cdpilot
Zero-npm-dependency browser automation from your terminal. One command, full control.

Quick Start
npx cdpilot launch
npx cdpilot go https://example.com
npx cdpilot shot
No config files. No boilerplate. Just npx and go.
Why cdpilot?
AI agents and developers need browser control that just works:
- Zero config —
npx cdpilot launch starts an isolated browser session
- Zero npm dependencies — No Puppeteer, no Playwright, no Selenium. Pure CDP over HTTP/WebSocket; the Python side needs one package,
websockets (the setup wizard installs it)
- 70+ commands — Navigate, click, type, screenshot, network, console, accessibility, video understanding, progressive anti-bot resilience, and more
- AI-agent friendly — Designed for Claude, GPT, Gemini, and any LLM tool-use workflow
- Isolated sessions — Your personal browser stays untouched. cdpilot runs in its own profile
- Visual feedback — Green glow overlay, cursor visualization, click ripples, and keystroke display keep you informed during automation
- Multi-project isolation — Each project gets its own browser instance and port automatically, no conflicts
- AI control warning — Red toast notification appears when you hover during active automation
- Privacy-first — Everything runs locally; nothing leaves your machine unless you opt in (CAPTCHA solver keys,
tls-check, proxies)
Browser Selection (Workload-Aware Auto-Pick)
cdpilot picks the right browser for what you're doing. auto (default) is a
two-axis policy — extension workload × platform stability:
| Your workload | Auto-pick order |
|---|
Has extensions registered (ext-install) | vivaldi → brave → edge → chromium → chrome (→ Chrome for Testing, if installed) |
| No extensions (pure automation) | chrome → vivaldi → edge → chromium → brave |
Override anytime:
cdpilot browser
cdpilot browser vivaldi
cdpilot browser chrome-for-testing
cdpilot browser auto
Why the split?
- Chrome 137+ silently drops
--load-extension for unpacked extensions
(no error, no warning) — Google removed it from branded Chrome builds
(PSA).
Verified — chrome://extensions shows 0 items.
- Vivaldi, Brave, Edge, Chromium and Chrome for Testing honor
--load-extension (tested).
- On macOS 26 (Tahoe) Brave 1.89 crashes deterministically at ~7min
uptime (SIGTRAP in ThreadPoolForegroundWorker). cdpilot detects the OS
and demotes Brave automatically until a fixed Brave release ships.
Each browser gets its own isolated profile (~/.cdpilot/.../profile-vivaldi
etc.) so switching never causes prefs corruption.
Extension development: Chrome for Testing
If you develop an extension against Chrome itself, install
Chrome for Testing (CfT) —
the Chrome team's versioned, non-auto-updating Chrome build for automation, which
still loads unpacked extensions:
cdpilot browser install chrome-for-testing
cdpilot browser install chrome-for-testing --channel beta
cdpilot browser install chrome-for-testing --version 154
cdpilot ext-install ./my-extension/
cdpilot browser status
- Download only on that command. It is a one-time ~150-190 MB zip (mac-arm64 at
154.0.8037.57: 191,429,663 bytes); cdpilot never fetches it by itself. The build comes
from the official CfT JSON endpoints
(
last-known-good-versions-with-downloads.json, per-version and per-milestone files).
Those list URLs only, no hash, so the download is checked against the server's
Content-Length and its x-goog-hash md5; the zip's SHA-256 is recorded.
- It is extracted to
$CDPILOT_HOME/browsers/chrome-for-testing/<version>/ (on macOS the
quarantine attribute is cleared on that directory only) and recorded in installed.json.
- Used automatically for extension work: while dev extensions are registered, a
branded Chrome pick (
cdpilot browser chrome, or auto with Chrome the only
extension-capable choice) becomes Chrome for Testing, with one stderr line saying so.
Without CfT installed, ext-install on Chrome prints the install command and keeps
Vivaldi/Brave as the alternative. cdpilot browser chrome-for-testing selects it
always. An explicit CHROME_BIN is never replaced.
- It runs with cdpilot's usual per-project isolated profile (
profile-cft).
- It is for extension development and testing — not a stealth browser. cdpilot
makes no anti-bot claims for it; use your regular browser setup for that.
- Linux (Ubuntu 23.10+): AppArmor blocks unprivileged user namespaces, and CfT
(unlike the distro's Chrome package) has no profile allowing them, so it exits at
start. cdpilot prints this hint; allow them with
sudo sysctl -w kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=0.
Installation
npx cdpilot <command>
npm i -g cdpilot
Requirements: Node.js 18+, Python 3.10+, and one of: Brave Browser, Google Chrome, or Chromium. (The Python websockets module is auto-installed by the pre-flight wizard on first launch.)
First-time setup
npx cdpilot setup
npx cdpilot launch
npx cdpilot status
Claude Code plugin marketplace
Install cdpilot's MCP server and its skill straight into Claude Code, no
.mcp.json editing required:
/plugin marketplace add mehmetnadir/cdpilot
/plugin install cdpilot@cdpilot
This registers the cdpilot MCP server (npx cdpilot mcp) and a short skill
that teaches Claude Code when and how to reach for cdpilot's commands. See
.claude-plugin/marketplace.json and
plugins/cdpilot/.
MCP tools that take a url (browser_navigate, browser_console, browser_network,
browser_agent_act, browser_watch_start) open only http:, https: and about:blank.
Other schemes (file:, chrome:, javascript:, data: ...) come back as an error with a
hint: a model steered by page text must not open local files and read them back. Start the
server with CDPILOT_MCP_ALLOW_FILE=1 to allow file: too. The CLI (cdpilot go) opens any URL.
Your own browser over MCP
The MCP browser_connect tool is refused (error with a hint) unless the server runs with
CDPILOT_MCP_ALLOW_CONNECT=1. A connect moves every later cdpilot call of the project, MCP and
CLI, into that browser with its cookies and logins, and a model steered by page text must not
decide that. Run cdpilot connect yourself in a terminal instead: MCP tools then work in that
browser. browser_disconnect needs no opt-in. While a browser is connected, browser_tabs lists
only the tabs cdpilot opened in it and counts yours; cdpilot tabs in a terminal lists every tab.
Environment values over MCP
Commands the MCP server runs get no CDPILOT_VAR_<NAME> value unless the server runs with
CDPILOT_MCP_ALLOW_VARS=1. A model that ran a flow (browser_agent_run) could read the typed value
back from the page (browser_eval, an assert, a screenshot) and send it on. Without the opt-in, a flow
that needs such a value fails before its first step with missing variables and a hint; the model can
pass its own values in vars. With the opt-in, the model can read a typed value back from the page.
The CLI (cdpilot agent run, cdpilot replay) always uses CDPILOT_VAR_* (for agent run of a flow an
MCP session saved, only with --trust-flow; see below).
Flows an MCP session saves
The CLI and an MCP server started in the same directory share the project's flows. agent flow save
records who wrote a flow: written_by is mcp when an MCP tool call saves it or made the saved acts,
otherwise cli (a file from an older version counts as cli; so does a cdpilot run script line or a
shell with CDPILOT_MCP_SESSION=1, which only keeps the visual layer on). agent flow list and
agent run --dry-run show it. An MCP session cannot overwrite a flow written from the terminal:
browser_agent_flow_save fails (exit 2, nothing written) with a hint to save under another name; it can
re-save its own flows (drift repair). From the terminal, cdpilot agent run types no --var or
CDPILOT_VAR_* value into an mcp flow unless you pass --trust-flow, because a model chose the pages
its {{placeholder}} steps type on. The error (exit 2, nothing typed) lists each value step and its
origin in value_steps; --dry-run shows them without the flag. A flow that needs no value runs as
before. A save that changes a flow's steps starts its run counts (runs, ok, drift) again.
cdpilot mcp --tools core (or CDPILOT_MCP_TOOLS=core; the flag wins) lists 10 core
tools (navigate, click, fill, content, screenshot, eval, wait_for, assert, tabs, connect)
plus browser_tools. The agent calls browser_tools with list to see the other
tools, or enable to add some (the server sends tools/list_changed). --tools a,b,c
picks tools by name; all (default) is unchanged. Schema size of tools/list
(tiktoken o200k_base, compact JSON, measured 15.11.2026, after the browser_connect opt-in text): all = 50 tools = 5,422 tokens,
of which the five browser_agent_* tools are 1,061; core = 11 tools = 1,076 tokens.
The three browser_canvas_* tools are listed only while a live canvas is open (cdpilot canvas open), and never under core; tools/list_changed follows when the first canvas opens or the last one closes.
Agent mode over MCP
browser_agent_observe (diff, full, all, frame), browser_agent_find (text, role, max), browser_agent_act (ref/url, action, text), browser_agent_flow_save
(name, last) and browser_agent_run (flow, vars, dry_run) wrap the agent commands below, so a model
on MCP works from numbered refs, gets diffs, and replays a learned flow with no page read at all. They are
outside the core profile; browser_tools enable adds them. A drift or a missing variable comes back as
isError with the command's JSON (status:"drift" carries the page's observation).
Set CDPILOT_DAEMON=1 in the MCP server's environment and every tool call runs in the server process
instead of a fresh Python process: ~10 ms before the CDP work instead of ~400 ms (browser_eval /
browser_tabs / browser_content medians 11 / 7 / 9 ms against 412 / 390 / 416 ms, M1 Max under load).
Same rules as the warm process below — same output, exit codes and session log; lifecycle tools
(browser_launch, browser_connect) still run fresh; a call past 30 s is cancelled.
{ "mcpServers": { "cdpilot": { "command": "npx", "args": ["cdpilot", "mcp"], "env": { "CDPILOT_DAEMON": "1" } } } }
MCP Bundle (.mcpb)
For MCP clients that support one-click local server installation (Claude
Desktop and others), download the .mcpb file attached to the
latest release and
open it, or build it yourself:
The bundle still needs the same runtime on the machine that runs it: Node.js
18+, Python 3.10+, and Brave/Chrome/Chromium installed. See
manifest.json for the bundle's MCP Bundle manifest
(spec).
