Administers Linux via typed, approval-gated actions with an Ed25519-signed audit trail.
io.github.lacs-project/sysknife MCP Server
The io.github.lacs-project/sysknife MCP server administers Linux through typed actions that are gated by explicit approval. It uses an Ed25519-signed audit trail to record the actions taken, providing a verifiable history of administrative activity.
๐ ๏ธ Key Features
Administers Linux
Typed, approval-gated administrative actions
Ed25519-signed audit trail
๐ Use Cases
Managing Linux administrative operations that require approval
Tracking administrative changes with a cryptographically signed audit record
โก Developer Benefits
Clear action typing for administrative workflows
Approval gating to control execution of Linux operations
Verifiable audit logs via Ed25519 signatures
โ ๏ธ Limitations
Server details available only at the high level: no tool list, supported commands, or integration specifics were provided
Illustrative reproduction of the Claude Code MCP flow โ same flow works in Cursor and Codex CLI. Looking for the standalone CLI? See the CLI guide.
Describe what you want in plain language. Review a typed plan with risk
levels. Approve explicitly. Watch it execute with live output. Atomic-host
changes (rpm-ostree) roll back automatically on failure. Every action is
Ed25519-signed and audited.
The AI never supplies a command. Every action is a typed operation with a
formal risk level, and the daemon builds the command line itself from the
action's own definition โ some actions do run through sh -c, but the shell
fragment is constructed by SysKnife, never by the model. The AI cannot touch
your system directly. A privileged daemon executes only what you approve, writes
a tamper-evident Ed25519-signed audit chain, and rolls back atomic-host
(rpm-ostree) changes automatically on failure.
Why typed actions and not a guarded shell? Red-team research (GuardFall)
found that 10 of 11 AI agents bypass raw-string shell guards โ an allowlist
or regex is filtering a language rich enough to hide intent. SysKnife removes
the shell string entirely: the model emits
typed actions, and a
public-key-verifiable audit chain records every one.
Install
The fastest path is the setup wizard. It installs the daemon and wires
SysKnife into your AI IDE โ Claude Code, Cursor, or Codex CLI โ so you can
plan and execute from chat.
sh
npx sysknife-setup
Needs Node 18 or newer. On Ubuntu 22.04 apt install nodejs gives Node 12,
which is too old; the installer says so and how to get a current Node. No Rust
toolchain and no compile: it downloads verified prebuilt binaries.
What this does:
Downloads the prebuilt sysknife + sysknife-daemon binaries for your
architecture (x86_64 / aarch64) from GitHub Releases, SHA-256-verifies
each against the release checksum file โ a mismatch aborts the install โ and
places them in ~/.local/bin (no sudo). Pass --no-binary to skip the
download and build from source instead.
Asks for your LLM provider, key, and model โ OpenAI / Anthropic / Gemini
/ Ollama / Groq / DeepSeek / Mistral / xAI (Ollama needs no key). The key
prompt is skipped when the matching env var is already set.
Asks which AI integration to wire up (or pick --claude / --cursor /
--codex / --all) and your daemon target(s) โ socket, plus an optional
vsock token for a remote VM.
Writes the integration-specific MCP config (merging into any existing
file, never clobbering) so the next chat session sees the sysknife_* tools โ
sysknife_plan, sysknife_execute, sysknife_history, sysknife_doctor,
sysknife_audit_verify โ as first-class tools.
Installs and starts the daemon as a service (last step) โ a systemd
user service by default (no sudo; kept alive across logout via linger).
That service runs as you, so read-only actions work but mutating ones do
not: installing packages or restarting services needs the system-level
service, whose sudoers grants belong to the sysknife system user. Pick the
system service on any host where you intend to change something, and pass
--daemon-mode=system|user|skip to choose without a prompt. --daemon-mode=system
does not install the system service from the wizard โ it needs root-owned
sudoers, polkit and helper policy that sudo make install owns โ so it prints
the exact sequence and reports the daemon as not yet installed.
To verify the download against a checksum list you trust independently of the
release, set SYSKNIFE_PINNED_SHA256SUMS=/path/to/sums; see
SECURITY.md.
Client
Files written
Claude Code
.mcp.json + .claude/hookify.*.local.md
Cursor
.cursor/mcp.json + .cursor/rules/sysknife.mdc
Codex CLI
~/.codex/config.toml (appended) + AGENTS.md
Then in your chat: ask for what you want and review the plan with risk pills.
Approve each transaction with sysknife approve <transaction-id> in a
terminal, return the one-time receipts, and watch it execute. The daemon, not
the prompt, enforces the receipt boundary.
Prefer the standalone CLI? Same engine, no IDE โ see the
CLI guide for sysknife "...", --dry-run, --json,
approval prompts, and audit-log inspection.
Manual install โ Ubuntu 20.04+
Needs Rust stable and a C compiler (build-essential): the TLS and SQLite
dependencies build native code, so a rustup-only machine stops at
error: linker cc not found. cmake is not required. Budget 7 to 12
minutes for the ~400-crate build (6m56s on Ubuntu 24.04, 11m43s on 22.04).
sh
sudo apt-get install -y build-essential
git clone https://github.com/lacs-project/sysknife
cd sysknife
make build # builds sysknife (CLI) + sysknife-daemonsudo make install # installs both; daemon runs as a system servicesudo systemctl enable --now sysknife-daemon
# Join the socket group and one role group, or every request is refused with# "Permission denied" before any role check runs: /run/sysknife is 0750# sysknife:sysknife, and a sudo admin is not in that group automatically.# Role groups: sysknife-observer (read-only), sysknife-dev (medium risk),# sysknife-admin (high risk). Members of wheel are treated as admin.sudo usermod -aG sysknife,sysknife-admin "$USER"
newgrp sysknife # or log out and back in# Then wire your IDE โ --no-binary skips the download since you just built them# (--daemon-mode=skip: make install already set the service up)
npx sysknife-setup --no-binary --daemon-mode=skip
Ubuntu 24.04 is validated with 65/65 stories on a live VM. Ubuntu 22.04 and
26.04 have passed bootstrap and smoke tests but not the full story suite.
