700 folder. For a key made by an earlier
version, run
chmod 600 keys/gateway.json; the gateway warns until you do.
- A once approval at
POST /approve names the exact action: the Request ID the
gateway prints, tool:payload_hash. The approval nonce is on the gateway's
stderr only.
See the changelog for every change.
Documentation
Contribute
Start with a bounded help-wanted task:
one real host capture,
another clean-package runtime, or
one tested policy recipe.
Bug reports, minimal reproductions, documentation fixes and compatibility tests
are welcome. See CONTRIBUTING.md for setup and checks, and
GOVERNANCE.md for maintainership. Report vulnerabilities privately
through SECURITY.md, not a public issue.
The shared conformance corpus
records compatibility results across receipt producers. A passing corpus is
bounded interoperability evidence, not a security certification.
MIT licensed; see LICENSE and the existing patent notice.
Maintained by Tom Farley at
ScopeBlind. Receipt format:
Acta individual Internet-Draft.