App-Generation Microservice

Takes a JSON Product Requirements Document and emits a compiled Flutter application. Built as a LangGraph loop with four subagents, a QA gate that runs the real Flutter toolchain, and an x402 payment gate in front of packaging.

The design goal is not "generates plausible code" but zero-error compilation: if the output fails CI, the loop has failed.

Use it from Claude or Cursor — nothing to install

Add this as an HTTP MCP server:

https://37-27-249-33.sslip.io/mcp

Four tools: validate_prd and prd_schema and payment_terms are free — your agent can check whether a document is well-formed and see exactly what it would build before anything costs money. start_build buys a build: call it once to get quoted, sign, call again to build. No account, no API key, no subscription — $3.00 USDC per build, paid on the spot via x402 and settled on-chain before the build starts. That's the whole pricing model: nothing recurring, pay only for the app you actually generate.

Prefer curl? Same service, plain HTTP:

# Does my document build, and what would come out? Free.
curl -X POST https://37-27-249-33.sslip.io/validate \
     -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d @examples/todo_app.prd.json

# What does it cost, and how do I sign for it?
curl https://37-27-249-33.sslip.io/.well-known/x402

/validate runs the same validator the paid path runs, so a document it accepts will not be rejected after payment. A build that fails still returns its diagnostics, because payment settles first and a silent failure would be theft.

Quick start

No credentials and no Flutter SDK needed — the defaults are fully offline:

poetry install
poetry run python src/supervisor.py examples/todo_app.prd.json --clean

That validates the PRD, runs the loop, and writes a Flutter project to generated_apps/current_build/.

To grade the output with the real toolchain instead of the offline stub:

poetry run python src/supervisor.py --clean --analyzer dart --flutter-root "C:\flutter" --run-tests

As a service

CLAUDE.md calls this an M2M microservice; this is the part a machine buyer calls.

X402_SHARED_SECRET=... FLUTTER_ROOT="C:\flutter"   poetry run uvicorn src.service.app:app --port 8000

Builds take minutes, so the API is asynchronous. x402_payment_verified in a submitted PRD is discarded: the PRD is buyer-supplied, so trusting that field would let anyone assert their own payment. Only the server's verifier sets it.

Payment is real x402: the buyer signs an EIP-3009 TransferWithAuthorization (EIP-712), and the service recovers the signer, checks recipient, amount, chain and validity window, and claims the nonce atomically so one signature buys exactly one build.

X402_TOKEN_CONTRACT=0x036CbD...  X402_CHAIN_ID=84532 X402_PAY_TO=0xYourAddress        X402_PRICE_ATOMIC=500000   poetry run uvicorn src.service.app:app --port 8000

Configure nothing and the service refuses every payment — it fails closed rather than falling back to the development shared secret. /healthz reports which mode is active.

Verification is not settlement. A valid signature proves the payer authorised a transfer; it does not prove they hold the balance or that the transfer landed on-chain. Set X402_FACILITATOR_URL and the service submits the authorization for on-chain execution and blocks the 202 until it confirms — so a build only starts once the money has actually moved. Without it, /healthz reports settlement: verification-only and the service is accepting signed promises.

Before the nonce is claimed the service asks the facilitator's /verify endpoint whether the payment would settle. Insufficient funds is recoverable — the payer tops up and re-presents the same signature — so burning their authorization for it would be needlessly destructive.

Settlement distinguishes three outcomes, not two. A refusal ("insufficient funds") is definite and is not retried. A timeout is unknown: the facilitator may have broadcast and failed to answer, so the build is refused while recording that the buyer may have been charged. Retrying a transport failure is safe — an EIP-3009 nonce is single-use on-chain, so a duplicate submission reverts rather than charging twice.

A working testnet configuration

Verified end to end on Base Sepolia — a real transaction, a real APK:

export X402_TOKEN_CONTRACT=0x036CbD53842c5426634e7929541eC2318f3dCF7e  # USDC
export X402_CHAIN_ID=84532
export X402_NETWORK=base-sepolia
export X402_PRICE_ATOMIC=3000000                                      # 3.00 USDC
export X402_PAY_TO=0xYourReceivingAddress
export X402_FACILITATOR_URL=https://facilitator.payai.network         # public, no auth
export FLUTTER_ROOT="C:\flutter"
poetry run uvicorn src.service.app:app --port 8000

The payer needs USDC only — no ETH. The facilitator submits the transaction and pays gas, which is the point of EIP-3009; if a wallet is being asked for testnet ETH, something is wired wrong. Faucet: https://faucet.circle.com.

scripts/check_x402_funding.py reports whether a payer is funded by asking the facilitator's /verify, rather than introducing a second source of truth that could disagree with the one the gate actually uses.