Fedora Atomic is the rpm-ostree target; record a current Silverblue 44 VM run
before treating a release as current-validated. Plain Fedora Workstation and
Server remain experimental until the dnf action family ships. See the
distro support matrix for evidence and scope.
Dry run โ plan only, nothing executes
sh
# Requires the sysknife binary (see manual install above, or `npx sysknife-setup`).# Plans only: no daemon, no approval, no execution.export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...
sysknife --dry-run "show disk usage and list services that ate cpu in the last hour"
Prefer the terminal? The CLI is a first-class path
Same engine, no IDE and no MCP client โ plain language to a typed plan to live
execution, straight from your shell, with --dry-run, --json, --yes up to a
risk ceiling, and sysknife audit verify. This is a fully supported way to run
SysKnife, not an afterthought. See the CLI guide.
sysknife CLI โ plan, approve, and execute in the terminal
Also: a desktop GUI โ a distant third option. An experimental Tauri
desktop app (sysknife-shell) wraps the same plan โ approve โ execute loop in
a window. It is the least frequently maintained surface, well behind the MCP
integration and the CLI, so reach for it only if you specifically want a
graphical approval flow.
How it works
code
sysknife-brain โ sysknife-shell โ sysknife-daemon
(planner) (approval gate) (executor)
talks to LLM shows the plan, only privileged
never to OS takes y/n process; signs
every action
You type a natural-language request.
The brain proposes a plan โ each step is a typed action with
a risk level (Low ยท Medium ยท High).
The shell shows the plan with previews, side-effects, and rollback
metadata.
You approve each step explicitly (or set --yes up to a risk ceiling).
The daemon executes, streams live output, rolls back automatically on
high-risk failure.
Every execution is logged to a hash-chained SQLite or Postgres audit
trail you can verify with sysknife audit verify.
The brain proposes; only the daemon is privileged. The daemon enforces
policy, executes typed actions, writes the signed chain, and triggers
atomic-host rollback (rpm-ostree) on failure. The trust boundary is
mechanical: no shell strings cross the wire.
Why not just X?
Tool
The gap
Open Interpreter
Runs arbitrary Python/Shell. No formal risk model. No audit chain.
Goose / Continue
General-purpose. Ad-hoc confirmation, not typed risk levels.
Claude Computer Use
Uncontrolled desktop automation, not system administration.
Ansible
YAML written in advance. Not conversational. No risk classification.
shell-gpt / Copilot
Suggests raw shell commands. You still run raw shell.
AIShell-Gate
Closest peer, but proprietary and closed; audit is symmetric HMAC (the verifier holds the signing secret, so a proof convinces no one else). No rollback.
Manual
No audit trail. No rollback. One typo = lost work.
SysKnife is different by construction: typed actions, an Ed25519-signed audit
chain, explicit approval gate, automatic rollback for atomic-host (rpm-ostree)
changes, polkit-mediated privilege boundary. The AI never holds a shell. See the
full SysKnife vs. alternatives breakdown (AIShell-Gate,
gate-oc-audit, MCP gateways, generic mcp-shell).
Status
The trust chain is built, tested, and shipping. Multi-distro is the active
milestone.
SysKnife implements the Model Context Protocol
and exposes approval-gated planning and execution tools. sysknife_plan
returns a daemon-issued transaction ID for each step. After reviewing the
plan, the user runs sysknife approve <transaction-id> in a real terminal and
gives the one-time receipt to the agent. sysknife_execute rejects missing,
expired, mismatched, or replayed receipts. The MCP server cannot mint approval
receipts itself.
Use the setup wizard (above) to wire it into Claude Code, Cursor, or Codex CLI.
All config files that may contain API keys are created with chmod 0600.
โ Ubuntu 24.04 โ 65/65 stories validated on a live VM (gpt-4.1)
โ Ubuntu 22.04 / 26.04 โ VM tooling complete; smoke tests pass on all three LTSes
๐ Telegram inline-button approvals
๐ sysknife audit export (CEF / NDJSON for SIEM ingest)
๐ Fleet plan/execute (one plan, N targets, parallel approval)
Protocol
SysKnife is the reference implementation of the LACS (Linux Agent Control
Standard) protocol โ typed actions, risk classification, approval gates,
audit requirements. The spec is CC0 (public domain):
Other implementations for other distros and languages are explicitly
encouraged.
Contributing
We want help. Multi-distro is the highest-impact area to plug into right
now โ see docs/distro-support.md for the
roadmap matrix and CONTRIBUTING.md for the workflow.
Issues labelled
good first issue
are scoped with clear acceptance criteria.
Where the privileged daemon listens: a unix:// path, a vsock:// target, or a bare path. Defaults to wherever the daemon bound, so it is only needed for a non-default install or a remote VM.