Read-only MCP server for Calibre-Web: library search, browsing and covers via the OPDS feed
calibreweb-mcp (io.github.ni-c/calibreweb-mcp)
Read-only MCP server for Calibre-Web that provides library search, browsing, and cover retrieval using the OPDS feed. It is published under the io.github.ni-c/calibreweb-mcp identifier and is positioned as an MCP server for interacting with ebook library data.
🛠️ Key Features
Read-only MCP access
Library search
Browsing via OPDS feed
Cover retrieval through OPDS feed
🚀 Use Cases
Querying Calibre-Web libraries for ebook metadata
Navigating library contents with OPDS-based browsing
Fetching cover images for items found via OPDS
⚡ Developer Benefits
Fits the Model Context Protocol (MCP) workflow
Integrates with Calibre-Web using OPDS as the underlying data source
⚠️ Limitations
Read-only; does not provide write or modification operations
Functionality depends on Calibre-Web’s OPDS feed availability
Lets MCP clients like Claude Code, Claude Desktop or Codex search your library,
browse the curated views and shelves, follow per-format download links and pull cover
images straight into the conversation. It never writes anything: every tool is a GET.
Six tools is the ceiling, not the floor: CALIBRE_WEB_ALLOW_TOOLS=essential
registers a curated five instead, and a model picks the right tool far more
reliably from five than from six — see
choosing which tools load.
Calibre-Web has no REST API — its only stable machine-readable interface is the OPDS
catalog feed it serves for e-reader apps. This server speaks that feed: Atom XML with
HTTP Basic auth in, structured book data out.
Demo: listing the tools, searching the library and reading the stats through the MCP Inspector CLI
What makes it different
The API Calibre-Web never had. Calibre-Web exposes no REST API — its only
stable machine interface is the OPDS Atom feed built for e-reader apps. These
tools parse that feed into structured book data with numeric ids, per-format
download URLs and bounded summaries.
Read-only by construction. All six tools are GETs. Redirects are refused so
Basic credentials never travel, XML carrying a DOCTYPE is rejected outright,
hrefs are locked to the configured origin, and metadata is marked as the
untrusted data it is.
Requirements
Node.js 22 or newer
A Calibre-Web instance (developed against the current
linuxserver/calibre-web image; Calibre-Web Automated works the same way)
A Calibre-Web user for the server. The OPDS feed authenticates with the
normal web login — use a dedicated account with only the View and Download
roles, not your admin account. If the instance allows anonymous browsing,
the server can also run without credentials.
Configuration
Variable
Required
Description
CALIBRE_WEB_URL
yes
Root URL of the instance, e.g. https://books.example.com. The /opds path is appended automatically.
CALIBRE_WEB_USERNAME
yes¹
Username of the Calibre-Web account.
CALIBRE_WEB_PASSWORD
yes¹
Password of that account (the web login password).
CALIBRE_WEB_INSECURE_TLS
no
true to accept self-signed certificates — scoped to the configured host only.
CALIBRE_WEB_ALLOW_TOOLS
no
Comma-separated tool names, list_* prefixes, or essential for a curated preset
CALIBRE_WEB_DENY_TOOLS
no
Same syntax; removed from whatever CALIBRE_WEB_ALLOW_TOOLS left
¹ Leave both unset for an instance that allows anonymous browsing; setting
only one of them is a configuration error.
Choosing which tools load
CALIBRE_WEB_ALLOW_TOOLS and CALIBRE_WEB_DENY_TOOLS take comma-separated tool names;
a trailing * matches a whole family. essential is a curated preset of
five: search_books, list_books, list_shelves, get_shelf_books, get_stats.
An entry that matches no tool aborts startup and names it, so a typo cannot
silently hide a tool — an absent tool is not something anyone traces back to an
environment variable. A filtered tool is never registered, so it is absent from
tools/list and unknown to tools/call alike.
If you run several of these servers at once, mcp-hub
is the other answer — its /hub endpoint replaces every server's tools with six
meta-tools.
