@mindstone/mcp-server-replit-ssh

Replit SSH MCP server β read, write, list, search, stat, move, and delete files on Replit projects over SSH/SFTP, plus one-shot generation of the local SSH key and ~/.ssh/config block.
Local Replit SSH MCP. Connects from the operator's machine to *.replit.dev hosts only, writes are atomic with SHA-256 read-back, and the ~/.ssh/config rewrite parses via AST rather than Match exec shell evaluation.
Status
- Version: 0.2.2 Β· npm
- Auth: Local SSH key on disk (
~/.ssh/rebel-replit by default; resolved via ~/.ssh/config IdentityFile if set). No env-var-supplied secrets.
- Tools: 9 (connection, files, ssh-setup)
- Surface: local-protocol
- Machine-readable:
STATUS.json
Why this exists
Replit ships a hosted "Agent" experience but does not publish an MCP server for the SSH/SFTP surface its Core users get. The community options at the time we built this either shelled out to the system ssh binary (so connection failures surfaced as generic non-zero exit codes) or parsed ~/.ssh/config with the upstream ssh-config@5.1.0 package, which evaluates Match exec "<cmd>" blocks by running them through the shell β that is local code execution against any consumer that reads a user-controlled config file. We wrote our own so that the host application can read, list, and atomically write files on a Replit project from the operator's own machine, with a host allow-list pinned to *.replit.dev, a safe AST-only config evaluator, SHA-256 read-back verification on every write, and a structured recovery contract on every tool error.
Example interaction
"List the files in my Replit project, then read package.json and tell me which scripts are defined."
Tools the host calls:
replit_check_connection β verifies SSH connectivity and SFTP support, returns latency.
replit_list_files β lists files and directories at ..
replit_read_file β reads package.json from the project root as UTF-8 text.
Response (trimmed):
{
"ok": true,
"files": [
{ "name": "package.json", "type": "file", "size": 612 },
{ "name": "src", "type": "directory" }
],
"package": {
"scripts": {
"dev": "node src/index.js",
"test": "vitest run"
}
}
}
Requirements
- Node.js 20+
- npm
- A Replit account with SSH access (Replit Core or higher)
- A live
*.replit.dev host from a Replit project (open the project, click SSH β Connect β Connect manually, copy the host and username)
- An SSH key registered with Replit at replit.com/account#ssh-keys. Run
replit_setup_ssh once to generate one if you do not already have one.
One-click install

After clicking the button, your host will prompt you to fill: REPLIT_SSH_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS.
Manual config for Claude Desktop / Claude Code / Goose / Continue.dev (Replit SSH)
{
"mcpServers": {
"Replit SSH": {
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-y",
"@mindstone/mcp-server-replit-ssh"
],
"env": {
"REPLIT_SSH_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS": "60000"
}
}
}
}
Quick Start
Install & build
cd <path-to-repo>/connectors/replit-ssh
npm install
npm run build
npx (once published)
npx -y @mindstone/mcp-server-replit-ssh
Local
Configuration
This server has no required environment variables. Authentication is via the local SSH key resolved through ~/.ssh/config.
Optional environment variables
REPLIT_SSH_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS β per-request timeout in milliseconds (default: 60000, max 600000). Tool-level timeout for SFTP operations; the lower-level TCP/SSH handshake uses a separate 30-second budget.
MCP_REPLIT_SSH_STRICT_HOST_KEY β set to 1 to require pre-populated known-hosts entries. When unset (default), unknown hosts are recorded on first contact (matches OpenSSH's StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new); a fingerprint mismatch on a subsequent connect always fails closed regardless of this flag. See the SSH host-key verification entry in Security notes below.
MCP_REPLIT_SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS_PATH β explicit path to the connector's SSH known-hosts file. Defaults to $MCP_WORKSPACE_PATH/.replit-ssh-known-hosts, falling back to $HOME/.replit-mcp/known_hosts. The file is created with mode 0o600 and the parent directory with mode 0o700.
Host configuration examples
Claude Desktop / Cursor
{
"mcpServers": {
"ReplitSSH": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@mindstone/mcp-server-replit-ssh"]
}
}
}
Local development (no npm publish needed)
{
"mcpServers": {
"ReplitSSH": {
"command": "node",
"args": ["<path-to-repo>/connectors/replit-ssh/dist/index.js"]
}
}
}
After the host launches the server, run replit_setup_ssh once to generate the local key, then add the printed public key to replit.com/account#ssh-keys.
Read
replit_check_connection β verify SSH connectivity, working directory, and SFTP support. Set verbose=true for handshake/auth diagnostics.
replit_list_files β list files and directories at a path (relative to the project root). Default path is .. Entry types are file/directory/symlink (symlinks are reported as links, not followed β consistent with replit_stat).
replit_read_file β read a file (capped at 1 MiB; larger files fail with FILE_TOO_LARGE rather than being truncated silently). UTF-8 text by default; binary files (detected via null-byte scan) are returned as base64.
replit_search_files β recursive search by file-name substring and/or text-content substring (case-insensitive), with result caps (max_results, default 50) and a depth cap (max_depth, default 4). Content search skips binary files and files over 1 MB. Returns matching paths and, for content matches, up to 5 matching lines per file with line numbers (lineMatchesTruncated: true when a file has more).
replit_stat β file/directory metadata (type, size, permissions, mtime/atime) without reading contents. Symlinks are reported as type symlink (via lstat), not followed.
