Security scanning for AI agents: SAST, SCA, secrets, IaC, DAST, ranked by real risk.
dev.draugr/draugr MCP Server
This MCP server provides security scanning for AI agents, covering SAST, SCA, secrets detection, IaC, and DAST. Results are ranked by real risk, and the workflow is positioned around generating one SARIF report and a single verdict. Tools referenced include Trivy, Semgrep, and Gitleaks.
🛠️ Key Features
Security scanning for AI agents
SAST, SCA, secrets, IaC, and DAST coverage
Ranked by real risk
Produces one SARIF report and one verdict
Integrates Trivy, Semgrep, and Gitleaks
🚀 Use Cases
AppSec and DevSecOps security scanning
Vulnerability scanning across supply-chain security scenarios
CI-friendly code scanning and container-security checks
⚡ Developer Benefits
Unified output (one SARIF report, one verdict)
Supports tooling and reporting via security-focused formats (e.g., SARIF)
CLI and GitHub Actions alignment via automation workflows
⚠️ Limitations
Documentation excerpt only references the scanning/ranking approach and SARIF/verdict outputs; full configuration options are not provided here.
Every application carries problems nobody put there on purpose: a library that turned out to have a
hole in it, a password committed by accident, a server setting that leaves a door open. Draugr finds
them, works out which ones actually matter for your app, and answers the question you are really
asking before a release. is this safe to ship?
It runs the established open-source scanners for you, Trivy, Semgrep, Gitleaks and others, so there
is nothing to choose between, wire up, or read five of. You describe what you built, once, in one
file: where the repositories are, what images it builds, what it exposes, what infrastructure it
runs on. Draugr picks the checks that apply, runs the right tool for each, and produces evidence you
can hand to somebody else. Bring the scanners you already pay for, or use the open-source defaults.
Findings are ranked, not listed. A scanner's "critical" describes a flaw in the abstract. How
bad it could be at its worst, anywhere. The same flaw is act-now in the service strangers can reach
and backlog in the internal tool three people use, and no scanner can tell those apart because the
difference is in the file you wrote, not in the code. And draugr diff
gates a pull request on new findings only, so inheriting two hundred existing ones does not
block every change.
Priority (P1–P4) is not severity. Severity says how bad a flaw is at its worst, anywhere.
Priority weighs that against how exposed and how important the part of your app it sits in is, which
no scanner can work out, because it is not in the code.
draugr-dev/draugr-demo is a deliberately
vulnerable app wired to Draugr: every control lights up, findings land in the repo's
Security → Code scanning tab, and its example pull requests show the new-vs-fixed diff.
Quickstart
bash
curl -fsSL https://draugr.dev/install.sh | sh
Installs to ~/.local/bin, no sudo. It verifies before it installs and says which checks ran, the
archive's SHA-256 against the release checksums.txt, plus the cosign signature on that file when
cosign is on your PATH, and installs nothing if a check
fails. The script is readable in the repo; other routes, including Homebrew and go install, are in the install guide.
bash
draugr init # describe this project in a draugr.saga.yaml
draugr tools install # fetch the scanners it needs, pinned and verified
draugr scan # scan what the descriptor describes
tools install takes its answer from the descriptor beside it, so a small service gets three
scanners rather than every one Draugr can provision. --all when you are preparing a machine for
several projects.
Your editor already knows this file. Draugr's
JSON Schema is registered with
SchemaStore, so any *.saga.yaml gets completion, hover docs and
typo warnings on open with nothing to configure.
Alongside them: content-hash caching, an SBOM per repository and image, KEV/EPSS enrichment,
per-control gate thresholds, and suppressions that stay in the report with the reason someone
gave rather than disappearing.
In your pipeline
The first-party GitHub Action installs Draugr, provisions the scanners, and hands the merged SARIF
to code scanning, one clean Draugr tool in the Security tab:
yaml
permissions:contents:readsecurity-events:writesteps:-uses:actions/checkout@v4-id:draugruses:draugr-dev/draugr@v0# pin @vX.Y.Z for reproducible CIwith:saga:draugr.saga.yamltools:true# provision the scanners the controls need-if:always()# publish findings even when the gate failsuses:github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3with:sarif_file:${{steps.draugr.outputs.sarif}}
From an AI coding assistant. Ask one to check a change and it will, using whatever scanner it
finds over a scope it chose. draugr mcp serves Draugr over the Model Context
Protocol so it reads your committed descriptor instead, and
scanning is off by default, because it clones repositories and runs external tools.
A passing verdict means the controls you configured found nothing they were looking for. It is not a
statement that your software is secure. It is silent about anything your descriptor does not
declare, controls you did not enable, and whatever the underlying scanners miss. License findings
are information, not legal advice. Draugr is provided under Apache-2.0 without warranty.
The details, including whose terms the scanners carry and your responsibility for authorization
when scanning live endpoints: scope and disclaimer.
Security & supply chain
A security tool should hold itself to what it checks. Draugr does:
Standard output. Every finding is normalized to SARIF 2.1.0 (OASIS), so results flow
into GitHub / GitLab / Azure DevOps code scanning and any SARIF-aware tool.
Signed releases + provenance, release archives' checksums.txt is keyless-signed with
cosign (Sigstore) into a checksums.txt.sigstore.json bundle, and each release publishes
SLSA build-provenance attestations (gh attestation verify …); verify before installing
(recipe).
SBOMs. A Syft SBOM is published for every release archive.
Verified tooling, draugr tools install fetches scanners pinned by SHA-256 and, where
the upstream signs them, verifies the cosign signature too, and cosign itself is
installable, so verification is self-sufficient.
We scan ourselves. Draugr runs on its own repo every PR (dogfood self-scan), and we track
our supply-chain posture with the OpenSSF Scorecard
(badge above).
That card reports SAST: 0, and it is worth saying why we are leaving it there. Static
analysis does run on this repository: Semgrep and gosec through Draugr's own sast control on
every scan, and gosec again inside golangci-lint on every pull request. Scorecard looks for a
specific set of tools it recognizes, and ours are not in it.
Adding a third static analyzer purely to move the number would be the same thing as writing
tests that touch code without asserting anything, a metric improved without the property
behind it improving. We would rather the score be wrong and the analysis be real. If you want
to check the analysis rather than the score, the findings are in the repository's Security tab,
uploaded by the scan itself.
Requires Go 1.26+. make build builds ./bin/draugr; make gate runs the full local gate, fmt,
vet, lint, race tests with coverage, and govulncheck. See CONTRIBUTING.md.