The Proxmox MCP server lets you hand the keys to VE, PBS, PMG, and PDM operations. Each action is planned, audited, and undoable, enabling controlled, auditable model-context-driven management for Proxmox environments.

🛠️ Key Features

MCP for Proxmox: VE, PBS, PMG, PDM operations
Planned, auditable workflows with undo capability
Self-hosted, multi-cluster ready
Integrates with AI agents and model-context protocols
Broad Proxmox ecosystem support (PVE, PBS, Proxmox Backup, MDM)

🚀 Use Cases

Managed deployments in homelabs and small clusters
Agent-led orchestration with audit trails
Model-context driven operations for Proxmox environments
Infrastructure automation with versioned, reversible actions

⚡ Developer Benefits

Clear MCP structure for Proxmox components
Rich topic coverage: a2a, api, devops, llm-tools
Readme excerpt provides quick branding and CI visibility
Open-source repository patterns for easy contribution

⚠️ Limitations

Source data emphasizes planning and undoability; actual rollback semantics depend on implementation
Details about specific APIs or command surfaces are not enumerated
Documentation breadth may vary with repository updates

OpenSSF Scorecard LobeHub — grade, tools, prompts

Enter the ludus ↗ · Quickstart · Setup · Trust layer · Demo · Tools · Install · Security · Docs

Named for Proximo, the lanista of Gladiator. The story is the design, joint for joint.

He armed his fighter with exactly what he needed, never more. He answered for every move in the arena. A lanista, not a jailer. The Spaniard earns his name by conduct, on the record, and the helmet comes off: truth said plainly, at cost. His last act opened the cages, holding the wooden sword of his own freedom. A tool should hope to end that well.

"Win the crowd and you will win your freedom."

The others make you pick: a read-only toy, or full keys and pray. Proximo won't. Every dangerous move is planned: see the blast radius first. Every move is proven: a tamper-evident record. And undoable wherever the platform gives us a primitive: a config change hands back the exact prior state, and a risky in-container command can take a snapshot first, and refuses to run if it can't.

Trust built into the substrate, not bolted on after. Hand an AI agent the keys; keep the receipts.

Sovereign and agent-agnostic. Your metal, your token, a ledger you own. No cloud, no phone-home, no standing server unless you opt in.

What it does

Ask, in plain English: "why is ct 105 thrashing?" An AI agent pulls node and guest status, tails the logs, and runs a diagnostic inside the container to find out.

If there's a fix, it shows you the plan before it touches anything. Takes a snapshot first if you ask it to, and won't run if it can't. Applies. Hands you a signed receipt of exactly what changed.

That's the product: a hypervisor an AI can operate without being able to wreck it.

Read-only by default. No mutation runs on the first call: it returns its blast radius as a plan for you to see first. A tamper-evident receipt for every change.

The comparison isn't Proximo vs. the GUI. It's Proximo vs. handing an LLM your root token and hoping.

Don't take our word for any of it. Verify it yourself.

Verify in 60 seconds: three receipts, no trust required

bash

# 1. The tool count is real. Ask the server itself, cold (=> 906).
#    (in a clone of this repo, after `uv sync`)
uv run python -c "import asyncio; from proximo import server; \
print(len(asyncio.run(server.mcp.list_tools())))"

# 2. The container image is what the repo built. Sigstore provenance (exit 0 = verified):
gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/john-broadway/proximo:latest --owner john-broadway

# 3. The security posture is graded by a third party, not by us:
#    https://scorecard.dev/viewer/?uri=github.com/john-broadway/proximo

The rest is in VERIFY.md: forge a ledger byte and watch verify() refuse, grep the outbound surface for phone-home (there is none). These checks work on any tool, from any vendor. Demand them everywhere.