Running more than one worker

Set REDIS_URL and both the nonce store and the job store move to Redis; /healthz reports multi_process_safe. Nonce consumption uses SET NX EX, one atomic round trip, so the time-of-check/time-of-use protection holds across workers rather than only within one interpreter. A Redis outage refuses payment rather than allowing replays.

Surviving a restart

The money moves on-chain before the build starts, so losing a build to a deploy means having taken payment for nothing. Execution is therefore durable, not just job state: POST /builds settles the payment, writes the PRD onto the job record, and pushes the id onto a queue. Workers pull from it.

BUILD_WORKER_EMBEDDED=0 poetry run uvicorn src.service.app:app --port 8000  # accepts
poetry run python -m src.service.worker                                     # builds

An API process builds as well as accepts by default, so a single-container deployment needs neither of those flags; set BUILD_WORKER_EMBEDDED=0 once requests and builds want scaling apart.

A worker holds a lease on the job it is building and renews it while it works. Kill the worker and the lease lapses, another worker returns the job to the queue, and it is rebuilt from the stored PRD — which is why the PRD is stored rather than captured in a closure, as it was when execution lived inside the accepting process. scripts/verify_durable_execution.py demonstrates exactly that, across real processes and a real SIGKILL.

Two things this deliberately does not promise. A lease bounds duplicate work rather than preventing it: a worker partitioned from Redis for longer than its lease is indistinguishable from a dead one, so its build may be handed on while it is still running. renew returning False is how the stalled worker learns to discard its result, but the overlap is real, and it costs compute rather than money — the payment settled once, before the job was queued. And retries are bounded (BUILD_MAX_ATTEMPTS, default 3): without that, one build that reliably kills its worker would be requeued into the next one and take the fleet down a process at a time.

/healthz reports durable_execution, which is true only when the queue and the job store are both shared — a Redis queue over an in-memory job store loses the record the build would be resumed from.

Why the accepting endpoint is throttled

The x402 gate stops anyone getting a free build, so this is not about theft. It is the cost of refusing: POST /builds carrying a payment header makes the service call the facilitator's /verify and then /settle, two network round trips with a 60-second timeout, from a synchronous endpoint. A few hundred concurrent requests with junk authorizations exhaust the thread pool and the service stops answering anyone — including the buyers who paid. So the limit is on that endpoint only; polling a running build and downloading an APK are cheap and legitimately frequent, and throttling them would punish correct behaviour.

Identifying the caller is the part that fails quietly. Behind the TLS proxy every request arrives from Caddy's address on the compose network, so keying on the socket peer puts every buyer in the world into one bucket — a limiter that looks configured while blocking either everyone or nobody. The client is the rightmost X-Forwarded-For entry, because Caddy appends the peer it actually saw to whatever the caller sent. Taking the leftmost, which is the more common convention, would let a caller supply their own header and mint a fresh identity per request; there is a test that fails on exactly that.

Deploying it

One container that accepts payment and builds APKs, plus the Redis that makes both durable. It wants a VM with a disk: the image carries Flutter, the Android SDK and a JDK, and measures 7.71 GB, which rules out serverless targets and most PaaS free tiers.

A finished build used to cost 2.0 GB of Gradle output for a 144 MB APK, and nothing reclaimed it — job records expire from Redis after seven days, which is the wrong half, since the record is kilobytes and the directory it names is gigabytes. The service now keeps the artifact and drops the tree the moment a build finishes, while the worker still holds the lease. Measured on the deployment: the last unpruned build is 2.0 GB on disk, the first pruned one is 144 MB, and it still downloads. That is the difference between about 58 sales and about 790 on a 150 GB box.

cp .env.deploy.example .env.deploy     # fill in X402_PAY_TO and ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
docker compose --env-file .env.deploy up -d --build
poetry run python scripts/verify_deployment.py http://127.0.0.1:8000

docs/DEPLOY.md is the runbook: how the machine should be sized and why, the firewall trap that Docker's published ports set for ufw, and the order — build, prove over an SSH tunnel, buy one real build, and only then put it on a public address behind TLS.

