@cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server
Passive external attack-surface mapping: CT subdomains, DNS, TLS, HTTP posture, RDAP/WHOIS, Shodan via MCP. STDIO or Streamable HTTP.
8 Tools โข 1 Resource
IMPORTANT
Authorized, defensive use only. Point this server only at assets you own or are explicitly authorized to assess. It performs passive, non-intrusive reconnaissance โ it reads public records (Certificate Transparency logs, DNS, RDAP/WHOIS) and each target's own published surface (one TLS handshake and one HTTP GET per host). It does not port-scan, exploit, brute-force, fuzz, or probe for vulnerabilities; that capability is excluded from the surface by design, not gated behind a flag. Output is descriptive โ what exists and what the security posture is โ never an exploitation plan. Every outbound connection passes an SSRF guard that refuses private, loopback, link-local, and cloud-metadata targets.
Overview
Passive external attack-surface mapping (EASM) over Certificate Transparency logs, DNS, TLS, HTTP, and RDAP/WHOIS registries, with optional Shodan host intelligence. Discover subdomains, resolve DNS records, and inspect TLS and HTTP security posture across a domain's live hosts. Runs as a stdio process or a local Streamable HTTP server.
| Tool | Description |
|---|
attacksurface_map_domain | Flagship workflow. Maps a domain's external surface end to end: CT-log subdomain discovery โ DNS liveness โ (standard+) DNS records, TLS posture, HTTP headers/tech โ optional RDAP/WHOIS โ (thorough + key) per-IP Shodan enrichment. Returns a structured surface map and a defensive assessment of observable facts. |
attacksurface_enumerate_subdomains | Passive subdomain discovery from Certificate Transparency logs (crt.sh โ Certspotter โ TLS-SAN fallback chain), with DNS resolution to mark which names are live. Per-source provenance; no DNS brute-forcing. |
attacksurface_resolve_dns | Resolve and enumerate DNS records (A/AAAA/CNAME/MX/NS/TXT/CAA) for one or more hosts across multiple public resolvers, with optional reverse DNS (PTR). Per-resolver values surface propagation gaps. |
attacksurface_inspect_tls | Inspect TLS/SSL posture via a real read-only handshake: protocol, cipher, leaf certificate and chain depth, SANs, validity window, days-to-expiry, issuer, validation status. Reports invalid/expired/self-signed certs instead of failing. |
attacksurface_probe_http | Passive HTTP(S) probe: one GET following redirects. Returns status, redirect chain, headers, a security-header audit (HSTS/CSP/X-Frame-Options/cookie flags/CORS reflection), and an evidence-bound technology fingerprint. |
attacksurface_lookup_registration | Registration and ownership lookup via RDAP (JSON; WHOIS fallback). A domain returns registrar, status, lifecycle events, nameservers, DNSSEC; an IP/CIDR returns netblock, allocation CIDRs, origin ASN, country. |
attacksurface_lookup_host | Infrastructure intelligence for a single IP (open ports, banners, software versions, ASN, geo) or a faceted internet-wide search, via Shodan. Requires SHODAN_API_KEY โ returns a typed source_unavailable error when unset; the rest of the server is unaffected. |
attacksurface_recon_guidance | Offline synthesis over findings gathered so far. Returns a prioritized defensive review plan plus pre-filled follow-up calls (which certs to renew, which hosts to inspect, which software versions to check for CVEs against an external NVD/OSV server). No external calls. |
Resources
| Resource | Description |
|---|
attacksurface://surface/{domain} | Read-once snapshot of a domain's mapped external surface (subdomains, live hosts, per-host TLS/HTTP posture summary), equivalent to a standard-depth attacksurface_map_domain call. |
All resource data is also reachable via tools โ tool-only clients lose nothing, since attacksurface_map_domain covers the same ground.
Capability reference
attacksurface_map_domain tool
depth: quick discovers subdomains and liveness; standard adds DNS records, TLS, and HTTP posture; thorough adds per-IP Shodan data when a key is present, otherwise a note.
- Returns a structured surface map and defensive
assessment of observable facts. Failed sources or unreachable hosts become notes; subdomain resolution is capped by ATTACKSURFACE_MAX_SUBDOMAINS (default 200), with truncation disclosed.
includeRegistration adds RDAP/WHOIS data for the apex at standard or thorough depth.
attacksurface_enumerate_subdomains tool
- Discovers names through crt.sh โ Certspotter โ the apex TLS certificate SANs, then resolves DNS liveness.
includeUnresolved: false keeps only live hosts.
- Returns each name's source provenance and per-source status; no DNS brute-forcing or target-resolver probing.
- Accepts up to 50 hosts and queries A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, TXT, and CAA across public resolvers (default
8.8.8.8, 1.1.1.1, 9.9.9.9); reverse DNS (PTR) is optional.