Upgrading from 0.4.x → 0.5.0 — read this first
One breaking change, the rest is additive.
Breaking — Visual feedback default flipped to OFF. The green glow border,
animated fake cursor, click ripples, and keystroke display made cdpilot feel
like an amateur typing on every page. They are now opt-in:
cdpilot show on
cdpilot show off
The MCP server's persistent-glow flow (CDPILOT_MCP_SESSION=1) is unchanged
— AI agents that rely on visible feedback during a session still see it
automatically. Only direct-CLI users see the difference.
New in 0.5.0 (no migration needed):
cdpilot dismiss — heuristic auto-click for "Stay signed out / No thanks"
buttons on LLM chat sign-up walls.
cdpilot adaptive on — auto-escalate to stealth on CAPTCHA-protected
hosts, with persistent per-host memory.
cdpilot cookies save/load — export/import cookies as JSON to replay
CF/DataDome clearance across runs.
cdpilot context create/list/close + CDPILOT_TARGET — isolated browser
contexts for true parallel automation inside a single browser.
cdpilot fast / cdpilot show — bundled timing + visual toggles.
- Pure performance: post-load sleep 1500ms → 300ms,
scrollIntoView instant,
WebSocket connection pool, /json TTL cache.
See CHANGELOG.md for the full list with rationale.
Commands
Navigation & Content
cdpilot go <url>
cdpilot content
cdpilot html
cdpilot shot [file]
cdpilot pdf [file]
Screenshots
cdpilot shot defaults to CSS pixels on HiDPI displays (scale = 1/devicePixelRatio). Use --hidpi or CDPILOT_SHOT_SCALE=device to capture native device pixels instead.
Each screenshot costs ceil(width / 28) * ceil(height / 28) vision tokens (before any model downscale). Cropping with --element=<selector> reduces pixel dimensions; --format (png/jpeg/webp) and --quality adjust file size without changing token costs.
Interaction
cdpilot click <selector>
cdpilot type <selector> <text># Type into input
cdpilot fill <selector> <val>
cdpilot submit <form>
cdpilot hover <selector>
cdpilot keys <combo>
cdpilot scroll-to <selector>
cdpilot drag <from> <to>
A real mouse click (inside a frame, or --entropy=on) whose target moves or gets covered while the button is held is not clicked again by script: click prints Pressed (released elsewhere, not clicked): … and ends with exit 3 (pressed, release missed the target, not clicked; 1 stays "error"). A target the page replaced or navigated away from on mousedown prints Pressed (the page replaced or left it, not clicked): … and exits 0. MCP (browser_click, browser_smart_click) returns isError: false with a first line {"clicked": false, "reason": "moved"|"gone"|"unknown"}. batch and run finish every step, then exit 1 if a step failed, else 3 if a click was not clicked, else 0.
Element targeting inside iframes
Card forms (Stripe/iyzico-style), embedded login widgets and the reCAPTCHA
checkbox live inside <iframe>s. Name the frame chain before the element
selector with >>>, or pass --frame:
cdpilot fill "iframe#card >>> input[name=cardnumber]" "4242424242424242"
cdpilot type --frame "#card" "input[name=cvc]" "123"
cdpilot click "iframe[title='Secure card payment'] >>> button#pay-btn"
cdpilot click "iframe.checkout >>> iframe.card >>> button"
cdpilot click --frame 0 "button.submit"
cdpilot fill --frame "url=js.stripe.com" "input[name=cardnumber]" "4242424242424242"
cdpilot frame list --frame "#card"
cdpilot frame eval --frame "#card" "document.title"
-
Works for click, fill, type, submit, hover, dblclick, rightclick,
smart-click, smart-fill, smart-select and frame list|eval|shadow.
-
A frame hop is a CSS selector, a 0-based index, a name/id, or
url=<URL text>. --frame also takes bare URL text.
URL text is matched against each frame's current URL as the browser
reports it (Page.getFrameTree; an out-of-process frame's own target),
never against the src attribute, which the page sets: a srcdoc frame,
or a frame that navigated elsewhere, does not match by its src. Only
http/https frames match (never about:, data:, blob:,
javascript: or srcdoc frames), and the query string and #fragment
are never part of the match: the page sets those too, so a same-origin
<iframe src="/pixel?js.stripe.com"> or about:blank#js.stripe.com placed
before the card frame does not match js.stripe.com.
- A host (it has a dot and no
/: js.stripe.com, 127.0.0.1:8762;
or localhost:8762, or an IPv6 address in brackets: [::1]:8762)
matches the frame's host or a subdomain of it: stripe.com matches
js.stripe.com, not evilstripe.com or stripe.com.evil.test, and
[::1]:8762 does not match https://evil.test/[::1]:8762. A port,
when given, must match too.
- A host and a path (
stripe.com/v3): that host rule, and the frame's
path starts with /v3. https://js.stripe.com/v3: that scheme, host
and port exactly, and the path starts with /v3.
- Anything else (
/checkout/embed, card-frame) matches as a
substring of scheme://host[:port]/path. A frame the page made can match
such text, so name a card or sign-in frame by its host. A file name is a
path: url=/card.html (url=card.html is read as a host).
Hosts compare case-insensitively, as the browser reports them (an IDN host
in punycode). The first matching frame in page order is used. A bare
--frame value that names a host (js.stripe.com, stripe.com/v3,
https://…) is URL text first: a frame on that host wins over a CSS
selector or iframe name/id match, which the page sets
(<iframe id="js.stripe.com">). Only when no frame's URL matches is it
tried as a selector, then a name/id, so --frame iframe.card still
works; that fallback can still pick a frame the page made while the real
one is missing, and says so on stderr (note: no frame on host js.stripe.com; used the page-set selector or name/id match '…'), so for
a card or sign-in frame write --frame url=js.stripe.com. Other bare values (#card, card-frame) are
a selector, then a name/id, then URL text.
>>> inside quotes or [...] is literal. A selector that matches an
element wrapping an iframe (Stripe's #card-element) enters the iframe
inside it and says so on stderr:
note: '#card-element' is not an iframe; using the iframe inside it.
-
Selectors and texts that already contain >>> keep working: when the part
before the first >>> finds no iframe or shadow host in the page, or a segment is empty
(click "Next >>>"), the whole string is used as written, exactly as
before. If that fails too, one stderr line explains:
note: 'Home' matched no iframe or shadow host; used the selector as written.
--frame never falls back: a frame it cannot find is an error (exit 1).
-
Right before fill, type, smart-fill or smart-select types into a
frame reached with --frame or >>>, cdpilot checks again that the frame
is the document it found (frame id and loader id). If the frame navigated
or was replaced in between, the command exits 2 and types nothing:
Error: frame 'iframe#card' is no longer the document it was resolved to (it navigated or was replaced); nothing was typed.
-
Inside a frame, fill and type set the value in one step, also with
--entropy=on or when adaptive mode turned humanized typing on for the
site: key events go wherever focus is, and a script of the page around the
frame could focus its own field between keys. stderr says so:
note: humanized typing (--entropy) is off inside a frame: the value is set in one step ….
-
Shadow DOM support: >>> hops also pierce open shadow roots (host.shadowRoot.querySelector(next)).
Chains mix freely with iframes: cdpilot click "iframe#pay >>> my-card >>> button.inner" or
cdpilot click "my-app >>> my-panel >>> input". A closed shadow root is unreachable by design
and fails with 'X' has a closed shadow root; cdpilot cannot reach inside it.
When a plain CSS selector matches nothing at document level, cdpilot automatically falls back
to a depth-first search across all open shadow roots, printing one stderr note:
note: '<sel>' found inside the shadow root of <host tag#id>. Explicit >>> hops do not print this note.
wait and wait-for poll shadow roots every 200 ms alongside the document MutationObserver.
-
For smart-click / smart-fill / smart-select the part before the first
>>> is a frame only if it looks like a selector (it has #, . or [,
or starts with an iframe/frame tag) or is url=…; words stay text.
smart-click "Main >>> Settings" clicks the page's "Main >>> Settings"
link even when a <main> element holds an iframe. For a frame index or a
bare name use --frame.
-
Same-origin and cross-origin frames work, including out-of-process
iframes (site isolation): cdpilot resolves each hop over CDP
(DOM.describeNode → frame id → the frame's execution context, or
Target.attachToTarget with a flat session for an out-of-process frame),
never through contentDocument, which the browser blocks cross-origin.
-
Inside a frame, click and smart-click are real mouse input
(isTrusted: true), like hover, dblclick, rightclick and
--entropy=on clicks; an element with no box falls back to a script click.
Mouse input is dispatched at page coordinates: each frame's offset and scale
(transform: scale(), zoom) in the page is applied automatically, so the
browser hit-tests into the right frame. Before pressing, cdpilot checks the
point (elementFromPoint in each document on the way); if something covers
the target, such as a cookie banner, it clicks the target by script instead
and says so on one stderr line (note: … is covered by div#cookie at the click point; used a script click). cdpilot's own input blocker (show on,
MCP sessions) lets only cdpilot's click through, for the click itself.
-
smart-click / smart-fill / smart-select look in the page first and
compare texts with whitespace collapsed ( and line breaks count as
one space). An enabled page element whose text or label contains the whole
query is used. If the page's only such elements are disabled, the command
fails as before (no enabled element matches …) without looking in frames.