Every toolchain version in the Dockerfile is pinned to the one the table above was proven against — Flutter 3.44.8, Android SDK 36, build-tools 36.0.0, JDK 17. Floating any of them makes the build environment a moving target, which is the one thing a service promising "it compiles" cannot afford. tests/test_deployment_config.py fails if they drift, if a ${VAR} in compose has nothing to supply it, or if the builds volume disappears.

The deployment check is the point of that last command. A container can come up, answer HTTP and still be unsellable: taking payments it never settles, losing paid builds on restart, or falling back to the dev shared secret because a token variable was misspelled. /healthz was built to make each of those visible in one line, and verify_deployment.py refuses the deployment when it sees them. It was itself checked against four deliberately broken deployments — no Redis, no facilitator, no token config, wrong chain, no rate limit — and caught all five with the fix named in the message. --pay goes further and buys a real build with the testnet key, which is the only check that proves the deployment can do the thing it charges for.

Two things about the buyer-facing surface are worth knowing before pointing traffic at it. The service defaults to the Claude generator, so a deployment without ANTHROPIC_API_KEY accepts payment and then fails to build; SUPERVISOR_GENERATOR=template is the free, deterministic path and a sane first deploy. And SUPERVISOR_BUILD_MODE decides whether a buyer gets an installable debug APK or an unsigned release one — see below for why the service will not sign.

The image has now been built and sold from. A 4 vCPU / 8 GB Hetzner box running Ubuntu 26.04 built it on the first attempt, and a signed EIP-3009 authorization settled on Base Sepolia (0x0637c94b…) bought a 151 MB APK from it end to end.

It did not work first time, and the way it failed is the point. Every layer of the image built, the service came up healthy, /healthz reported a correct posture, and the deployment check passed — and then the first paid build died:

PermissionError: [Errno 13] Permission denied: '/opt/flutter/bin/flutter.bat'

The Flutter SDK ships flutter and flutter.bat on every platform. Four call sites had independently resolved the tool by taking the first candidate that exists(), Windows spelling first — correct here, an unrunnable batch file on the machine that was actually going to run it. 299 tests, an eval sweep, APK packaging and the entire verification table had all passed on Windows, where the bug cannot appear. It took a buyer paying for a build to find it, which is exactly the failure mode the paid check exists to provoke while the buyer is still us. src/ports/toolchain.py now answers that question once, and takes windows= as a parameter so both branches are reachable from a test on either platform.

Release builds, and why the service will not sign them

flutter create scaffolds a release build type that signs with the debug key, under a // TODO: Add your own signing config comment. Left alone, flutter build apk --release succeeds, produces a plausible app-release.apk, installs on a device, and cannot be published — Play rejects the debug key. A buyer would find that out at upload, having already paid.

So --build-mode release strips that config and emits an unsigned APK.

poetry run python src/supervisor.py <prd.json> --execute \
  --build-mode release --flutter-root "C:\flutter" --sdk-root "C:\Android"

The service does not sign, and holds no keys. A release key decides who can ship updates to an app's installed base; holding buyers' keys would mean holding that power over every app ever generated here, and one breach would compromise all of them together. The buyer signs with a key this service never sees:

zipalign -p -f 4 app-release-unsigned.apk app-release.apk
apksigner sign --ks my-release-key.jks --ks-key-alias mykey app-release.apk
apksigner verify --print-certs app-release.apk

Two details worth knowing. The Gradle edit is best-effort and not the guarantee — pattern-matching a template that changes between Flutter versions is not something to stake a security property on — so the pipeline then inspects the APK that actually came out and fails rather than hand over a release build it cannot show to be unsigned. That check needs apksigner, so release builds require --sdk-root or ANDROID_SDK_ROOT; without it the state is unknown, and unknown is refused, because guessing in the reassuring direction is how a debug-signed APK reaches a buyer labelled as a release build.

