Stateful Windows RPC attack-surface research for AI agents: 22 tools on NtObjectManager.
This MCP server provides access to stateful Windows RPC attack-surface research for AI agents, centered on NtObjectManager. The server is described as exposing 22 tools related to NtObjectManager, supporting developer workflows that need structured interaction with Windows object management concepts.
π οΈ Key Features
Stateful research focus for Windows RPC attack-surface analysis
NtObjectManager scope
22 tools available via the server
π Use Cases
Investigating Windows RPC-related attack surfaces using NtObjectManager
Building AI agent workflows that require NtObjectManager tool access
β‘ Developer Benefits
Tool-based integration: 22 tools centered on NtObjectManager
Provides a defined interface for stateful Windows RPC research tasks
A Model Context Protocol server that gives an AI agent live, stateful access to Windows
RPC attack-surface research, built on James Forshaw's
NtObjectManager (NtCoreLib).
Three things a generic PowerShell MCP cannot do β and the reason this exists:
Stateful RPC connections β a persistent PowerShell engine keeps parsed
RpcServer objects and connected RPC clients alive across tool calls:
rpc_connect once, rpc_call many times (auth handshakes, context-handle
chains, session variables survive).
CVE methodology as fixed tools β the standard hunting workflows from
2024β2026 public research are one-click, not prompt-engineering.
Stateful execution inside a lab VM β the same one-engine principle applied
in the guest: rpc_vm_exec keeps variables and connected RPC clients alive
across calls through a single persistent guest runspace, never a fresh shell
per call (the vmrun fallback is reported as stateful: false).
Session-variable and cache management (eviction cap 150)
Every tool call is appended to output/mcp_audit.log.
Field-Tested (real machine, full hunting round)
Candidate
Result
srvsvc.dll 98716d03β¦ flagged HIGH
Identified as XactSrv (XsOpenPrinter/XsClosePrinter/XsAddJob/XsScheduleJob) β single printer-handle type; live probe: non-admin connect OK but XsOpenPrinter β ACCESS_DENIED (authorization gate works). Scanner false-positive mode documented
ssdpsrv.dll (CVE-2025-48815 original)
All 20 context handles strict β patched state on current builds
51-module sweep
31 findings, 6 HIGH, all "one producer β many consumers"; NDR layer cannot prove multi-type handles (needs RE)
EPM hijack surface
10 stopped services with unregistered interfaces (AppIDSvc, ClipSVC, dcsvcβ¦)
Task chains
44 user-startable SYSTEM tasks inventoried
Verdict
No confirmable exploitable vuln on the tested host β with per-step evidence
Example: context-handle type confusion (CVE-2025-48815 pattern)
code
1. rpc_parse C:\Windows\System32\target.dll [symbol_path optional]
2. rpc_scan_context_handles ["C:\\Windows\\System32\\target.dll"]
3. rpc_get_interface target_0 β producer ([out] ctx) / consumer ([in] ctx) pairs
4. rpc_connect s1 target_0 β auto-discovers binding via EPM
5. rpc_methods s1 β opnum-mapped signatures
6. rpc_call s1 XsOpenPrinter-like args store_as="h" β keep the raw handle object
7. rpc_call s1 XsClosePrinter-like [{"__var__":"h"}] β feed it to the other type
store_as / {"__var__"} is the core chain primitive: RPC return objects flow
between calls without serialization round-trips, which is exactly what
producerβconsumer handle-confusion testing needs.
ARCHITECTURE.md β engine protocol, state model, design decisions
CHANGELOG.md β R1βR13 decision history incl. two PS 5.1 marshaling bugs
SECURITY.md β authorized use, VM isolation, MSRC disclosure
CONTRIBUTING.md β development invariants and test requirements
β οΈ Disclaimer
For lawful security research, education, and authorized testing only.
rpc_call invokes real RPC methods and can crash services β run it against an
isolated VM, never a production or daily-driver host. Vulnerabilities found
through this tool must follow responsible disclosure (MSRC).
π License
MIT β Copyright (c) 2026 ntobjmanager-mcp Contributors