Otherwise the visible frames are searched breadth-first for a whole-query
match (at most 20 frames, and 2 s for all of the search's CDP calls) and the
match is reported on stderr:
smart-click: matched inside frame iframe#card (https://…). The search only
looks (no click, no typing); the command then acts once, in the chosen
frame. With no frame match, the page's partial (word) match is used as
before. When the 2 s run out:
smart-click: frame search stopped after 2s (3 of 7 frames); a frame that
had not answered by then has not been touched.
-
smart-fill and smart-select search automatically only frames of the
page's own origin, so a typed value never lands in a third-party frame (an
ad, chat or payment widget) by accident; reach a cross-origin frame with
>>> or --frame. smart-click searches all visible frames.
-
The first hop of every --frame / >>> route and frame list resolves in cdpilot's isolated world (Page.createIsolatedWorld), protecting the frame lookup against monkey-patched DOM methods in the page's main world (hops inside a child frame use that frame's own context); frame list without --frame prints the same list as before on iframe-only pages and now numbers <frame> elements too.
Debugging
cdpilot console [url]
cdpilot network [url]
cdpilot network <url> --har trace.har
cdpilot debug [url]
cdpilot perf
cdpilot eval <js>
cdpilot eval-batch <json>
Network monitoring & HAR export
cdpilot network <url> --har <file> exports all HTTP requests of a navigation as standard HAR 1.2 JSON (--har - writes to stdout).
- Included: URLs, methods, headers, status codes, query strings, and CDP timing breakdowns (DNS, connect, SSL, send, wait, receive).
- Omitted: Response bodies are not fetched or stored (avoids memory bloat and round-trip overhead); content.size reflects transfer length; bodySize is -1.
- Masking: Sensitive header values matching security patterns (
Cookie, Set-Cookie, Authorization, X-Api-Key, token, secret) are replaced with "«masked»". URLs are masked the same way as the session log: userinfo passwords and query/fragment parameters named like secrets (token, key, code, session, …) in request.url, queryString, redirectURL and URL-bearing header values (Location, Referer, Link); a data: URL keeps only its media type.
cdpilot eval-batch '["document.title","location.href","document.links.length","document.images.length"]'
cdpilot block
cdpilot block on
cdpilot block off
cdpilot block preset images,fonts,ads,media
cdpilot block patterns '*.png' '*.woff2'
cdpilot block clear
Stealth caveat: block changes the fingerprint surface — real browsers fetch
images, fonts, and analytics. Cloudflare-class bot detectors notice missing
requests. Keep block off for stealth/anti-bot targets; turn it on for
known-safe internal sites where speed matters more than blending in.
cdpilot fast
cdpilot fast on
cdpilot fast off
CDPILOT_WAIT_MS=1000 cdpilot click
cdpilot show
cdpilot show on
cdpilot show off
Visual feedback default changed in 0.4.4 — the old animations (green glow,
moving cursor, click ripples) used to make every action look like an amateur
driving the screen. They're now opt-in via cdpilot show on. The MCP server's
persistent-glow flow (CDPILOT_MCP_SESSION=1) is unaffected — AI agents that
rely on visible feedback during a session still see it automatically.
Tab Management
cdpilot tabs
cdpilot new-tab [url]
cdpilot switch-tab <id>
cdpilot close-tab [id]
cdpilot close
Network Control
cdpilot throttle slow3g
cdpilot throttle fast3g
cdpilot throttle offline
cdpilot throttle off
cdpilot proxy <url>
cdpilot proxy off
cdpilot proxy add brd "http://USER:PASS@brd.superproxy.io:22225" --geo us
cdpilot proxy add ipr "http://USER:PASS@geo.iproyal.com:12321" --sticky
cdpilot proxy use brd
cdpilot proxy list
cdpilot proxy show [<name>]
cdpilot proxy remove <name>
TLS Fingerprint (v0.8.0)
cdpilot tls-check
cdpilot tls-check --service browserleaks
cdpilot tls-check --json
Known limitation: v0.8.0 ships the probe (tls-check) but no in-tree TLS fix.
There is no Chromium-based TLS-corrected browser that ships as a standalone binary
exposing --remote-debugging-port. Camoufox is Firefox+Juggler (no CDP);
Patchright / undetected-chromedriver / nodriver are Python/Playwright libraries,
not standalone browsers. cdpilot's CDP-only architecture is incompatible with all
of them without a protocol adapter. Tracking: v0.9 roadmap (TLS-MITM plugin
using curl-impersonate semantics, OR BoringSSL-patched Chromium fork).
Request Interception
cdpilot intercept block <pattern>
cdpilot intercept mock <pattern> <json-file>
cdpilot intercept headers <pattern> <header:value>
cdpilot intercept list
cdpilot intercept clear
Device Emulation
cdpilot emulate iphone
cdpilot emulate ipad
cdpilot emulate android
cdpilot emulate reset
Geolocation
cdpilot geo istanbul
cdpilot geo london
cdpilot geo 41.01 28.97
cdpilot geo off
Accessibility
cdpilot a11y
cdpilot a11y summary
cdpilot a11y find <role>
Choosing a page view
Tokens are o200k_base counts of each command's stdout on Hacker News and the Wikipedia "Web browser" article
(median of 3 runs, rounded to hundreds, 2026-11-11; pages drift, so expect a few percent).
| View | What it gives | Can act on it | HN / Wikipedia |
|---|
content | the page's plain text | no | 1,200 / 4,700 |
agent observe | numbered @refs for actionable entries and headings/landmarks, plus a short text | yes (agent act --ref) | 4,300 / 8,300 |
agent observe --rows | the same entries as arrays | yes | 2,900 / 5,200 |
agent observe --full | every entry, nothing hidden, no size limit | yes | 6,900 / 17,300 |
agent find "<text>" | the entries whose name contains the text, from the whole page (at most 20) | yes | a few hundred |
a11y-snapshot | one @ref line per interactive or structural node | yes (click-ref @N) | 8,100 / 13,100 |
a11y | the full tree with roles and names, no refs | no | 9,800 / 31,400 |
describe | a11y-snapshot + page text, and it writes a screenshot file | yes (click-ref @N) | 8,800 / 13,600 |
To act on a page under a token budget, start with agent observe; --rows prints the same entries in about a
third fewer tokens (opt-in: [ref, role, name(, value)]). After a click or a fill, read the agent act result: it
already holds the change (142–496 tokens on Wikipedia, MDN and react.dev), and agent observe --diff right after
it returned 45–60. Use a11y-snapshot or
observe --full when you need a ref for every node, and content when you only read. The ranking is
page-dependent: on react.dev a11y-snapshot (1,200) is smaller than content (1,500).
agent observe (and the lists in agent act and agent run) print at most 400 entries, in accessibility-tree
order, and say so in a truncated note ({shown, total, hint}). Of 13 measured pages 7 have more than 400
entries; a long page costs 17,000-85,000 tokens uncut. Refs past the cut still work: agent act --ref @N takes
any ref, and agent find "<text>" [--role r] lists the ones you need. --all (or CDPILOT_OBSERVE_MAX=0)
prints everything in the default view; --full also shows the hidden entries.
Agent mode: numbered refs and diffs (token budget)
cdpilot agent observe
cdpilot agent act --ref @3 --action click
cdpilot agent act --ref @4 --action fill --text "cdpilot"
cdpilot agent act --url https://example.com/
cdpilot agent observe --diff
cdpilot agent observe --full
cdpilot agent observe --all
cdpilot agent find "Stalingrad" --role link
cdpilot agent observe --rows
cdpilot agent observe --frame 1
cdpilot agent stats | agent reset
agent observe never saw into iframes, so a cookie layer in a full-screen iframe (theguardian.com, weather.com) left the model
with 400 entries of a page it could not click. It now adds frames (at most 5 visible iframes: {i, origin, w, h, cover, blocking}, read in cdpilot's isolated world, so a page that replaces getBoundingClientRect or elementFromPoint cannot
hide or invent one) and, when one covers the page, a frames_hint. Top-level
frames[].origin is read from the iframe's src attribute (not the post-redirect address) and is not a trust signal; the
frame field in agent observe --frame <i> output comes from the live frame URL. agent observe --frame <i> resolves the frame index in that isolated world, lists that frame's entries and names the frame's live origin as frame; they pass the same tag-character cleaning and
injection_suspect scan as page text (a frame is third-party content), and its text passes the same hidden-text cut
(hidden_removed); hosts its hidden text names feed the guard's url_from_hidden. A frame ref belongs to its frame and never resolves in the main
document; if the frame is gone or replaced, agent act --ref gives the stale-ref error. click, type and fill work on a frame ref
(type/fill only on a text field, inside the frame's own session); hover and submit do not, and frame acts are not part
of a saved flow's trail.
The agent commands (agent observe, agent act, agent run, agent flow list|show) print compact
UTF-8 JSON when stdout is not a terminal (an agent, a pipe, an MCP tool call) and indented JSON in a
terminal. CDPILOT_JSON=pretty|compact overrides this. Scripts that grep line by line should use jq
or set CDPILOT_JSON=pretty.
observe turns the accessibility tree into a numbered list of things an agent can act on (buttons, links,
fields with their current value, unique text anchors) plus a short text summary; no screenshot, no HTML.
Every act and observe --diff returns only the change: changed.added (full descriptors, so the agent can act
on a new element without another observe), changed.removed (refs), changed.value_changed, and text only
when it changed (text_changed). Refs are stable while the element exists (keyed by the DOM node, not by
position); a navigation starts a new set. token_estimate is len(json)/4; saved_vs_full compares the diff
with a full observe of the same page. State lives in ~/.cdpilot/projects/<id>/agent-state.json.