Commands

Useful flags: --generator {template,claude}, --analyzer {stub,dart}, --max-repairs N, --build-dir PATH, --clean, --execute, --build-mode {debug,release}, --sdk-root PATH.

Poetry may not be on PATH; python -m poetry ... works either way. The Flutter SDK is deliberately not on PATH — pass --flutter-root or set $FLUTTER_ROOT.

How it works

plan ──> genui ──> logic ──> qa ──┬──> package ──> END
          ^          ^            │
          └──────────┴── repair ──┘        (bounded by --max-repairs)

Each subagent owns a strict slice of the output and may not write outside it — enforced in code, not just documented:

QA diagnostics are routed to whichever agent can actually fix them. If a round changes nothing, the router escalates to the other agent rather than spending the whole repair budget re-running the one that already failed.

The three generators

Both implement the same CodeGenerator port, so the graph does not know which it has.

• template (default) — deterministic Python templates. No network, no credentials. This is the validated path.
• fixture — a test double emitting correct Flutter that shares none of TemplateGenerator's naming conventions. Proves the grading harness is not merely grading its own output. See evals/fixture_generator.py.
• claude — real Claude calls with structured outputs. Validated on Opus 5 at 11/11 across the eval sweep.

What is actually verified

Honest status, because "it compiles" and "it works" are different claims:

One caveat on the two Redis rows, since "✅" is doing real work there. There is no Redis daemon on the development machine, so both were verified against fakeredis — for the unit tests in-process, and for the cross-process durability run over TcpFakeServer, a real TCP socket speaking real RESP. The process boundaries, the sockets and the SIGKILL are genuine; the server implementing LMOVE and key expiry is not. Running scripts/verify_durable_execution.py against a real Redis is a REDIS_URL away and has not been done.

Those rows earned their asterisk the hard way. Everything above them is static — flutter analyze proves the code type-checks, conformance proves it matches the PRD, the generated widget tests prove each screen builds in isolation with its providers overridden — and none of it runs the app. Actually running it found two bugs in every app the generators had ever produced.

The app could not start. The composition root was await Firebase.initializeApp(); with no options, and the generator emits no google-services.json either. On web that fails an assertion inside firebase_core_web before the first frame; natively there is no config file to fall back to. The app compiled, analysed clean, passed its widget tests and packaged into a release-ready APK — and died on launch. Identifiers now come from --dart-define, with null passed when none are supplied so a build carrying a native config file still works.

Dates threw on the way back in. Firestore stores a DateTime as a Timestamp and hands back a Timestamp, so data['x'] as DateTime? — well-typed Dart — always threw the first time an app read a document it had written itself.

Both fixes are guarded by tests that fail against the old output and pass against the new, which is the only reason to trust them.

That guard is no longer hand-written. The QA phase now emits an integration_test/<model>_roundtrip_test.dart per model, and the emitted test was itself checked the same way: it passes against the fixed mapper and fails against the old one with the exact Timestamp is not a subtype of DateTime?.

It writes through the app's own serialiser and reads back through the app's own deserialiser, which is the only formulation that is not a trap. A hand-written document would have to pick a wire format, and the two generators disagree on purpose — TemplateGenerator stores a date as a Timestamp, the fixture generator as an ISO-8601 string, and both are correct because each reads back what it wrote. Nothing about the pair is hard-coded either: the method names are read out of the generated code, because fromSnapshot/toMap and fromDoc/toJson are the same contract spelled differently, and a check written against one generator's spelling silently stops testing the other.

Running it is opt-in. It needs an emulator and a browser, and making the analysis loop depend on Node, a JDK 21 and Chrome would be a large tax on every build for a check most builds cannot run.

One limit on that ✅: it ran in Chrome, not on Android — this machine has no AVD or system image — which is enough for a platform-independent Dart mapper bug and not enough to claim the app works on a phone.

Opus output has now been through it, and passed: the model it wrote handles Timestamp correctly in both directions, so the prompt guidance holds up rather than merely existing. Getting there cost two bugs, both in the discovery and both the same mistake this module was written to avoid — over-fitting to the one generator that was available while writing it.