Proximo architecture: MCP clients (stdio and Streamable HTTP), A2A, and HTTP/OpenAPI clients all land on one governed spine, pass the six-pillar trust spine (PLAN, PROVE, UNDO, DIAGNOSE standing by default; CONSENT and CONTAIN yours to raise), sit on the Proxmox-enforced token floor, and reach four products — PVE, PBS, PMG, PDM

_{Every transport enters one governed dispatch and crosses the same trust spine; the token floor beneath it all is enforced by Proxmox itself.
Watch it hold in the Demo.}

Quickstart

jsonc

// your MCP client config (Claude Desktop / Claude Code / Cursor / …)
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "proximo": {
      "command": "uvx",
      "args": ["proximo-proxmox"],
      "timeout": 60,                                     // startup is ~3.5s; a 3s client default drops the server silently
      "env": {
        "PROXIMO_API_BASE_URL": "https://your-pve:8006/api2/json",
        "PROXIMO_NODE": "your-node",
        "PROXIMO_TOKEN_PATH": "/path/to/token-file"   // USER@REALM!TOKENID=SECRET, by reference, never inlined
      }
    }
  }
}

Claude Code, one line:

bash

claude mcp add proximo --env PROXIMO_API_BASE_URL=https://your-pve:8006/api2/json \
  --env PROXIMO_NODE=your-node --env PROXIMO_TOKEN_PATH=/path/to/token-file -- uvx proximo-proxmox

Or install with one click:

_{Both prompt for the token file path; the secret never lands in client config. No token yet? uvx proximo-proxmox mint prints the least-privilege runbook.}

Then preflight what your token can actually do (read-only):

code

uvx proximo-proxmox doctor

Start with a read-only token. Proximo is useful long before you grant it write. Full token-first walkthrough: docs/SETUP.md · more install paths: Install & run.

Why Proximo exists

The Proxmox MCP landscape is split. API-based servers manage nodes and VMs but structurally cannot run a command inside an LXC: the REST API has no exec endpoint. SSH-based servers can, through broad shell access with little scoping.

Proximo builds the principled whole. Both halves, one audited surface, least-privilege. Trust by construction:

	Read-only inspector	Full-access executor	Proximo
Can mutate	no, that's the safety	yes	yes, plan recorded first, then `confirm=true`
Preview before a change	n/a	rarely	default: blast radius + live state, every mutation
Record of what happened	no	app logs, editable	keyed hash-chained ledger, tamper-evident, on by default
Undo	n/a	rare	snapshot-first, wherever the platform can snapshot
Command inside an LXC	no	broad SSH	opt-in, fail-closed CTID allowlist
Products covered	usually PVE	usually PVE	PVE + PBS + PMG + PDM, one audited plane
Verify the artifact you run	varies	varies	signed image · PyPI provenance · SBOM · Scorecard

(The archetype columns describe the split above, not any specific project. There is no official Proxmox MCP; Proximo is a community project, standing on its own.)

The trust layer: what makes Proximo different

The spine has six pillars. Four stand by default:

Control	What it does
PLAN	Every mutation first returns a recorded preview: the exact change, live state, blast radius, an advisory risk rating. Nothing mutates without its plan recorded; one `confirm=true` call records and performs.
PROVE	Keyed (HMAC-SHA256), hash-chained audit ledger; `audit_verify` catches edits, reordering, insertion. Pin the head off-box (`expected_head`) to catch truncation too: that's the strong guarantee, and it's opt-in.
UNDO	Where the platform has a primitive: a config change returns its `prior_config` automatically (revert with `pve_guest_config_revert`), `ct_exec`/`ct_psql` take `snapshot=true` for an auto-snapshot and then fail closed (if the snapshot can't be taken the command does not run) and `pve_rollback` restores a guest snapshot. The exec snapshot is per call, not automatic. Planes with no snapshot primitive (firewall/SDN/ACL) have no rollback, said plainly.
DIAGNOSE	Read-only evidence battery + node health → advisory flags that surface incompleteness too, so an empty list never reads as a false clean bill.