What the printed list leaves out. By default actions keeps every interactive entry, headings, regions
and navigation landmarks, and text that is clickable although the accessibility tree calls it text (a
<div onclick>: cursor:pointer starts there, or Chrome marks it clickable, and no link or button sits
above it). It leaves out plain text, table cells and list markers, entries whose name is only the sum of
their own kept children, and cuts names over 80 characters to 79 + … (output only). The text is still in
text. Only the printed list is thinned: refs, saved flows (agent run anchors on the full list) and
act --ref of a hidden ref are unchanged. One extra DOMSnapshot.captureSnapshot call (2 s limit) decides
"clickable"; if it fails nothing is hidden. --full (CLI observe/act/run; over MCP only browser_agent_observe takes full: true,
browser_agent_act and browser_agent_run have no full) prints the unfiltered list. --rows (or CDPILOT_OBSERVE_FORMAT=rows) prints actions and changed.added as arrays
[ref, role, name], with the field value as a 4th element only for entries that have one ("" = role same as the previous row in the same list); objects stay
the default (--objects or CDPILOT_OBSERVE_FORMAT=objects).
Learned flows: drive a site once, replay it with no model
cdpilot agent observe && cdpilot agent act --ref @3 --action click && cdpilot agent act --ref @4 --action fill --text "cdpilot"
cdpilot agent flow save inbox-triage
cdpilot agent run inbox-triage
cdpilot agent run login --var password=…
cdpilot agent flow list | show <name> | delete <name>
Every agent act leaves a trail entry addressed by an anchor, the element's accessibility role, name and
position among equals ({"role":"button","name":"Archive","nth":0}), never a @ref or a DOM node id, which
belong to one session. agent flow save writes the trail as a flow; agent run finds each anchor on the live
page (exact name, then case-insensitive, then a longer name containing it when that is unambiguous) and acts,
with no model in the loop. The result's tokens_avoided is an upper bound — a full observation before each step;
an agent that reads diffs reads less. On three real sites (measured on 2026-11-10, before observe hid text that
cannot be acted on) the model loop read 2,292–18,331 tokens, the agent run result 90–136 (HN 18,331 → 90,
Wikipedia 15,474 → 136, httpbin 2,292 → 119). A default observe now prints about 4,300 tokens on HN and 8,300
on Wikipedia, still far above the agent run result. When a site has a flow, agent observe lists it under known_flows.
Drift stops, never guesses. If a step's anchor is gone, or the step lands on another host than it did
when recorded, agent run exits 4 and prints that page's full observation (status:"drift", step,
expected, actions, text): the agent acts on those refs, finishes the task, and agent flow save <name>
rewrites the flow (over MCP only a flow an MCP session saved; new steps start the run counts again).
Exit 2: unknown flow or a {{variable}} without a value (checked before any step runs);
--dry-run prints the steps with placeholders, never values. Values typed into secret-named fields
(password, one-time code, API key, PIN, card number, …) or token-shaped values are placeholders on disk; the
same fields show «masked» as their value in observe output. Masking goes by field name or token shape: a
secret typed into a field named otherwise is stored in clear, so review a flow before sharing it (flow files
and agent-state.json are 0600). A {{placeholder}} typed into agent act --text or --url is refused
(exit 2): placeholders are cdpilot's own. A model can still make one over MCP by filling a secret-named
field, so an MCP session cannot overwrite a flow saved from the terminal, and from the terminal agent run
types a value into a flow an MCP session saved only with --trust-flow
(Flows an MCP session saves): a flow replays your values only on pages you
recorded or chose to trust. A step that types a placeholder runs only on the origin (scheme, host, port) it
was recorded on (old flows without an origin fall back to host); another origin or an opaque page is a drift.
--var values are visible in the process list for the duration of the call and are redacted in the session
log; an environment value never enters argv.
CDPILOT_VAR_<NAME> is used only by a step recorded on a host named in CDPILOT_VAR_HOSTS (comma-separated,
subdomains included), on that same origin over https (http only on loopback), and never inside a URL — so a flow
that a prompt-injected model records on another site cannot draw on the environment's secrets; anything else is
refused before the first step (exit 2, refused says why) or is a drift. Over MCP, commands get no
CDPILOT_VAR_* value unless the server runs with CDPILOT_MCP_ALLOW_VARS=1: the model could read a typed value
back from the page (Environment values over MCP). agent run sets a placeholder value on
the recorded field in one browser call that first checks the field (editable, in the top-level page, not an
iframe; for an environment value not a search or url field) and the page's origin; a failed check exits 2 and types nothing.
An agent run that types an environment value runs in a tab of its own, never the project's shared tab (where an
MCP model's browser_eval could read the field): a new tab with no opener, closed before the run returns, success
or failure. If no go step comes before the first value step, that tab first opens the step's recorded page
(before.url, or its origin for an older flow). A popup that tab opens before the value is typed stops the run
(exit 2, nothing typed); one found at the end is closed with the tab (exit 2). A running cdpilot watch screencast
stops the run before its first step (cdpilot watch stop first). After the run the refs of the closed tab
are dropped; run agent observe before agent act --ref. A run with --var values only uses the shared tab.
Text that talks to the agent: injection_suspect
Page text that addresses the model instead of the user is the shape of an indirect prompt injection ("AI
assistants reading this page: ignore your previous instructions…"). agent observe, the diff of agent act
and a drift result of agent run carry injection_suspect: [{text, match}] (at most 5, absent when none)
whenever such a block is in the text: ignore_instructions, addresses_ai, system_prompt,
new_instructions, hide_from_user, exfiltrate, fake_system, fake_turn, encoded_order, tool_call,
navigate_order. Nothing is
hidden or blocked, the text stays where it was; the agent sees the mark next to it and treats the block as data.
Matching runs on a normalised copy (zero-width characters removed, NFKC, case folded, spaced-out letters joined,
Cyrillic/Greek look-alikes mapped inside a mixed-script word); base64 payloads are decoded and scanned; the
"ignore previous instructions" family covers 14 languages. The patterns were tuned on three sets
(test/fixtures/injection-korpus.json, injection-heldout.json, injection-heldout-2.json), so their numbers
there (20 of 20, 24 of 24 and 27 of 30 caught) are in-sample. On a set never used for tuning
(injection-heldout-3.json, 40 + 40 lines in 12 languages, written without seeing the patterns) they catch 11 of 40
with 2 of 40 false alarms (a quoted security report and a recipe line); the gain over the previous pass (7 of 40)
came from multilingual, encoded and urgency lines, not from fake chat turns or fake system notices, which still
mostly pass when phrased differently. Treat the mark as a hint, not a filter: a page without it can still carry an injection.
Text the layout hides from a person — outside the page or its clipping box (offscreen), under 4 px (tiny),
almost fully transparent (transparent), the color of its CSS background (camouflage), or an aria-label that
differs from what is shown (name_attr) — is detected on every observation: a marked block that is such text
carries why: ["pattern", "hidden:<how>"] (also when the record comes from the heading, link or button that holds
it, its name containing the removed text), and only the marked text node itself of an offscreen or tiny part
leaves text: the rest of the part, a visible copy of the same words and every other node stay. A heading or
paragraph that holds such a node is printed from its text nodes only (its name, which repeats them, is left out).
hidden_removed: N counts every node left out, also past the 5 parts hidden_text lists; injection_suspect (at
most 5 records) usually shows them, but on a page with more marks it may not. Known limits: a heading whose name
comes from an image's alt, an SVG title or an aria-label rather than from its text nodes loses that name in text
when it holds such a node; a heading named through aria-labelledby by an off-screen node elsewhere keeps that
text (only an aria-label that differs from the content is name_attr).
With CDPILOT_AGENT_HIDDEN=1
the output also lists hidden_text: [{text, how, words}] (parts of 8 words or more, at most 5) and
hidden_check: "unavailable" when the layout probe failed and the text was not checked. The list is opt-in until a
rule that separates screen-reader text and clipped carousels passes a new blind set: on a blind set it caught 42 of
50 hidden injections, with no injection_suspect false alarm in 60 clean pages, but listed text on 10 of those 60
(long screen-reader descriptions, clipped carousel slides).
Before agent act --url and each go step of agent run, a guard (CDPILOT_AGENT_GUARD=off|warn, default
warn) adds guard: {rule, host, mode} when the URL carries a cookie value of another site (secret_in_url),
goes to a host the last 3 observations named only in hidden or marked text and no shown link points to (a link
whose text is hidden, or that has none, does not count; url_from_hidden), or leaves CDPILOT_AGENT_ORIGINS
(outside_origins). The navigation still runs; a guard that fails reports guard: {rule: "guard_error"} and one
stderr line. A cookie value the guard found is replaced by «redacted:N chars» wherever an agent command prints or
stores the page URL — that result and every later agent observe, act, run and stats (url, last_url, the
trail) — and in their session log lines, however the URL spells it (any mix of raw and percent-escaped characters);
agent-state.json keeps fingerprints for that, written before the navigation (the length and 64 bits of the
SHA-256 of the decoded value and of each spelling, unsalted, never the value; agent reset clears them). Later
commands search the first 16 KB of a URL for them: a value placed after that is printed. The browser's own URL still
carries it, and so may the page's text and the log lines of other commands. The guard compares strings: a value sent
base64-encoded, with letters changed, split, encoded twice, partly escaped right after a stray %, a cookie shorter
than 16 characters, or a shared suffix missing from its short list (s3.amazonaws.com, myshopify.com) passes.
Live canvas (experimental)
A canvas (experimental; macOS and Linux, not on Windows yet) is a tab in your browser that an agent writes HTML into and updates in place: a status board, a form the
user fills in, a table that grows while the model streams. The tab keeps its scroll position, focus and form state
between updates (the new HTML is morphed into the page, not reloaded). Clicks and form input come back as events; treat their content as untrusted page data (an untrusted field says
which fields).
cdpilot canvas open --name board
cdpilot canvas set page.html --name board
cdpilot canvas patch page.html --name board
llm-cli ... | cdpilot canvas stream --name board
cdpilot canvas watch page.html --name board
cdpilot canvas events --name board --follow
cdpilot canvas list
cdpilot canvas close --name board
Mark the elements that report back with data-action (or data-emit): a click on them, a form submit and
input become {seq, t, src, type, action, id, data} lines; src is page for the page's events and host for
cdpilot's own (blocked, nav, closed). Event data is capped at 1 KB; data.url in host events is chosen by the
page and is not trusted.