• TemplateGenerator marks every constructor parameter required. Claude makes most of them optional with defaults. Matching only required this.x found nothing to assert and emitted no test at all — failure that looks identical to success.
• The deserialiser need not take a DocumentSnapshot. Opus writes fromMap(String id, Map<String, dynamic> map), keeping the model free of Firestore types, which is arguably the better design and matched nothing.

Four serialiser shapes are now covered — fromSnapshot/toMap, fromDoc/toJson, fromFirestore/toFirestore, fromMap/toMap — across two call arities. The lesson is the one this repo keeps relearning: a check written while looking at a single generator encodes that generator's taste, and the only way to find out is to run it against code somebody else wrote.

The routes nothing could reach

The PRD declares navigation as data — Action(kind="navigate", target=<screen>) — and the schema already refuses targets that name screens which do not exist. The generator listed every one of those screens in the routes table and then never pushed a single route. /capture and /settings existed and no widget could get to them: the app was a form nobody could open.

Everything passed. Each screen built in isolation, so the smoke tests were green. The routes table was valid Dart, and the analyzer has no opinion about whether a route is ever navigated to. Conformance checked that the screens existed, which they did.

unreachable_screen closes it, and is deliberately loose about how a screen is reached — a named route, a MaterialPageRoute building the widget, or a router's go() all count. What it will not accept is the target appearing only in the routes table that declares it, which is exactly the shape the bug had.

Two things worth recording. The first version of the check was vacuous: it searched every UI file for CaptureScreen( and found the destination's own constructor in its own file, so every unreachable screen looked reachable. It was caught by running it against the actual broken output rather than a fixture. And once it worked it immediately found two more instances nobody had looked for — auth_flow and many_screens — because the fix had only covered list screens, and auth, settings and detail screens had no affordance to hang navigation off at all.

unreachable_screen is a static guarantee: something in the app navigates to every declared target. It says nothing about whether the destination works, and it cannot — '/capture': (context) => const CaptureScreen() satisfies it whether or not CaptureScreen survives being built.

So the QA phase also generates integration_test/navigation_test.dart, which boots the app through its own main() — the real composition root, the real ProviderScope, the real Firebase initialisation — drives its own Navigator to each declared target, and checks the destination is on screen. Delete a route from the generated app and it fails with Could not find a generator for route RouteSettings("/capture"), which is how we know it is testing anything.

Destinations are identified by their PRD title, the one label that is the same whatever a generator calls its classes, files or routes. Matching <Id>Screen would be matching one generator's convention.

Tapping the button, and how we know that test is real

Driving the navigator still leaves the user out of it. unreachable_screen says something in the source navigates to each target; the push case says the destination renders once you get there. Neither says a person looking at the source screen has anything to tap.

The first version of this refused to go further, on the grounds that hunting for a button depends on widget choices and would go flaky. Three decisions make it honest instead:

• What counts as tappable is not a list of buttons. InkResponse sits under TextButton, ElevatedButton, IconButton, FloatingActionButton and ListTile; CupertinoButton and a hand-rolled GestureDetector cover the rest. Enumerating button classes would have encoded TemplateGenerator's taste — and would have missed the affordance that ships most, since a generated list screen navigates from a FAB whose only child is an icon and whose label is therefore nothing at all.
• Every attempt restarts from a freshly pushed source screen, which turns "tap things until something happens" from one stateful sequence into N independent one-tap experiments. It matters here: the generated FAB writes a draft document before it navigates, so without the reset each attempt would face a different screen than the last.
• Arrival is the route name first and the title second. A button labelled with the destination's title is good UI, and if arrival meant "the title is on screen" the test would pass before tapping anything — so the title only counts when it was not already visible.

None of that is evidence. scripts/verify_navigation_flow.py is: it generates the eight-screen many_screens app, runs the navigation test in Chrome against a Firestore emulator, and then runs it again against a mutant with one affordance wrapped in Offstage(offstage: true, ...).

That mutation is chosen for what it leaves working. The Navigator.pushNamed call is still in the file, so unreachable_screen still passes. The route table is untouched, so the push case still passes. The widget is still in the tree, so nothing about the build changes. It is simply never on screen — the app ships with a screen no user can open, and everything static stays green:

Failure in method: openToday: a tap on inbox reaches today
  Expected: empty
    Actual: 'tapped 2 of 2 affordance(s) on /inbox and none of them reached /today'

Exactly one of the six generated cases went red, and it was the right one. That is the only reason to believe the tap cases test anything.