Two are yours to raise, by design, off until their state paths exist, because both are only worth having if those paths sit outside the agent's reach. A pillar Proximo raised for you would be a pillar the agent could lower for itself:

Pillar (off until configured)	What it holds
CONSENT	Independent, out-of-band approval per plan: an agent (compromised, confused, or steered by injected text) cannot confirm its own mutation. Grants live in a directory only you write (`PROXIMO_CONSENT_DIR`), expire on a TTL, and never clear a taint.
CONTAIN	The kill-switch: one trip file halts every mutation immediately, mid-incident, no redeploy and no restart. Checked fresh on every mutation; fails closed. Put the trip path where only you can write (`PROXIMO_CONTAIN_TRIP_PATH`).

proximo doctor reports the spine: which pillars stand, which sockets are empty, and exactly how to fill them. Five more controls ship off until configured: an arm-LEASE, an arm-time SCOPE, a FORBID/RATE ENVELOPE, TAINT (the prompt-injection mitigation), and PRINCIPAL (who-asked attribution). What each one defends against: SECURITY.md.

Honesty note (load-bearing): risk ratings are an advisory heuristic, not a sandbox — LOW means "no state change," not "safe," and the absence of a HIGH flag is not a safety signal. Review every change yourself. The floor beneath it all is the token you mint: Proxmox RBAC holds even if Proximo's process is fully compromised — a stronger guarantee than anything Proximo's own code provides. Scope it to exactly what you mean to grant: SECURITY.md.

Hold any tool to this, including this one: The Keys Test. Ten questions to ask before you hand an AI agent real infrastructure. Proximo's own scorecard published, partials included.

Demo

The record defends itself:

Hand-the-keys demo: three agent moves land in the keyed hash-chained ledger and audit_verify answers ok=True keyed=True; an in-place edit breaks the chain at the exact line (ok=False); a truncation that fools the forward walk is caught by the pinned head

_{Three agent moves land in the keyed ledger; one entry gets edited in place; audit_verify() breaks at the exact line, ok=False; the truncation a forward walk would miss is caught against the pinned head. Real code, real crypto, nothing staged, recorded on 0.30.0.
Run it yourself anywhere: scripts/demo/hand_the_keys.py (needs only the pip package) · against your own host: --live · verify by hand: VERIFY.md.}

Surfaces & tools: one control plane

Surface	Backend	For
Proxmox VE	REST API + scoped token	node/guest lifecycle, storage, SDN, identity, HA, firewall
Proxmox Backup Server	REST API + scoped token	datastores, namespaces, snapshots, sync, GC, verify, tape
Proxmox Mail Gateway	Ticket auth	mail flow, quarantine, filtering rules, domains, services
Proxmox Datacenter Manager	API token	federated fleet: reads plus governed control (power/snapshot/migrate, dry-run-first)
Container exec	`ssh` → `pct exec`	run-command-in-container, `psql`, log tailing: what the API structurally can't do

Those backends are deliberately boring. Anyone can call them. The product is the trust layer over them.

906 tools is an estate, not a starting point, and you only carry the part you use. Since 0.30 the floor IS the default: a bare install serves the search-and-call facade (~1,740 tokens of context) with every tool this box serves still callable; one domain like pve.guests runs ~9,781, a whole plane ~101,398, PROXIMO_TOOLSETS=catalog the classic auto-scoped catalog. The estate is 906. The doorway is yours to size. Coverage and context stopped being the same number.

Where an operator actually starts:

You want to…	Start with	Worth knowing
See the whole cluster at once	`pve_cluster_resources`, `pve_list_guests`	one call, every node
Find out why a container is sick	`ct_diagnose`, `ct_logs`, `pve_guest_status`	read-only evidence battery
Preflight a token / config	`proximo doctor` (CLI) or `pve_doctor`, `pve_overbroad_grants`	run this before wiring an agent
Power / lifecycle	`pve_guest_power`	returns a PLAN first; nothing moves without `confirm=true`
Snapshot before touching anything	`pve_snapshot_create`, `pve_rollback`	UNDO's foundation
Check backups are actually fresh	`pve_backup_freshness`, `pbs_snapshots_list`	walks real archives; "task OK" is never evidence
Run a command in a container	`ct_exec`	opt-in (`PROXIMO_ENABLE_EXEC=1`), fail-closed allowlist
Trace / release mail	`pmg_tracker_list`, `pmg_quarantine_spam`	full PMG plane behind it
Operate the federated fleet	`pdm_resources_list`, `pdm_pve_lxc_list`	governed control, dry-run-first
Prove the record wasn't touched	`audit_verify`	registered on every surface, always

Every tool with typed inputs: docs/TOOLS.md · sizing the surface to your model: docs/SETUP.md.

