@guardbee/mcp-server-auditor
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An MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that scans other MCP servers' tool definitions for insecure patterns.
While ai-code-scanner looks at general LLM/AI integration code, this package specifically looks at an MCP server itself: how privileged a tool defined via server.tool(...) is, how loose its parameters are, which dangerous sinks (shell/filesystem/HTTP/SQL) its handler passes tool input into directly. The MCP ecosystem is growing fast, but there's no common tool yet for auditing these servers' security.
This package sends usage telemetry by default (tool name + short parameters, the scanned code is never included — see @guardbee/mcp-telemetry). Disable with GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY=0.
Claude ──► mcp-server-auditor ──► An MCP server's source code
│
├─ Excessive agency (execSync(input.command), a tool named "run_shell")
├─ Unsafe input (fetch(input.url) → SSRF, SQL string interpolation)
├─ Loose schema (a parameter typed z.any()/z.unknown())
├─ Secrets exposure (a hardcoded API key in a schema default, the entire process.env)
└─ Network exposure (wildcard CORS)
Features
- 10 patterns, 5 categories — excessive-agency, unsafe-input, loose-schema, secrets-exposure, network-exposure
- Every finding includes why it's risky and what to do about it (
recommendation) — not just "found it"
- SARIF 2.1.0 output — CI/CD integration (GitHub Code Scanning, etc.)
- Config file support via
guardbee.yml
- 32 unit tests — a positive and a negative (false-positive) scenario for every pattern
Quick Start
Claude Desktop / MCP Client
{
"mcpServers": {
"guardbee-mcp-server-auditor": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-server-auditor"]
}
}
}
CLI (CI/CD)
npx @guardbee/mcp-server-auditor scan ./src --fail-on=high --format=sarif > results.sarif
| Tool | Description |
|---|
scan_text | Scans a given text/code snippet |
scan_file | Scans a single file |
scan_directory | Recursively scans a directory (node_modules, .git, dist skipped automatically) |
list_patterns | Lists all supported patterns by category |
Detected Patterns
| Category | Pattern | Severity | What it means |
|---|
| excessive-agency | shell_exec_from_tool_input | critical | A tool handler passes tool input directly into a shell call like execSync/spawn |
| excessive-agency | eval_of_tool_input | critical | Tool input is executed as code via eval()/new Function() |
| excessive-agency | unrestricted_shell_tool_name | high | A tool name (run_shell, execute_sql, etc.) implies shell/SQL execution directly |
| unsafe-input | fs_write_from_raw_tool_input | high | A path from tool input flows into a file write/delete call with no validation (path traversal) |
| unsafe-input | ssrf_fetch_from_tool_input | high | A URL from tool input flows directly into fetch/axios with no allowlist (SSRF) |
| unsafe-input | sql_injection_via_tool_input | critical | Tool input is interpolated into a SQL string via a template literal |
| loose-schema | overly_permissive_tool_schema | medium | A tool parameter is typed z.any()/z.unknown() — accepts anything |
| secrets-exposure | hardcoded_secret_in_tool_schema | critical | A credential-shaped schema field's default value is a hardcoded literal |
| secrets-exposure | full_env_exposed_to_tool_caller | critical | The entire process.env is spread/stringified/returned (not one named variable) |
| network-exposure | permissive_cors_on_server | medium | Wildcard CORS (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *) or cors() with no options |
These are heuristic findings — a static text-pattern scan, not a full AST/type analysis. Designed for a low false-positive rate, but every finding should still be reviewed manually.
Configuration (guardbee.yml)
mcp-server-auditor:
fail-on: high
max-files: 5000
exclude:
- ".test.ts"
- "fixtures/"
Development
License
MIT — GuardBee