mcp-k8s-ephemeral-job
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Public OSS MCP server (Go, MIT) that spawns an ephemeral Kubernetes Job/pod from a
caller-chosen image, runs a command inside it, returns exit_code / stdout / artifacts, and
deletes the pod. The server builds the pod manifest in code — the caller passes parameters
only, never raw YAML.
It is the "operating room" counterpart to mcp-exec (the
"scalpel"): where mcp-exec runs a single Python file in a locked-down, network-less sandbox in
milliseconds, this one spins up a full pod with the toolchain/image you choose, controlled
network (clone repos, pull deps), long tasks and file artifacts out. They complement each
other.
Works over three transports — stdio / HTTP / SSE — with an identical tool set everywhere
(official modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk).
run_job — run and wait
Input: { image (required), command (required), files?, env?, limits?, timeout_s?, workdir?, clone? }
Output: { exit_code, stdout, stderr, duration_ms, status, artifacts, truncated }
status is one of succeeded / failed / timeout / error. A non-zero exit_code or a
timeout is a normal result, not a tool error. Only invalid input (empty image/command,
image not in the allowlist, bad file path) is a tool-call error.
stdout carries the container's combined stdout+stderr — Kubernetes merges the two streams in
pod logs. stderr is reserved and always empty, so adding stream separation later stays
backward-compatible.
- Artifacts (files from the working directory) come back inline (base64) under a size cap.
Exceeding a cap never loses data silently: the matching
truncated flag is set.
- The manifest is built deterministically by the server — no raw YAML from the caller.
submit_job / fetch_job — run in the background
submit_job takes the same arguments as run_job but returns a job_token immediately;
fetch_job collects the result later. This is what lets an agent start a long job (a full test
battery, a build) and keep working instead of idling inside one synchronous call for its whole
wall-clock time.
fetch_job returns status=running while the job is in flight; pass wait_s (≤120) to
long-poll instead of hammering. It answers as soon as the job is done rather than sitting out the
full wait.
- Results are retained for 60 minutes and can be fetched more than once.
- Arguments are validated at submit time, so a bad image fails the submit while the caller can
still fix it.
- Handles live in memory (the server is single-replica by design): a restart drops pending tokens
and the caller simply resubmits.
Cloning a repository
With clone: { repo_url, ref, subdir? } an init container checks the repo out into the working
directory before the command runs. The caller never handles credentials: the server holds a
secret with one token per git host, mounts it only on the cloner, and the token is masked in
.git/config afterwards — the main container never sees it. The clone field is accepted only when
the operator has configured MCP_K8S_CLONE_IMAGE + MCP_K8S_CLONE_SECRET.
Security model (invariants)
Per run: a fresh ephemeral pod, deleted afterwards (success / failure / timeout). The server's
RBAC is namespace-scoped (Role/RoleBinding, never ClusterRole) — create/delete jobs,pods
plus pods/log, pods/exec in one namespace. Spawned pods run with cap-drop=ALL,
no-privilege-escalation, seccomp RuntimeDefault. The blast radius is that one namespace:
LimitRange (per-pod default+max) + ResourceQuota (namespace ceiling) + wall-clock timeout
(→ kill) + TTL/owner-reference GC + a concurrency cap. Images must pass a strict allowlist
(MCP_K8S_ALLOWED_IMAGES; empty = nothing runs). Caller data (command / files / output /
artifacts) is never persisted and never logged in full — only metadata.
run_job is the most powerful surface there is (it creates pods). When embedding it in an agent,
gate it behind that agent's tool-policy (trusted roles only).
Network note: the pod's network is not disabled (it's needed to clone repos / pull deps).
Egress is controlled by a namespace NetworkPolicy (allowlist) as a deployment concern, not a
right baked into the code. The invariant is ephemerality + deletion, not the absence of network.
Resources: the server's MCP_K8S_DEFAULT_CPU/MEMORY are pod requests (the scheduler's
reservation). Limits are set only when the caller passes limits; otherwise the ceiling comes from
the namespace LimitRange. Passing limits.memory also raises the memory request to match, since
memory is incompressible and the pod must land on a node that actually has it.