Install & run

📦 0.37.0: on PyPI, GitHub, and GHCR (signed multi-arch image).

New in 0.37.0 (a journal witness, and a pin that travels). The audit anchor gains a journal sink: the same write-only witness as syslog with nothing to stand up, appending each verified head to systemd's journal and inheriting its retention and sealing. Read the trail with journalctl -t proximo-anchor -o json. Separately, a pinned TLS bundle now means the same thing on every interpreter. Python 3.13 quietly changed the default verification policy, which made one pinned file verify on one Python and fail on the next. Pin your node's certificate rather than your cluster CA: Proxmox issues that CA without a keyUsage extension, and a strict verifier is right to refuse it.

Recent: 0.35.0 gave PBS, PMG and PDM task lists the classified envelope, on each plane's own live-probed vocabulary. See SECURITY.md for what each control honestly holds.

Proximo runs on your machine, on demand. No daemon, no open port.

code

uvx proximo-proxmox            # zero-install run (PyPI package: proximo-proxmox; command stays `proximo`)
# or: pip install proximo-proxmox            the MCP core
# or: pip install "proximo-proxmox[a2a]"     + the optional A2A face
# or: pip install "proximo-proxmox[http]"    + the optional HTTP/OpenAPI face
# or: pip install "proximo-proxmox[mcp-http]" + the optional MCP-over-streamable-HTTP face
# or, from source:  git clone https://github.com/john-broadway/proximo.git && cd proximo && uv pip install -e .

Wire it into your MCP client as the command proximo, with the PROXIMO_* env vars; see packaging/proximo.env.example.

Docker (GHCR): docker run -i --rm … ghcr.io/john-broadway/proximo:latest. Multi-arch, SBOM, sigstore-signed provenance (gh attestation verify oci://ghcr.io/john-broadway/proximo --owner john-broadway). Mirrored to Docker Hub (docker.io/jebroadway/proximo, identical digest); GHCR stays the signed primary.

Safe by default: API-only out of the box. The two near-root edges are opt-in and say so loudly: LXC exec (PROXIMO_ENABLE_EXEC=1, near-root on the host) and the qemu-guest-agent edge (PROXIMO_ENABLE_AGENT=1, near-root in a guest). Each is scoped by its own fail-closed allowlist.

Smallest footprint by design: you don't have to load the whole estate: what a box serves is autoscoped to what it configures. A PBS-only box gets that plane's tools plus the always-on audit trail; PROXIMO_SURFACES=pve,exec scopes the searchable catalog to that pair (316 tools); a typo'd surface refuses startup rather than serving a surprise. Surfaces choose which planes are searchable, never how many schemas load; the doorway stays the default unless you name another with PROXIMO_TOOLSETS. Scoping is context hygiene, not an authorization control: it changes what is advertised, never what a token is allowed to do. The default doorway (dynamic mode) keeps four search-and-call tools resident (proximo_read runs read-only tools with an enforced readOnlyHint; proximo_call runs anything) plus the two ledger tools (audit_verify proves the chain, audit_entries reads who did what) and proximo_recall while estate memory is on (the default; PROXIMO_MEMORY=0 opts out), with the full catalog reachable by name. That narrowing is guarded at every entry point (0.27.0 closed a path where an opt-in flag could silently cut the registry to 5 tools), and the gates don't shrink with the doorway: PLAN and PROVE apply however small the visible surface gets.

The network faces (experimental, opt-in): proximo-a2a speaks Agent2Agent. proximo-http serves plain HTTP + generated /openapi.json for no-code clients. proximo-mcp-http serves MCP itself over Streamable HTTP (the SDK's native transport) for networked MCP clients: no third-party stdio→HTTP bridge, so the perimeter stays Proximo's.