- Returns per-resolver answers to expose propagation gaps. Private or loopback resolver IPs produce
blocked_resolver; an individual host failure becomes a per-host error.
- Canonical records come from the first configured resolver. Resolver failures (including SERVFAIL) remain in
queryError and hostError alongside any successful records; absent records are error-free.
- Accepts up to 50 hosts; port defaults to 443 and handshake timeout to 8000ms (1000โ30000ms).
- Returns negotiated protocol, cipher, leaf certificate and chain depth, SANs, issuer, validity window, days to expiry, and validation status. Invalid, expired, and self-signed certificates are reported; one host failure becomes a per-host error.
- Unparseable validity bounds retain their raw values and add findings.
daysUntilExpiry is null only when expiry cannot be parsed; a malformed start date does not erase a known expiry.
- Accepts one HTTP(S) URL; timeout defaults to 10000ms (1000โ30000ms). Follows up to ten redirects with an SSRF check at every hop; a refused target produces
blocked_target. Another redirect at the limit returns finalStatus: 0 and a transportError.
- Returns status, redirect chain, headers, security-header findings (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, cookie flags, CORS reflection), and technology detections with their triggering evidence.
- Cloudflare server banners identify a CDN; AWS ELB banners identify edge infrastructure (
other). Neither banner alone establishes WAF protection.
- Accepts a domain, IP, or CIDR;
type (auto / domain / ip) controls interpretation. Uses RDAP first, then WHOIS port 43 when needed.
- Domain results include registrar, EPP statuses, lifecycle events, nameservers, and DNSSEC; IP/CIDR results include netblock, allocation CIDRs, ASN, and country. Sparse or redacted fields stay unknown.
mode: "host" (default) looks up one IP; mode: "search" accepts an internet-wide query with optional facets and may consume Shodan query credits. Requires SHODAN_API_KEY.
- Both modes reject blank targets. Host mode accepts bare IPv4/IPv6 addresses and returns
invalid_target for other syntax before contacting Shodan; search queries are preserved verbatim.
- Returns ports, banners, software versions, hostnames, ASN, and geography from Shodan's last scan. Missing credentials produce
source_unavailable; no host data produces no_data. The server performs no port scans.
- Takes prior findings (hosts, certificates, missing headers, software versions, ports);
topic (triage / posture / coverage) selects the plan's emphasis.
- Returns markdown guidance, structured priority items, and pre-filled follow-up calls, including external NVD/OSV lookups. Runs offline and produces a defensive remediation or visibility plan.
attacksurface://surface/{domain} resource
- Takes a domain and returns an
application/json snapshot equivalent to a standard-depth attacksurface_map_domain call.
- Includes subdomain and live-host counts plus per-host TLS/HTTP posture. Caps host detail at 50 live hosts, discloses omissions, and points to
attacksurface_map_domain for the full set.
Features
Built on @cyanheads/mcp-ts-core: stdio and Streamable HTTP transports, pluggable auth (none / jwt / oauth), swappable storage (in-memory, filesystem, Supabase, Cloudflare KV/R2/D1), structured logging with optional OpenTelemetry tracing.
Attack-surface-specific:
- Passive and non-intrusive by mandate โ public records plus each target's own single published response; active scanning, exploitation, and brute-forcing are excluded from the surface, not toggled by a flag
- Keyless core โ CT subdomain enumeration, DNS, TLS, HTTP/tech, and RDAP/WHOIS all work with zero API keys; Shodan is strictly additive depth
- SSRF guard on every outbound connection โ rejects private, loopback, link-local, cloud-metadata, and reserved IPv4/IPv6 ranges before connecting (opt out for trusted internal assessment via
ATTACKSURFACE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_TARGETS)
- Multi-source aggregation with fallback chains โ CT discovery falls through crt.sh โ Certspotter โ TLS-SAN; registration falls through RDAP โ WHOIS
Agent-friendly output:
- Provenance on every result โ source labels (
source: crt.sh | certspotter | tls-san, source: rdap | whois) and per-source status so agents can assess completeness and trust
- Graceful partial failure โ multi-target and multi-source tools return per-item/per-source
error fields and operational notes instead of failing the whole call; only malformed input throws
- Discriminated, typed contracts โ typed error reasons (
source_unavailable, blocked_target, all_sources_failed) and union output (kind: domain | ip) let callers branch on data, not string parsing
- No fabricated signal โ technology detections carry their triggering evidence; absent CT/DNS/RDAP fields are reported as unknown, never inferred
Getting started
Add the following to your MCP client configuration file. Every tool except attacksurface_lookup_host works with no configuration โ the keyless core boots on an empty environment.