A client that cannot spawn a local process — ChatGPT connectors, Claude on the web,
Cursor, LibreChat — reaches calibreweb-mcp through mcp-hub: one
container serves many stdio MCP servers over Streamable HTTP, with an OAuth 2.1 login
behind a single password and long-lived tokens for the clients that cannot do OAuth. Its
/hub endpoint puts every server behind six meta-tools, so one connector reaches all of
them without N×tool schemas in the model's context, and it speaks both protocol revisions
— a question this server asks travels through it to the person at the far end.
Its /config/mcp.json uses Claude Code's format, so the entry is the one you already
have:
allowTools and denyTools there are the hub's own per-server filter, which is not
the same thing as *_ALLOW_TOOLS in env — the difference, and the mistake it invites,
are in the client guide.
Tools
All tools are read-only (readOnlyHint: true).
Tool
Description
search_books
Search by title, author, series, publisher and tags. Calibre-Web returns every match at once; the result is capped client-side (limit, default 50) and reports the real match count.
list_books
Book listings by view: new (default), hot, rated, discover (random), read, unread, or all (optionally narrowed to an initial letter).
list_shelves
Public shelves plus the configured user's own shelves.
get_shelf_books
The books on a shelf, in shelf order.
get_cover
A book's cover, returned as an image the client can display.
get_stats
Total books, authors, categories and series.
Book entries include authors, tags, series (with index), rating, a bounded
summary, a cover URL and per-format download URLs — ready-made links a human can
open, since the model itself has no reason to download an EPUB.
Structured output
Every tool declares an outputSchema and answers with structuredContent
alongside the text block, so a client can use the result without parsing prose:
jsonc
{"untrusted":true,"source":"calibre-web","totalFound":2,"truncated":false,"books":[{"id":7,"title":"Dune","authors":["Frank Herbert"]}],"notes":["Book titles, authors, tags, series and summaries come from …"],}
The untrusted marker is a field and not only a line in notes, because a
client that reads the structured half would otherwise have to find the warning
in a list of sentences. The two tools without it are get_stats, which is four
counters this server has checked are numbers, and get_cover, which reports an
id, a media type from a four-entry allowlist and a byte count — the image itself
stays in the content block where a client renders it.
An over-budget result drops book summaries as before. Where that is still not
enough it is now an error rather than JSON cut at the ceiling: unparseable
text was tolerable in a text block and is not something structuredContent can
carry, and the two channels have to hold the same value.
Pagination
Feeds are paginated by the instance's books per page setting (default 60); the
page size is not client-controllable. Every listing returns
pagination.nextOffset when more pages exist — pass it as offset in the next
call. The discover view is a random selection and not paginated.
Not exposed, on purpose
No writes. The OPDS feed has none, and this server would not add any.
No file downloads. Tools return download URLs, not ebook payloads.
No facet browsing (authors/series/tags/publishers/languages/formats as
their own index feeds). search_books covers those lookups; the routes exist
and tools for them can be added if there is a real use case.
Safety
The server is read-only by construction — GET requests only, no state anywhere.
Book metadata is untrusted third-party data; every result says so, control
characters are stripped, and XML entity processing is disabled (documents
declaring a DOCTYPE or entities are refused outright).
Responses are bounded before parsing (8 MB feeds, 1 MB covers) and again
before they reach the model (per-book and per-response budgets).
Feed hrefs are only passed through when they resolve to the configured
origin over http(s) — a hostile feed cannot plant javascript:, file: or
cross-origin URLs into the results.
Redirects are refused so the Basic credentials can never be replayed to
another host; covers are only passed through for real image content types.
The password is scrubbed from the process environment at startup, and URLs
are credential-redacted before they appear in any log or result.
Update CHANGELOG.md and bump the version in package.json (+ lockfile).
npm run lint && npm run test:coverage && npm run build
Tag the release: git tag -s vX.Y.Z -m "vX.Y.Z" && git push origin vX.Y.Z
Contributing
Issues, discussions and pull requests are welcome — see
CONTRIBUTING.md. For vulnerabilities please use
private reporting
rather than a public issue; the policy is in SECURITY.md.