What it still cannot prove is that a multi-step flow arrives. A sign-in screen that navigates only after valid credentials needs a tap and some typing, and the PRD says nothing about what to type. Those fail here rather than being quietly skipped, which is the right direction — but it means a red tap case is "look at this", not automatically "the app is broken".

And it has only been run on template output. Every over-fitting bug in this repo was invisible until code somebody else wrote went through the check — the round-trip discovery was broken twice that way. The affordance search is written not to care whose widgets it is looking at, which is exactly the kind of claim that has been wrong here before. --generator claude on this script is the next thing worth spending on.

Automation needs its own browser. flutter drive -d chrome cannot get a controllable Chrome while an ordinary Chrome session is running — the launch is delegated to the existing instance, the debug port is never opened, and dwds fails with AppConnectionException after about 25 seconds. It reads like a code fault and is not one. Point CHROME_EXECUTABLE at a Chrome-for-Testing binary whose version matches chromedriver:

npx @puppeteer/browsers install chrome@150.0.7871.124 --path ~/chrome-for-testing
export CHROME_EXECUTABLE=~/chrome-for-testing/chrome/win64-150.0.7871.124/chrome-win64/chrome.exe

flutter drive also wants the WebDriver on port 4444 unless --driver-port says otherwise, and the failure it gives for a chromedriver on any other port names 4444 rather than the port it was asked for.

339 unit tests; eval sweep 11/11 against real analysis and widget tests; a debug APK built end to end from a payment-verified PRD.

Layout

src/
  supervisor.py        CLI entry point
  prd/schema.py        the PRD contract — strict, validates referential integrity
  graph/               LangGraph wiring, shared state, the five nodes
  ports/
    generator.py       CodeGenerator protocol
    templates.py       deterministic generator (validated)
    llm.py             Claude generator (Opus 5, validated)
    analyzer.py        StubAnalyzer (offline) + FlutterAnalyzer (real)
    conformance.py     does the app match the PRD?
    smoke.py           generates widget tests from the output
    roundtrip.py       generates the Firestore round-trip test from the output
    navigation.py      generates the runtime navigation test: push and tap
    runtime.py         runs them
    ownership.py       which agent can fix which diagnostic
  payments/x402.py     the payment gate + x402 verifier selection
  payments/eip3009.py  EIP-712 signature recovery and field checks
  payments/replay.py   single-use nonces, atomic claim
  service/
    app.py             FastAPI app; accepts and pays, then queues
    jobs.py            the job record (including the PRD) and its store
    queue.py           reliable queue: atomic reserve, leases, requeue
    worker.py          pull-based workers; heartbeats and bounded retries
  build/pipeline.py    APK packaging (x402-gated)
  build/signing.py     unsigned release builds, and proving they are unsigned
  build/scaffold.py    generates android/ via `flutter create`
evals/
  prds/                10 PRDs chosen to break things
  run.py               pass-rate harness
emulator/              Firestore emulator config (a demo-* project; no keys)

Notes and limitations

• Escaping is load-bearing. PRD text crosses into two generated languages, and each boundary needs its own escaping: yaml_scalar for pubspec.yaml, dart_string for Dart literals. Both exist because both broke in testing.
• The Firestore emulator needs a different JDK than the build does. firebase-tools refuses anything below JDK 21; the Android/Gradle toolchain here is pinned to 17. They coexist — the emulator is handed a 21+ on its own PATH and nothing else changes — but the failure reads as a Java problem rather than a version-policy one. Set EMULATOR_JAVA_HOME if the script's search does not find a 21+. It also needs firebase-tools and a chromedriver whose major version matches the installed Chrome.
• The stub analyzer cannot parse Dart. It enforces conventions and catches provider desync, but it passed a project with 59 syntax errors. Treat a green offline run as a smoke signal, not proof; use --analyzer dart for that.
• Cupertino is a full template family, not a swapped root widget — a CupertinoApp provides no MaterialLocalizations, so Material widgets throw at runtime inside one.
• Smoke tests use stubbed providers. They prove a screen builds and its data layer resolves; they do not prove navigation works or that writes reach Firestore.