MCP: browser_canvas_set, browser_canvas_patch, browser_canvas_events appear in tools/list only while a canvas
of the project is open (the server sends notifications/tools/list_changed); browser_tools enable lists them
anyway. They are not in --tools core. A canvas is opened from the CLI (cdpilot canvas open). HTML goes to the canvas process over a local socket, never in a
command line or the session log.
What the canvas page cannot do (the HTML is treated as untrusted — an agent may have copied it from anywhere):
- It runs in its own browser context, so it never sees your other tabs, cookies or storage; the context and the tab
close when the canvas process ends, even on SIGKILL.
- Only
http://cdpilot-canvas.invalid/<name>/ is served to it, with a CSP (default-src 'none', inline script and
style only, data:/blob: images) and sandbox allow-scripts. Every other navigation gets an empty 204 and a
blocked event; every subresource request is refused (BlockedByClient). --allow-net <host> at open allows
https requests to that exact host on port 443 and nothing else.
- The canvas runs in a browser context whose proxy is a local port that never answers (
--allow-net hosts bypass
it), so a request that slips past cdpilot's interception goes nowhere (speculation-rules prefetch did, measured
before this was added). Pop-ups the page opens in that context are closed.
- WebRTC constructors are removed before the page's scripts run, in its frames too (CSP does not cover WebRTC).
- The document is written only after cdpilot has proven it is the canvas document (frame URL and execution context);
if the context changes, the write is refused and the page reopened. Navigation history is cleared after each load.
- A leak test runs every vector we know (fetch, img, script, iframe, WebSocket, prefetch, ping, window.open, form,
meta refresh,
blob: navigation, history.back(), speculation rules, pop-ups from derived documents, WebRTC
STUN/TURN in the page and in srcdoc frames) against an unguarded and a guarded canvas:
each vector must reach the test listener unguarded (or is reported as not measurable in that environment) and show 0 requests guarded. Not measurable there: data:
navigation (Chrome blocks it itself), preconnect and DNS prefetch (the canvas's off-the-record context does not
send these hints; the canvas also sends X-DNS-Prefetch-Control: off).
Not supported on Windows yet (the canvas process uses a Unix socket). Paint latency is not published until it is
measured on an idle machine.
Session Management
cdpilot session
cdpilot sessions
cdpilot session-close [id]
Advanced
cdpilot cookies [domain]
cdpilot cookies save <file> [<domain>]
cdpilot cookies load <file>
cdpilot cookies save --host x.com
cdpilot cookies load --host x.com
cdpilot cookies list
cdpilot cookies clear --host x.com
cdpilot cookies clear --all
cdpilot cookies clear --older-than 7d
cdpilot cookies auto on
cdpilot cookies auto add <host>
cdpilot cookies auto remove <host>
cdpilot cookies auto list
cdpilot cookies cf-replay <url>
cdpilot wipe [--cookies|--storage|--tabs|--keep h1,h2]
cdpilot storage
cdpilot upload <sel> <file>
cdpilot multi-eval <js>
cdpilot headless [on|off]
cdpilot frame list
cdpilot frame eval --frame <f> <js>
cdpilot dialog auto-accept
cdpilot permission grant geo
Parallel Contexts
cdpilot context create [url]
cdpilot context list
cdpilot context close <ctx>
Address a specific context's tab in subsequent commands via the env pin:
ID=$(cdpilot context create https://example.com | jq -r .target_id)
CDPILOT_TARGET=$ID cdpilot eval 'document.title'
True isolation — each context has its own cookie/storage jar. Designed for
running N AI chat queries in parallel without history pollution, or A/B
testing logged-in vs logged-out flows without spinning up multiple browsers.
Smart Navigation (LLM-aware)
cdpilot dismiss
cdpilot dismiss aggressive
Built-in English + Turkish pattern library. Explicitly excludes destructive
lookalikes (Delete account, Sign out, Subscribe) — safe to chain into a
query workflow.
Video Understanding
A single screenshot can't see motion. cdpilot watch runs a continuous
screencast (Page.startScreencast) into a ring buffer of JPEG frames, so an
AI agent can query a time window and actually watch what happened —
animations, mouse cursor movement, scroll, an explosion effect — instead of
guessing from one still frame.
cdpilot watch start <url|file://...>
cdpilot watch query --at 1:23 --window 5s
cdpilot watch ask "did the menu animate open?"
cdpilot watch status
cdpilot watch stop
Works on both local files (file://...) and online video (YouTube, Vimeo,
Twitter, Facebook, Instagram). No extra package needed — Pillow is optional and only
used for motion-detection between frames.
DRM limitation: DRM-protected players (Netflix and similar) render as
black frames at the CDP layer — cdpilot cannot capture them. Everything
non-DRM works.
A replay or agent run that types a CDPILOT_VAR_* value does not start while
a screencast records the project (exit 2, cdpilot watch stop first), and
watch start refuses while such a run is active: the frames would show the value.
MCP exposes this as browser_watch_* tools for AI agents.
Video Understanding (commands)
cdpilot watch start <url|file://>
cdpilot watch query --at 1:23 --window 5s
cdpilot watch ask "did the modal slide in?"
cdpilot watch status
cdpilot watch stop
Stealth & CAPTCHA
Self-contained anti-fingerprint layer (no extra packages) — patches navigator.webdriver,
chrome.runtime, plugins (proper PluginArray inheritance), WebGL
vendor/renderer, permissions, hardware concurrency, and the Worker
constructor. Injected via Page.addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument before
any page script runs. Disabled by default; opt-in.
At launch, cdpilot also passes --disable-blink-features=AutomationControlled,
which closes the Blink runtime flag that Cloudflare and DataDome probe to detect
an automated browser.
Real mouse clicks (frames, --entropy=on, click @ref, dblclick, rightclick) hold the button 40-120 ms like a person's press; CDPILOT_PRESS_MS=min-max changes the range (0-0 = instant).
Three-tier stealth mode
cdpilot mode is the recommended entry point — one switch that sets how much
fingerprint surface cdpilot touches, lightest to heaviest:
cdpilot mode
cdpilot mode regular
cdpilot mode stealth
cdpilot mode undetected
regular is the default because Stealth Bench V1 found the full patch set
alone lowered scores — a synthetic plugin array is itself a tell. The
stealth tier deliberately omits plugin spoofing; escalate to undetected
only for hard targets. The adaptive layer learns the right tier per host and
escalates on CAPTCHA. Effect applies on the next navigation. Env override:
CDPILOT_MODE=<tier>. The legacy stealth on/off toggle still works and stays
coherent with the tier:
cdpilot stealth on
cdpilot stealth off
cdpilot stealth status
cdpilot captcha-check
cdpilot captcha-wait [sec]
cdpilot adaptive [on|off|status]
cdpilot adaptive forget <host>
cdpilot adaptive clear
Adaptive mode is the "run fast, climb walls when seen" automation: cdpilot
runs in the open lane by default, detects CAPTCHA after each navigation, and
when it sees one — adds the host to a persistent list, retries once with
stealth on. Never auto-demotes. Conservative by design.
Web Bot Auth (signed agent)
The opposite of stealth. Stealth tries to make the browser look like a person;
Web Bot Auth says "this is an automated agent, and here is proof of which one".
Every request the browser makes carries an Ed25519
HTTP Message Signature (RFC 9421)
that a site, or Cloudflare in front of it, checks against a key directory you
publish on your own domain. The format follows
draft-meunier-web-bot-auth-architecture
and draft-meunier-http-message-signatures-directory,
and reproduces the Ed25519 test vectors of Cloudflare's reference
implementation (cloudflare/web-bot-auth).
Optional dependency. Signing needs the cryptography package, for the Python cdpilot runs
on (CDPILOT_PYTHON if you set it):
Without it, the bot-auth commands and launch --bot-auth print that hint and exit 2. Every
other command works as before.
1. Generate the key (once):
cdpilot bot-auth init --agent-url https://your-domain.com
This writes an Ed25519 private key to CDPILOT_HOME/bot-auth/ed25519.key (default
~/.cdpilot), created with mode 0600. cdpilot never prints or logs the key, and it warns
when the file is readable by others. The agent URL must be an https:// origin (no path). A
second init refuses to replace the key unless you pass --force, because the new key would no
longer match the directory you published.
2. Host the directory on your own domain, signed. cdpilot bot-auth directory prints the
public key as a JWKS, where kid is the key's RFC 7638 JWK thumbprint. Cloudflare also requires
the directory response to be signed, so --headers prints the headers to serve with it:
cdpilot bot-auth directory --headers
cdpilot bot-auth directory --headers --json
Content-Type: application/http-message-signatures-directory+json
Signature-Input: sig1=("@authority";req);created=…;keyid="<thumbprint>";alg="ed25519";expires=…;nonce="…";tag="http-message-signatures-directory"
Signature: sig1=:<base64 Ed25519 signature>:
{ "keys": [ … ] }
Serve that body at https://your-domain.com/.well-known/http-message-signatures-directory with
those three headers. The signature covers ("@authority";req), the host the directory is fetched
from: by default the agent URL's host, or --authority <host>. There is one signature per key in
the directory. It is valid for 24 hours (--ttl <seconds>), so a static host needs it refreshed
daily, from cron or an edge function that runs the same signing. A cron example that rewrites the
headers file and the body your web server serves:
17 3 * * * cdpilot bot-auth directory --headers --ttl 172800 --json > /var/www/wba/directory.json.tmp \
&& mv /var/www/wba/directory.json.tmp /var/www/wba/directory.json
Your server (or an edge function) reads headers and body from that JSON and serves them at
the well-known path. --content-digest also covers the body (Content-Digest, RFC 9530), as
in Cloudflare's reference vector; then the body must be served byte for byte as printed.