{
"mcpServers": {
"attack-surface-mcp-server": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "bunx",
"args": ["@cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server@latest"],
"env": {
"MCP_TRANSPORT_TYPE": "stdio",
"MCP_LOG_LEVEL": "info"
}
}
}
}
Or with npx (no Bun required):
{
"mcpServers": {
"attack-surface-mcp-server": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server@latest"],
"env": {
"MCP_TRANSPORT_TYPE": "stdio",
"MCP_LOG_LEVEL": "info"
}
}
}
}
Or with Docker:
{
"mcpServers": {
"attack-surface-mcp-server": {
"type": "stdio",
"command": "docker",
"args": ["run", "-i", "--rm", "-e", "MCP_TRANSPORT_TYPE=stdio", "ghcr.io/cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server:latest"]
}
}
}
To enable Shodan host intelligence (attacksurface_lookup_host), add SHODAN_API_KEY to the env block.
For Streamable HTTP, set the transport and start the server:
MCP_TRANSPORT_TYPE=http MCP_HTTP_PORT=3010 bun run start:http
Prerequisites
Installation
- Clone the repository:
git clone https://github.com/cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server.git
- Navigate into the directory:
cd attack-surface-mcp-server
- Install dependencies:
- Configure environment (optional):
Configuration
All variables are optional โ the server boots and delivers its keyless core with an empty environment.
| Variable | Description | Default |
|---|
SHODAN_API_KEY | Enables attacksurface_lookup_host. Absent โ that tool returns source_unavailable; every other tool keeps working. | โ |
CERTSPOTTER_API_KEY | Raises Certspotter rate limits for the CT-log subdomain fallback. Absent โ free unauthenticated tier (rate-limited but functional). | โ |
ATTACKSURFACE_DEFAULT_RESOLVERS | Comma-separated default DNS resolver IPs for attacksurface_resolve_dns. | 8.8.8.8,1.1.1.1,9.9.9.9 |
ATTACKSURFACE_HTTP_USER_AGENT | Default User-Agent for attacksurface_probe_http (overridable per call). | attack-surface-mcp-server/passive-recon (+https://github.com/cyanheads/attack-surface-mcp-server) |
ATTACKSURFACE_MAX_SUBDOMAINS | Cap on subdomains resolved during a map_domain run โ bounds fan-out cost. | 200 |
ATTACKSURFACE_RDAP_BOOTSTRAP_URL | RDAP bootstrap base URL; override for a private/mirrored RDAP. | https://rdap.org |
ATTACKSURFACE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_TARGETS | Set true to disable the SSRF guard for internal-network assessment. Leave false on any public deployment โ it is the safety boundary that keeps the server from being pointed at internal infrastructure. | false |
MCP_TRANSPORT_TYPE | Transport: stdio or http. | stdio |
MCP_HTTP_PORT | Port for HTTP server. | 3010 |
MCP_SESSION_MODE | HTTP session mode: stateless, stateful, or auto. The server declares stateless; a value set here overrides it. Ignored under stdio. | stateless |
MCP_AUTH_MODE | Auth mode: none, jwt, or oauth. | none |
MCP_LOG_LEVEL | Log level (RFC 5424). | info |
OTEL_ENABLED | Enable OpenTelemetry instrumentation. | false |
See .env.example for the full list of optional overrides.
Running the server
Local development
-
Build and run:
bun run rebuild
bun run start:stdio
bun run start:http
-
Run checks and tests:
bun run devcheck
bun run test
bun run lint:mcp
Docker
docker build -t attack-surface-mcp-server .
docker run --rm -e MCP_TRANSPORT_TYPE=http -p 3010:3010 attack-surface-mcp-server
The Dockerfile defaults to HTTP transport, stateless session mode, and logs to /var/log/attack-surface-mcp-server. OpenTelemetry peer dependencies are installed by default โ build with --build-arg OTEL_ENABLED=false to omit them.
Project structure
| Directory | Purpose |
|---|
src/index.ts | createApp() entry point โ registers tools/resources and inits the six services. |
src/config | Server-specific environment variable parsing and validation with Zod. |
src/mcp-server/tools | Tool definitions (*.tool.ts). |
src/mcp-server/resources | Resource definitions (*.resource.ts). |
src/services | Domain service integrations (ct, dns, tls, http, registration, shodan). |
src/utils | SSRF guard and input validation. |
tests/ | Unit and integration tests mirroring src/. |
Development guide
See CLAUDE.md/AGENTS.md for development guidelines and architectural rules. The short version:
- Handlers throw, framework catches โ no
try/catch in tool logic
- Use
ctx.log for request-scoped logging, ctx.state for tenant-scoped storage
- Register new tools and resources via the barrels in
src/mcp-server/*/definitions/index.ts
- Every outbound connection to a user-supplied target must pass the SSRF guard (
assertSafeDomain / assertSafeUrl / assertSafeResolverIp) before connecting
- Wrap external API calls: validate raw โ normalize to domain type โ return output schema; never fabricate missing fields
Contributing
Issues are welcome. Run checks and tests before submitting:
bun run devcheck
bun run test
License
Apache-2.0 โ see LICENSE for details.