Run
Published in the MCP Registry as
io.github.inhuman/mcp-k8s-ephemeral-job; the image is on Docker Hub as
idconstruct/mcp-k8s-ephemeral-job.
docker run --rm -i \
-v "$HOME/.kube:/kube:ro" \
-e MCP_K8S_KUBECONFIG=/kube/config \
-e MCP_K8S_NAMESPACE=ephemeral-dev \
-e MCP_K8S_ALLOWED_IMAGES=busybox:1.36,python:3.12-slim \
idconstruct/mcp-k8s-ephemeral-job:latest
From source, against a dev cluster, over stdio:
go build -o mcp-k8s-ephemeral-job ./cmd/mcp-k8s-ephemeral-job
export MCP_K8S_KUBECONFIG=$HOME/.kube/config
export MCP_K8S_NAMESPACE=ephemeral-dev
export MCP_K8S_ALLOWED_IMAGES=busybox:1.36,python:3.12-slim
./mcp-k8s-ephemeral-job
In production the server runs in-cluster as a Deployment with its own ServiceAccount +
Role/RoleBinding on the ephemeral namespace + ResourceQuota/LimitRange (+ optional egress
NetworkPolicy), usually on the http transport.
Example call (run_job)
{
"image": "python:3.12-slim",
"command": ["python", "gen.py"],
"files": [{ "path": "gen.py", "content_b64": "<base64 of a script writing out.png>" }],
"limits": { "cpu": "500m", "memory": "256Mi" },
"timeout_s": 30
}
Returns exit_code, captured output, and out.png inline in artifacts. Afterwards the pod is
gone (kubectl get jobs,pods -n $NS is empty).
Optional auth (HTTP/SSE)
Set MCP_K8S_AUTH_TOKEN to require every HTTP/SSE request to carry a matching X-MCP-AUTH header
(constant-time compare; 401 otherwise). Empty token disables it. Not applicable to stdio.
Configuration
| Env var | Purpose | Default |
|---|
MCP_K8S_TRANSPORT | stdio | http | sse | stdio |
MCP_K8S_ADDR | listen address for http/sse | :8080 |
MCP_K8S_NAMESPACE | namespace where ephemeral pods are spawned | mcp-ephemeral |
MCP_K8S_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_S | default wall-clock timeout (s) | 60 |
MCP_K8S_MAX_TIMEOUT_S | timeout ceiling (s) | 600 |
MCP_K8S_MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES | combined stdout+stderr cap | 1048576 |
MCP_K8S_MAX_ARTIFACT_BYTES | total artifacts size cap | 10485760 |
MCP_K8S_DEFAULT_CPU | pod CPU request (scheduling reservation; limits come from the caller's limits or the namespace LimitRange) | 1 |
MCP_K8S_DEFAULT_MEMORY | pod memory request (see above) | 512Mi |
MCP_K8S_MAX_CONCURRENT | max concurrent ephemeral pods (over → queue/error) | 10 |
MCP_K8S_ALLOWED_IMAGES | strict image allowlist (CSV); empty = deny everything | `` |
MCP_K8S_SIDECAR_IMAGE | helper sidecar image for artifact collection (pinned) | busybox:1.36 |
MCP_K8S_CLONE_IMAGE | image with git for the clone init container; empty = clone unavailable | `` |
MCP_K8S_CLONE_SECRET | secret holding one token per git host (key = host); mounted only on the cloner | `` |
MCP_K8S_CACHE_PVC | existing PVC mounted into every job pod as a shared cache; empty = no cache | `` |
MCP_K8S_CACHE_MOUNT_PATH | where the cache PVC is mounted, e.g. /go/pkg/mod | `` |
MCP_K8S_JOB_EXTRA_ENV | JSON object {"KEY":"value"} added to every job pod; caller keys win | `` |
MCP_K8S_KUBECONFIG | path to kubeconfig; empty = in-cluster | `` |
MCP_K8S_AUTH_TOKEN | if set, http/sse require X-MCP-AUTH header (constant-time); empty = off | `` |
Both cache variables must be set together for the cache to mount. The PVC itself is provisioned
out-of-band (helm/manifest); the server only references it by name and fails fast at startup if it
is missing.
Not implemented
PVC / object-storage delivery for artifacts too large to inline, multi-cluster support, and proxying
other MCP servers into the pod.
License
MIT.