3. Launch a signing browser:
cdpilot launch --bot-auth
cdpilot status
cdpilot go https://example.com
cdpilot stop
launch --bot-auth starts a small detached signer next to the browser. It uses the same
self-fork as the idle-close watcher and lives exactly as long as the browser. It holds one CDP
connection and auto-attaches to every page, popup, new tab, out-of-process iframe and worker. It
signs each request at the Fetch "Request" stage, including every redirect hop. So requests the page makes on its own are
signed as well: timers, fetch() after your cdpilot command has returned, a tab the page opens.
data:, blob: and chrome-extension: requests never leave the browser, so they pass through
unchanged. If signing a request fails, that request goes out unsigned, one line is written to
CDPILOT_HOME/bot-auth/signers/<port>.log (host only), and the page is never held up. Running
launch --bot-auth against a browser that is already up adds the signer to it.
Each request gets three headers:
| Header | Value |
|---|
Signature-Agent | "https://your-domain.com" |
Signature-Input | sig1=("@authority" "signature-agent");created=…;keyid="<thumbprint>";alg="ed25519";expires=…;nonce="…";tag="web-bot-auth" |
Signature | sig1=:<base64 Ed25519 signature>: |
expires is created + 5 minutes. The nonce is 64 random bytes, base64-encoded, and new for
every request.
This is the legacy Signature-Agent form (draft-05 A.2.3), and it is the default because it
is the form Cloudflare's verifier accepts: Cloudflare rejects the dictionary form of later drafts.
To send the dictionary form instead (Signature-Agent: sig1="https://your-domain.com", covered as
"signature-agent";key="sig1"), run cdpilot bot-auth format dict (bot-auth format legacy
switches back, bot-auth format shows it, bot-auth init --agent-format dict sets it at
creation). It applies from the next launch --bot-auth.
What is not signed. WebSocket handshakes are not signed: the browser does not pass them
through CDP's Fetch domain, so a wss:// connection the page opens goes out without the
headers. Service-worker-internal cache hits and data:/blob: URLs never reach a server.
If the signer dies or hangs. While it runs, the signer holds every request of the browser at
the Fetch stage until it has added the headers. If it is killed, requests go out unsigned; cdpilot status and cdpilot go then print one stderr line (signer not running, requests go out unsigned,
run cdpilot launch --bot-auth again) until you do, or stop. If it is frozen (a
stopped process, a debugger), requests hang: cdpilot stop and launch --bot-auth again.
cdpilot trusts its signer state only for the process whose command line is that port's signer and
only for the browser it attached to, so a stale state file whose pid was reused by another program
is dropped, never signalled.
Idle close still works while the signer runs: the signer is attached to every page, so instead
of "a page is attached" cdpilot counts the CDP clients other than the signer (by socket owner:
netstat with an lsof fallback on macOS, netstat on Windows, ss on Linux), and a watch daemon or a Playwright session keeps
the browser open. On Linux, ss -tnp shows only your own processes' sockets, so a client running
as another user is not counted and idle close may close the browser under it.
Stealth conflict. Signing says "I am an agent", and stealth says "I am not". If you pass
--bot-auth together with --stealth/--undetected, or while cdpilot mode is stealth or
undetected, cdpilot prints one warning line and applies bot-auth. While the signer runs, no
stealth script or user-agent override is injected, and adaptive escalation does not retry at a
stealth tier.
Register with Cloudflare. Once the directory is live, submit it through the Bot Submission
Form in the Cloudflare dashboard as a signed agent (an agent acting for its users) or a
verified bot; see Cloudflare's
signed agents and
verified bots with cryptography
posts. Sites behind Cloudflare then see your requests as coming from your agent. Sites that
don't check Web Bot Auth ignore the headers.
Friction Ladder (progressive anti-bot detection)
Real sites don't just throw a CAPTCHA — they stack defenses incrementally.
cdpilot friction reports which rung is currently active so an agent can react
appropriately instead of guessing. Six levels, lowest to highest:
none → rate_limited → soft_captcha → login_wall → otp_sms → hard_block
Bilingual (English + Turkish) DOM heuristics. The detection is read-only — it
never bypasses anything. The response policy is deliberately conservative:
rate_limited → automatic exponential backoff + retry
soft_captcha → defer to the captcha tools
login_wall / otp_sms / hard_block → flagged for human handoff, not
autonomously solved
That last line is an ethics boundary, not a missing feature: cdpilot will not
attempt to defeat a login, an OTP/SMS gate, or an outright block on its own.
MCP exposes this as browser_friction.
Press-and-Hold (PerimeterX / HUMAN behavioral challenge)
PerimeterX's "Press & Hold" is a behavioral challenge, not a token — there's
no provider to call. The only solution is a real press → hold → release
gesture, which cdpilot emits via the CDP Input domain: a Gaussian-randomized
~3–7s hold with ±1–2px micro-jitter while the button is held.
cdpilot press-hold
cdpilot press-hold "#px-captcha button"
captcha-solve auto-routes here when it detects a perimeterx challenge.
MCP exposes this as browser_press_hold.
Captcha Solver Plugins (v0.6+)
Optional integration with 2captcha, anti-captcha, and capmonster. Per-solve
cost ~$0.001–0.003. API keys stored in ~/.cdpilot/captcha-providers.json
(chmod 600) — never committed to git.
cdpilot captcha config --provider 2captcha --api-key YOUR_KEY
cdpilot captcha config --provider anticaptcha --api-key YOUR_KEY
cdpilot captcha auto on
cdpilot captcha solve --type recaptcha-v2 --site-key SK --url https://example.com
cdpilot captcha solve --type hcaptcha --site-key SK --url URL
cdpilot captcha solve --type turnstile --site-key SK --url URL
cdpilot captcha solve --type funcaptcha --site-key SK --url URL
cdpilot captcha status
cdpilot captcha balance
Supported types: recaptcha-v2, recaptcha-v3, hcaptcha, turnstile, funcaptcha
Tokens are injected via Runtime.evaluate CDP — no browser-side libraries required.
When captcha auto on is set, the adaptive layer detects and solves automatically
after each navigation. Without auto-on, detection still works but solving is manual.
Expected bench improvement (v0.6): reCaptcha 2/6 → 5+/6, hCaptcha 2/3 → 3/3
Image CAPTCHA + profile warming
captcha-solve handles the image-based rate-limit CAPTCHAs that the token
solvers above don't cover:
cdpilot captcha-solve
cdpilot captcha-solve --provider amazon-local
cdpilot captcha-solve --provider capsolver
cdpilot captcha-solve --provider 2captcha
- Amazon classic image CAPTCHA (the "Type the characters you see" page) is
OCR'd offline via the optional
amazoncaptcha library
(pip install amazoncaptcha — pure-Python + Pillow, MIT). Not installed = the
command reports it and exits cleanly; no hard dependency added.
- BYOK providers (
capsolver, 2captcha) use their image-to-text APIs via
CAPSOLVER_API_KEY / TWOCAPTCHA_API_KEY.
profile warm browses a set of low-risk sites to build cookie/history age,
which nudges reCAPTCHA v3's behavioral score upward over time. Slow by
design — run it ahead of a session, not inline.
Public bot-detection panels, measured 2026-09-27, headless Brave (Chrome 154)
(method and raw results):
mode | bot.sannysoft.com (31 rows) | incolumitas intoli | incolumitas fpscanner | incolumitas new-tests |
|---|
regular (no patches, default) | 28 pass / 3 fail | 5/6 | 17 ok / 3 fail / 1 warn | all ok |
stealth | 31 pass | 6/6 | 19 ok / 1 fail / 1 warn | all ok |
undetected | 31 pass | 6/6 | 19 ok / 1 fail / 1 warn | all ok |
- The remaining fpscanner fail is
'webdriver' in navigator, which is true in every modern
Chrome; faking it away would make cdpilot the odd one out.
regular's fails all come from the HeadlessChrome user agent. stealth/undetected
rewrite it for the page load that go starts; a later, separate command in the same page
can still read HeadlessChrome.
- new-tests: every key is ok;
connectionRTT is reported as unknown in all tiers.
- nowsecure.nl and areyouheadless could not be measured (a fixed always-interactive
Turnstile test key; HTTP 502).
Earlier figures on this page (sannysoft 24/24, intoli 6/6) were measured on v0.4.x in April
2026; they are replaced by the table above.
Reliability
cdpilot browser [name|auto]
cdpilot browser install chrome-for-testing
cdpilot health
cdpilot health is designed for shell watchdogs:
until cdpilot health >/dev/null; do cdpilot launch; sleep 2; done
Surfaces today's Brave crash count from ~/Library/Logs/DiagnosticReports/
on macOS — spot degradation before your automation silently stalls.
Auto-launch. A page command (go, content, click, shot, …) that finds
the browser not running starts it the same way cdpilot launch does (same
profile, same headless/visible setting), then carries on, printing one line to
stderr: cdpilot: browser was not running — launched it (CDPILOT_NO_AUTOLAUNCH=1 to disable).
Lifecycle, status and configuration commands (launch, stop, close,
close-tab, stop-all, project-stop, session-close, status, health,
tabs, sessions, projects, headless, proxy, browser, extensions,
mcp, serve, …) never launch. CDPILOT_NO_AUTOLAUNCH=1 restores the old
"CDP connection error. Is the browser running?" error and exit code 1.