Write
replit_write_file β atomic write via temp + ext_openssh_rename with SHA-256 read-back verification. Fails closed if the server doesn't support atomic overwrite and the target already exists (we never unlink + rename, which opens a data-loss window).
replit_move β move or rename a file or directory. Never overwrites: fails with DESTINATION_EXISTS if the destination path is taken. The destination parent directory must already exist.
replit_delete_file β permanently delete a file (files only, not directories). Deletion is irreversible on Replit β there is no trash β so the tool carries destructiveHint: true and relies on the host's tool-approval layer as the gate.
replit_setup_ssh β generate an Ed25519 key pair at ~/.ssh/rebel-replit, write public/private files with mode 0600 (or icacls ACL on Windows), and append a *.replit.dev block to ~/.ssh/config. Idempotent by default; pass force_regenerate=true to replace the existing key (you will need to re-register the new public key with Replit).
Security notes
- Host allowlist. Only
*.replit.dev hosts are accepted, case-insensitive suffix match. Any other host is rejected before the SSH connection is opened.
~/.ssh/ mutation surface. replit_setup_ssh writes to the operator's home directory (~/.ssh/rebel-replit, ~/.ssh/rebel-replit.pub, ~/.ssh/config). Configuration rewrites use a safe AST-only evaluator that skips Match exec blocks entirely, rather than the upstream ssh-config.compute() which would spawnSync them through the shell.
- Path traversal. SFTP file paths are POSIX-normalized after rejecting absolute paths and any
.. segments β relative paths only, no escape from the project root.
- Atomic write invariant.
replit_write_file writes to a randomized temp filename, renames via OpenSSH's POSIX rename extension (ext_openssh_rename), and verifies the final file's SHA-256 against the expected hash. If the server lacks the extension and the target file already exists, the write fails rather than falling back to unlink + rename.
- Read-back verification. Every
replit_write_file re-reads the final file and asserts SHA-256 equality before returning verified: true.
- SSH host-key verification. Every outbound SSH connection passes an explicit
hostVerifier to ssh2 that pins server fingerprints in a per-user known-hosts file (mode 0o600). The default behaviour mirrors OpenSSH's StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new: the first time the connector reaches a host, the SHA-256 fingerprint is recorded and a notice is logged to stderr; on subsequent connects, a mismatch fails closed with HOST_KEY_MISMATCH. Pins are keyed by the stable proxy suffix (first DNS label stripped, e.g. riker.replit.dev) because Replit rotates the per-project hostname on every restart β a rotated hostname presenting a different key than the recorded suffix pin fails closed. The stripping stops at three labels: a three-label host pins under its full hostname, and a bare replit.dev entry is never consulted as a pin, so no single entry can act as a universal pin for every Replit host. The known-hosts file accepts both native <host> SHA256:β¦ lines and OpenSSH ssh-keyscan output (<host> <keytype> <base64-key>), and honours @revoked markers as an active refusal (HOST_KEY_REVOKED) like OpenSSH does β a revoked key fails closed even if it is also pinned as valid. Operators who need fail-closed first-contact set MCP_REPLIT_SSH_STRICT_HOST_KEY=1 and pre-populate the known-hosts file out-of-band (e.g. ssh-keyscan riker.replit.dev > "$MCP_WORKSPACE_PATH/.replit-ssh-known-hosts" from a trusted network). Added in 0.1.2 to close audit finding replit-ssh-001.
- Untrusted-content envelopes. Content from
replit_read_file, directory-entry names from replit_list_files, matched paths/lines from replit_search_files, and the peer-authored fields from replit_check_connection (server version, working directory, and diagnostic event details such as the server banner and keyboard-interactive prompts) are wrapped in <untrusted-content source="β¦">β¦</untrusted-content> envelopes per AGENTS.md invariant #6. Hosts must keep the envelopes intact when surfacing tool output to the model. Added in 0.1.2 to close audit finding replit-ssh-006; check-connection coverage added later.
- Delete is irreversible; approval is the host's job.
replit_delete_file performs irreversible deletion (Replit has no trash). The tool is enabled by default and carries destructiveHint: true β gating belongs to the host's tool-approval layer. Directories are never deleted.
- Move never overwrites.
replit_move pre-checks the destination and fails with DESTINATION_EXISTS rather than clobbering an existing file.
- Algorithm allow-list. Outbound SSH connections restrict the negotiated KEX/host-key/cipher/HMAC algorithms to curve25519-sha256 + ssh-ed25519/rsa-sha2-* + ChaCha20-Poly1305/AES-GCM + ETM HMACs. Blocks downgrade negotiation to weaker suites if the proxy is ever misconfigured.
Licence
FSL-1.1-MIT β Functional Source License, Version 1.1, with MIT future licence. The software converts to MIT licence on 2030-04-08.