All three serve the full surface through the same spine as MCP. No second code path; trust spine and token scope inherited. Fail-closed perimeter: loopback, bearer-token required off-localhost, DNS-rebind and CSRF defended. Details: SECURITY.md.

At scale

One container is the demo. A cluster is the point.

The whole cluster in one call. pve_cluster_resources: every VM, node, storage pool, SDN object.
One tamper-evident record across every node. "Show me every state-changing action this month, and prove the log wasn't touched" becomes a query you can actually answer. No human at the CLI walks away with that.
Where the time comes back. On one node a senior at the CLI is faster, and that's fine. Across a dozen nodes and hundreds of guests, a bounded, audited agent earns its keep.

Many boxes, one Proximo: register remotes in a TOML file (secrets by reference, never inlined), point PROXIMO_TARGETS at it, aim any tool with proximo_target="edge-pve". The target travels with the call. PLAN and EXECUTE hit the same box, the ledger records which, cross-plane calls error. Config shape: packaging/targets.example.toml.

Status: the arena record

🩸 0.37.0: a second witness, and a pin that travels. The audit anchor gains a journal sink: the write-only witness for a systemd box, with no collector to stand up and a field-injection defence that keeps hostile values intact instead of scrubbing them. And a pinned TLS bundle now anchors on every interpreter, after Python 3.13 changed the default verification policy and left one pinned file verifying on one Python and failing on the next. Pin the node certificate, not the cluster CA: Proxmox issues that CA without keyUsage.

Every release before it (every pillar, every redteam, every fix) lives in CHANGELOG.md.

The numbers, honestly: 906 MCP tools, proved in two deliberate layers. 11,000+ in-process tests (ruff + pyright clean) pin every tool's shape. A separate live-smoke harness drives real Proxmox hardware: a 3-node PVE 9.2 cluster, PBS 4.2, PMG 9.1, PDM 1.1.4, a real cross-datacenter move. The two are kept apart on purpose: passing shape tests never gets to masquerade as "works on a real host." And this workspace administers its own Proxmox estate through Proximo daily (dogfood). The blast-radius engine carries the destructive surface: across eleven op-classes it names the specific guests, nodes, principals, or disks at risk. Nothing falls back to a bare confirm.

Proven live (not mocks): the trust spine end-to-end; identity/storage/SDN/firewall/HA create→read→delete with the ledger verified throughout; offline + online live-migration and HA fencing (softdog) on a real 3-node cluster; full PBS/PMG/PDM planes including a real cross-datacenter move. Not yet proven — said plainly: hardware-watchdog fencing (needs physical iTCO/IPMI) and behavior at production scale. The unrecoverable ops (SDN apply, etc.) are deliberately never fired live: proven by plan, held back by design, not a gap. Per-surface detail: CHANGELOG.md.

Documentation

Document	What it answers
Setup	Token-first walkthrough: mint a least-privilege token, verify it, widen deliberately.
Verify	Every trust claim paired with the command that proves it. Run them cold.
Security	The two-deployment trust model, all ten controls, what each honestly holds, reporting.
Threat model	What Proximo defends against, what it doesn't, where the boundaries sit.
Tools	All 906 tools, grouped by surface, typed inputs.
Agents	The page written for the agent itself: Proximo's sharp edges, stated first.
Known issues	What's broken or odd right now, said plainly.
Contributing	Dev setup, the CI gates, what a PR is expected to keep intact.
Changelog	Every release, every redteam, every fix: the full build history.

License

Apache-2.0, chosen for the patent grant that suits infrastructure tooling. Full text in LICENSE.

Credits

Built by John Broadway with Claude and Maude: a human-AI partnership, and the first thing we made on this box to give away to the world. Claude Opus 4.8 built the trust pillars and the original tool surface and has carried the work since; Claude Fable 5 ran the 101-agent release audit and the first publish. Every commit carries its co-author trailer.

"Are you not entertained?" Stars, issues, and sparring partners welcome. Strength and honor. ⚔️

Proximo — the Proxmox MCP you can hand the keys