Idle auto-close. A browser that a page command auto-launched, or that the
MCP server launched (browser_launch included), closes itself after
15 minutes without a cdpilot command or a visible page change, so a
finished agent task does not leave it holding memory. An explicit CLI
cdpilot launch stays open (you may be browsing in it by hand) unless you ask:
cdpilot launch --idle-close 30 or CDPILOT_IDLE_CLOSE=30. The env var also
sets the auto-launch delay (read when the browser starts; fractions allowed);
0 turns idle close off. A browser you started yourself, or one cdpilot merely
attached to, is never closed.
What counts as use: any cdpilot command except the read-only checks (status,
health, projects, version — a cdpilot health watchdog loop does not keep
the browser alive), MCP tool calls, serve requests, a CDP client still
attached to a page (a long-running command, watch, Playwright via
connectOverCDP), and any change in the open pages' URLs or in the set of
tabs (someone navigating, a tab opened or closed). Title changes do not count,
so a page that rewrites its own title (a clock, an unread counter) cannot keep
the browser alive. cdpilot status and
cdpilot health show idle close in 12m or idle close off.
How: every command stamps ~/.cdpilot/projects/<id>/last-activity; the launch
starts a small detached watcher (one per port, no console window on Windows)
that checks every ≤30 s, stops the browser like cdpilot stop, marks it
stopped in the registry and exits — it also exits as soon as the browser is
gone for any other reason. Browsers started by serve --api are managed by the
server and have no idle close.
Timeouts. Any command takes --timeout <seconds>, before or after the
command name, or a default from CDPILOT_TIMEOUT (the flag wins; 0
disables). It bounds the whole command's wall-clock: on expiry cdpilot prints
cdpilot: timed out after <N>s (<command>) to stderr, kills the child processes
it started and exits with code 124 (like GNU timeout). A browser that was
already up and registered is left running.
cdpilot --timeout 10 click "#submit"
cdpilot shot page.png --timeout 30
CDPILOT_TIMEOUT=60 cdpilot run flow.cdp
For mcp and serve the value is not applied to the long-running server
itself; it is passed on to every tool call / request it runs.
Warm process (CDPILOT_DAEMON=1)
Every cdpilot call is a fresh process: node starts (~0.1 s), Python imports the
core (~0.15 s) and a CDP session is set up (~0.5 s) before the command itself
runs — a browser paints a page in 20 ms, cdpilot go took about a second before
0.9.6; now 0.5–0.8 s fresh and ~0.23–0.30 s with CDPILOT_DAEMON=1
(measured on an Apple M1 Max, 2026-11-08). With
CDPILOT_DAEMON=1 the launcher keeps one warm Python process per project and
environment and hands page commands to it over a Unix socket; the process keeps
the module and its event loop between calls, so the second and later calls skip
the Python start-up and CDP session set-up; node's ~0.1 s launcher remains: a
browser-free command ~270 → ~140 ms, content/eval ~360 → ~110 ms (M1 Max).
export CDPILOT_DAEMON=1
cdpilot go https://example.com
cdpilot content
cdpilot daemon status
cdpilot daemon stop
Output, exit codes, the session log and recordings are the same either way:
each request runs as its own process would (the caller's argv, cwd,
environment and stdin; module state reset between requests; exit-time hooks
run at request end; the CDP connections a command opened are closed at request
end, as a process exit closed them, so no viewport, throttle or event state
leaks into the next command). Closing the client (Ctrl+C) cancels the running
command. The launcher runs a fresh process instead whenever the daemon is
missing, busy with another call, of another version (that one is asked to
leave), set up for a port or profile the registry no longer names, or the
command is not a page command: launch, stop, connect, mcp, serve,
watch, replay, run, captcha-wait and the other lifecycle commands, and
anything with --timeout. Nothing is ever executed twice. POSIX only for now;
the socket lives in $CDPILOT_HOME/daemon/ (or $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR / a private
temp directory when that path is too long for a Unix socket), 0600, and is used
only when it and its directory belong to you. CDPILOT_DAEMON_IDLE=<seconds>
sets the idle exit (default 1800). Opt-in in this release; the default may
change once two weeks of use show no difference in error rates.
The MCP server (cdpilot mcp) reads the same variable: with CDPILOT_DAEMON=1
in its environment it runs each tool call in the server process the same way (the
same executor, no socket involved) instead of starting a Python process per
call — ~400 ms → ~10 ms before the CDP work. Lifecycle tools and a project
configuration that moved since the server started still run fresh; a call past
30 s is cancelled at its next async step. A tool call stuck in synchronous code
(not waiting on the browser) is not interrupted by the 30 s cancel, unlike the
fresh path's kill. See "Agent mode over MCP" above.
Session log
Every command (and every MCP tool call) appends one JSON line to a local,
per-project log, so when a browser task is done there is a record of what was
done and found. Nothing leaves the machine.
cdpilot log
cdpilot log --md
cdpilot log --json
cdpilot log --days 3
cdpilot log --path
Each line has ts, cmd, args, exit, duration_ms, the page url and
title after the command (when the command already had them), a ~200-char
summary of its output, the error line, and files it wrote (screenshots,
PDFs). Files live in ~/.cdpilot/projects/<project-id>/log/<YYYY-MM-DD>.jsonl.
Redaction happens before anything is written: values given to fill, type,
smart-fill, smart-select, assert-value and dialog prompt become
«redacted:N chars»; so do values of password/token/key/secret/cookie/auth
flags and headers, token-shaped arguments, and URL query/fragment values whose
names contain token, key, secret, password, auth, code or session. cookies
and storage output is never logged; eval source is, with string literals
over 40 chars cut and secret-looking ones replaced. Logging is best effort: it
never changes a command's output or exit code, and a failed write costs one
stderr line. CDPILOT_LOG=0 turns it off; CDPILOT_LOG_DAYS (default 14)
sets how many days are kept. The MCP server exposes it as browser_log.
Record & replay
Record sequences of CLI commands into a portable flow JSON file and replay them with variable substitution:
cdpilot record start [--name <n>]
cdpilot record status
cdpilot record cancel
cdpilot go https://example.com
cdpilot click "#login"
cdpilot fill "#email" test@test.com
cdpilot record stop [--save login-flow.json]
cdpilot replay login-flow.json [--var k=v ...] [--delay real|none|<ms>] [--dry-run] [--continue]
Commands that run while recording is active are appended to $CDPILOT_HOME/record/active.json; secrets are replaced by {{name}} placeholders before a step is written to active.json. A recording keeps only the terminal commands of the project that started it (record status shows the project): MCP tool calls and commands run in another project are not recorded. CDPILOT_LOG=0 does not turn recording off, and steps run by replay are not recorded; run <script> is recorded as one step, not its lines. Failed steps (exit != 0) are dropped at record stop. A value becomes a placeholder {{name}} cataloged under vars if the selector/label is secret-shaped (#password, input[type=password], API key), or the value matches a token/bearer pattern or secret URL parameter. Other typed values (emails, search terms, anything the rules do not recognise) are stored verbatim, so review a flow before sharing it; --save files are created with mode 0600. In replay, --delay real reproduces recorded inter-step timing (capped at 10 s per gap), while --delay none or a fixed millisecond delay skips waiting. Variables are supplied via --var k=v or CDPILOT_VAR_<NAME>; missing variables halt replay before any step runs. A --var value fills a {{name}} anywhere in a step. A CDPILOT_VAR_<NAME> environment value fills only the value of an input step (fill, type, smart-fill, smart-select, assert-value — never its selector, a flag or a flag's value, never a step routed into a frame or typed with --entropy=on), and only on an https page whose host CDPILOT_VAR_HOSTS names (subdomains included; http only on localhost, 127.0.0.1, [::1] and *.localhost; another port only when the entry is written host:port; a URL with a backslash, a control character, whitespace, or @ / % before its path is refused). The value reaches the step's process through its environment, never its command line. The page is checked right before the step and again inside the one browser call that sets the value; that call also refuses a target that is not a text, password, email, tel or number input, a textarea or a select of the top-level page (an iframe, a contenteditable element, a search or url field). A flow that takes any environment value may contain only these steps, which run no page script and print no page data: go / open (only to a page the rule above allows; the page the browser lands on is read back and checked too), click, dblclick, hover, smart-click, submit, scroll-to, dismiss, keys (no Ctrl/Alt/Meta), fill, type, smart-fill, smart-select, wait, wait-for, wait-for-text, assert-count, assert-visible, assert-hidden, and assert-value that takes the value itself. One eval, run, batch, tools call or any other step refuses the whole flow, as does an XPath selector or one that reacts to a typed value ([value…], @value, value=, :placeholder-shown, :valid, :checked and the like, CSS comments and escapes included); in such a flow replay never shows a step's stdout or its duration. Once a value is typed, every later step runs only on the exact origin it was typed on (checked before each step), and any other page stops the replay with exit 2. Such a flow runs in a tab of its own: replay opens a new tab (about:blank, no opener), runs every step there and closes it before it returns, success or failure, so the project's shared tab, where an MCP model's browser_eval runs page script, never holds the value. The flow must therefore open its page itself: start it with go <https URL>, or its first value step stops with exit 2. A popup the page opens before the value is typed stops the replay with exit 2 (one found at the end is closed with the tab, exit 2), and a running cdpilot watch screencast stops it before the first step (cdpilot watch stop first); watch start refuses while such a replay runs. The flow chooses the field, so a flow can still type the value into a field the allowed site shows or sends on (a comment box, a form): replay only flows you trust. A google.com entry covers every subdomain, so prefer exact hosts. A refusal exits 2 before the first step (JSON with missing / refused, names only) or stops the replay at that step with exit 2. go, eval and every other command take --var only. Replaying a flow runs its steps with your browser profile, so replay only flows you trust: a flow with eval can act on any page you are logged into.
Use your own browser (human-in-the-loop)
An agent hits a CAPTCHA or a login wall it cannot get past. A person solves it,
and the agent carries on in the same browser.
The simplest way needs no connect. cdpilot's own browser is a normal,
visible window unless you launch it headless (cdpilot headless on /
CHROME_HEADLESS=1). The person solves the CAPTCHA or logs in right there, and
the agent continues:
cdpilot go https://example.com/dashboard
cdpilot captcha-wait 300
cdpilot go https://example.com/dashboard
That window uses cdpilot's own profile, so the login stays for later runs.
connect is for a browser you start yourself, with a debugging port and
your own profile directory (log into it once; it keeps its cookies):
"/Applications/Google Chrome.app/Contents/MacOS/Google Chrome" \
--remote-debugging-port=9450 --user-data-dir="$HOME/cdpilot-chrome"
google-chrome --remote-debugging-port=9450 --user-data-dir="$HOME/cdpilot-chrome"
"%ProgramFiles%\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe" --remote-debugging-port=9450 --user-data-dir="%USERPROFILE%\cdpilot-chrome"
cdpilot connect 9450
cdpilot connect --auto
cdpilot go https://example.com/dashboard
cdpilot disconnect
Over MCP, browser_connect works only when the server runs with CDPILOT_MCP_ALLOW_CONNECT=1
(Your own browser over MCP); a browser you connect from the
terminal serves MCP tools without it.
Since Chrome 136, --remote-debugging-port is ignored on the default profile,
so the separate --user-data-dir is required. connect --auto reads the
DevToolsActivePort file of each known profile directory (~/cdpilot-chrome
from the command above, Chrome stable/beta/dev/canary, Chromium, Brave,
Vivaldi, Edge), skips files left over from a browser that is gone or was
replaced on that port (the browser id in the file must match), and connects to
the first live one. It asks over HTTP only; a WebSocket probe (which Chrome's
chrome://inspect mode may answer with a permission prompt) is sent only when no
live browser was found.
Not supported yet: Chrome's chrome://inspect/#remote-debugging toggle
(Chrome 144+, your everyday logged-in profile). In that mode Chrome answers
only on its WebSocket (/json/version and /json return 404) and may ask you
to allow every new debugging connection, while cdpilot lists tabs over /json
and opens a new connection per command. connect --auto recognises the mode
and exits with code 2 and the start command above instead of half-working.
What cdpilot does with a connected browser:
- Page commands (
go, click, fill, shot, …) run in a tab cdpilot opens
for itself in a new window that does not take the focus
(Target.createTarget with newWindow + background, so your window and
tab keep it) on the first page command, and keep using that tab. close,
session-close and the idle session cleanup close only such tabs, the ones
cdpilot opened in this browser run, never the last one. Your own tabs are
never navigated or typed into; only a command that names a tab touches it
(switch-tab, close-tab <index|id>, CDPILOT_TARGET, and multi-eval,
which runs its script in every open tab).
- It never closes or kills the browser.
close, close --force, stop,
stop --smart [--force], project-stop, stop-all, session-close and MCP
browser_close close at most cdpilot's own tabs (above) and print
"connected browser left running; run cdpilot disconnect to forget it".
The idle auto-close never touches it,
tabs --reap closes nothing, wipe, permission, cookies load and cf-replay are refused (add --allow-external to load/replay cookies anyway),
context close only destroys a context context create made, and launch /
MCP browser_launch start nothing.
close-tab is an explicit command and can close your tabs: the active
(cdpilot) tab with no argument, or any tab you name by index or id. It never
closes the last tab, which would quit the browser on Windows and Linux.
- It injects nothing into it: no stealth patch or user-agent override (whatever
cdpilot mode / stealth says), no glow, no input blocker, no dev-extension
scripts, no auto-cookie restore.
- The registration stays until you run
cdpilot disconnect. If the browser is
closed, page commands exit 1 with "your connected browser is gone; run
cdpilot connect again or cdpilot disconnect", and cdpilot never launches a
browser in its place.
connect refuses when this project already has a browser cdpilot launched
("stop it first (cdpilot stop) or use another project"), and only
127.0.0.1 / localhost is accepted (anything else exits 2). disconnect
closes cdpilot's own tab in that browser (never yours, never the last one)
and stops this project's watch daemon.
- cdpilot treats a browser as its own only with proof: the browser id it
recorded at
launch (or, for older entries, a live recorded pid that holds
the debug port). A busy port is not proof, so a leftover registry entry never
makes stop / close touch your own Chrome on port 9222.
Risks:
- Every cdpilot command, and any agent that can run cdpilot, can read and act
with the cookies and sessions of that profile (mail, banking, admin panels).
Use a profile that is logged into only what the task needs.
- The debugging port is open to every local program for as long as that browser
runs, not just to cdpilot. Close the browser when you are done.
- Sites can tell automation more easily: cdpilot applies no stealth to a
connected browser.
- cdpilot's tab sits next to yours in the same window, and an agent may
still act in one of your tabs when it names it (
switch-tab,
close-tab <n>, multi-eval).
WebMCP lets a page register
"tools" on document.modelContext: imperatively with registerTool(), or
declaratively with <form toolname tooldescription> (inputs described by
toolparamdescription). cdpilot lists and calls them through the browser's own
API, getTools() and executeTool(). In Chrome the API is behind
chrome://flags/#enable-webmcp-testing (Chromium 146+), so start the browser
with it:
cdpilot launch --webmcp
cdpilot go https://example.com/shop
cdpilot tools list
cdpilot tools list --json
cdpilot tools call add_to_cart '{"sku":"A1","qty":2}'
cdpilot tools call add_to_cart --arg sku=A1 --arg qty=2
cdpilot launch --no-webmcp
launch --webmcp adds --enable-features=WebMCP to the browser's command
line and saves the mode next to the stealth mode (webmcp.json in the
project profile); CDPILOT_WEBMCP=1|0 overrides it. cdpilot status shows a
WebMCP line while the mode is on.
Chrome reads feature flags only at startup: a browser that is already running
keeps its flags until cdpilot stop.
tools list shows the tools of the page and of its same-origin iframes
(with the frame URL; every readable frame is asked for its own tools, so a
frame tool missing from the top document's getTools() is still listed and
runs in its frame), marks form tools and whether the form submits itself
(toolautosubmit), and shows title and the readOnlyHint /
consequentialHint / untrustedContentHint annotations. Nothing is injected
into the page: the list is the browser's registry at that moment, so it
follows reloads and navigations. Both commands run in cdpilot's own isolated
world (no Runtime.enable), so a page script that wraps getTools() /
executeTool() cannot add tools, change results or see the calls; only if
that world cannot see document.modelContext does cdpilot use the page's
main world, and it says so on stderr. With no tools it says why (WebMCP not
enabled in the running browser, not a secure context, browser too old,
document not origin-keyed, or the page registered none) and exits 0.
tools call checks the arguments against the tool's inputSchema first
(required, type — true is not an integer —, enum, const, nested
properties and items; other keywords are left to the page) and exits 1
on a mismatch, an unknown tool or a tool error. It passes an AbortSignal
and aborts it when --timeout (default 20 s) runs out, then exits 124
with timed out after <N>s (--timeout); its execution was aborted. The
signal fires at the --timeout deadline; the watchdog waits 3 s more so
that report is printed.
A form tool without toolautosubmit waits for a person to submit the form.
When several frames register the same name, --frame <url-part> picks one
(an exact frame URL wins); without it the top document's tool is used, and
if there is none the call stops and lists the frames.
- MCP:
browser_site_tools and browser_site_tool_call are listed only while
the project's WebMCP mode is on (or CDPILOT_WEBMCP=1 for the server).
Security: tools call runs the page's own code, and tool names,
descriptions and results are page content: treat them as untrusted.
Arguments and results are written to the session log with secret-named
fields (password, token, key, secret, auth, ...) redacted at any depth.
Scaling & Workstation Use
CDPILOT_OFFSCREEN=1 cdpilot launch
- Off-screen mode (
CDPILOT_OFFSCREEN=1) keeps the browser headed (real
rendering, no headless fingerprint) but positions the window where it can't
steal focus — meant for automating on a workstation you're also using.
- Multi-instance pool (
CDPILOT_POOL_SIZE) — planned, not shipped yet.
See Roadmap.
- Docker + Xvfb harness — used in a separate, private benchmark
repo (
cdpilot-bench), not part of this package.
Use with AI Agents
cdpilot is designed to be called by AI agents as a tool:
Claude Code (MCP)
{
"mcpServers": {
"cdpilot": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["cdpilot", "mcp"]
}
}
}
{
"name": "browser",
"description": "Control a browser via CDP",
"parameters": {
"command": "go https://example.com"
}
}
Python (subprocess)
import subprocess
result = subprocess.run(["npx", "cdpilot", "go", url], capture_output=True, text=True)
print(result.stdout)
Environment Variables
| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|
CDP_PORT | 9222 | CDP debugging port |
CHROME_BIN | Auto-detect | Browser binary path |
CDPILOT_PROFILE | ~/.cdpilot/profile | Isolated browser profile |
BROWSER_SESSION | Auto | Session identifier |
CDPILOT_MODE | regular | Stealth tier override (regular/stealth/undetected) |
CDPILOT_OFFSCREEN | 0 | Headed but render off-screen — no window steals focus |
CDPILOT_TIMEOUT | unset | Default --timeout in seconds for every command (flag wins, 0 disables); expiry exits 124 |
CDPILOT_NO_AUTOLAUNCH | 0 | 1 = page commands fail with the old "Is the browser running?" error instead of launching the browser |
CDPILOT_IDLE_CLOSE | 15 | Minutes without a cdpilot command or page change before a browser cdpilot launched closes itself (fractions allowed, 0 = never; read at launch). Default applies to auto-launch and MCP launches; an explicit CLI launch is off unless this is set or --idle-close <min> is given |
CDPILOT_JSON | auto | pretty = indente |