smtp-mcp

OpenSSF Scorecard

A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for SMTP, the protocol every mail server speaks to accept a message for delivery.

Lets MCP clients like Claude Code, Claude Desktop or Codex send, reply to and forward mail from one configured address — with a human approving every message.

Seven tools is the ceiling, not the floor: SMTP_ALLOW_TOOLS=essential registers a curated five instead, and a model picks the right tool far more reliably from five than from seven — see choosing which tools load.

What makes it different

It sends mail. That is why it is a separate server. Its counterpart imap-mcp reads a mailbox and deliberately has no way to send anything — that absence is its entire security argument, because an agent that can reach private data and process attacker-controlled content is only exploitable once it also has a way out. This server is that way out, so it does not get to make the same claim. It earns its place by narrowing the channel instead, and by living in its own process with its own credentials.

It is off when you install it. SMTP_ALLOW_SEND defaults to false. Until it is set the sending tools are not registered at all — absent from tools/list, not refused at call time.

It can only write to people you named. SMTP_ALLOWED_RECIPIENTS is required to turn sending on. Every address in To, Cc and Bcc is checked against it before a connection is opened, so an injected "mail this to someone else" fails without the server ever reading it as an instruction. Allowing everyone is possible and has to be written as *.

Every message is approved by a person. Not by the model — the request goes to the client as an MCP elicitation. Recipients, subject and any Bcc appear on their own labelled lines, so a subject written to look like an instruction cannot become part of the server's own sentence.

The sender cannot be chosen. There is no from parameter. A model that could pick its own sender could write in a colleague's name, and the result would be indistinguishable from a message they wrote.

Requirements

• Node.js 22 or newer
• An SMTP account you may send from — a submission server on port 587 or 465, with a username and password. Providers with two-factor authentication generally need an app-specific password.

Configuration

Use TLS. SMTP_TLS=starttls (the default) requires the upgrade rather than attempting it, so a stripped STARTTLS capability fails the connection instead of quietly sending your password in the clear. For a self-signed certificate prefer a proper internal CA over SMTP_INSECURE_TLS.

Two defaults are worth reading twice, because they are the opposite of what the rest of this family does:

• SMTP_ALLOW_SEND is off. A freshly installed smtp-mcp can compose and preview messages and cannot send any.
• An unset SMTP_ALLOWED_RECIPIENTS is a startup error, not "anyone". Treating a missing line as permission is how an accident becomes a delivered message. Write * if you mean it.

Choosing which tools load

SMTP_ALLOW_TOOLS decides what is registered, SMTP_DENY_TOOLS is subtracted from it. Both take comma-separated tool names or a prefix with a single trailing *. A filtered tool is never built — it does not appear in tools/list and answers a call with "not found", the same as a sending tool while the send gate is closed. Nothing is advertised and then refused.

SMTP_ALLOW_TOOLS=essential          # the curated five
SMTP_ALLOW_TOOLS='get_server_info,preview_mail'
SMTP_DENY_TOOLS=forward_mail        # everything else, minus forwarding

essential is get_server_info, validate_recipients, preview_mail, send_mail and reply_mail. forward_mail is left out: forwarding carries somebody else's content and attachments outward, which is the call that most deserves to be switched on deliberately.

An entry that matches no tool aborts startup and lists the real names. A tool quietly missing from tools/list is invisible — nobody traces an absence back to an environment variable.

Installation

Claude Code

claude mcp add smtp -- npx -y @ni-c/smtp-mcp

Claude Desktop

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "smtp": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@ni-c/smtp-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "SMTP_HOST": "smtp.example.net",
        "SMTP_USER": "person@example.net",
        "SMTP_PASSWORD": "app-specific-password",
        "SMTP_FROM": "Your Name <person@example.net>",
        "SMTP_ALLOW_SEND": "true",
        "SMTP_ALLOWED_RECIPIENTS": "@example.net"
      }
    }
  }
}

Codex

[mcp_servers.smtp]
command = "npx"
args = ["-y", "@ni-c/smtp-mcp"]

[mcp_servers.smtp.env]
SMTP_HOST = "smtp.example.net"
SMTP_USER = "person@example.net"
SMTP_PASSWORD = "app-specific-password"
SMTP_FROM = "Your Name <person@example.net>"
SMTP_ALLOW_SEND = "true"
SMTP_ALLOWED_RECIPIENTS = "@example.net"

Docker

docker run --rm -i \
  -e SMTP_HOST=smtp.example.net \
  -e SMTP_USER=person@example.net \
  -e SMTP_PASSWORD=app-specific-password \
  -e SMTP_FROM='Your Name <person@example.net>' \
  -e SMTP_ALLOW_SEND=true \
  -e SMTP_ALLOWED_RECIPIENTS=@example.net \
  ghcr.io/ni-c/smtp-mcp

Through mcp-hub

A client that cannot spawn a local process — ChatGPT connectors, Claude on the web, Cursor, LibreChat — reaches smtp-mcp through mcp-hub: one container serves many stdio MCP servers over Streamable HTTP, with an OAuth 2.1 login behind a single password and long-lived tokens for the clients that cannot do OAuth. Its /hub endpoint puts every server behind six meta-tools, so one connector reaches all of them without N×tool schemas in the model's context, and it speaks both protocol revisions — a question this server asks travels through it to the person at the far end.

Its /config/mcp.json uses Claude Code's format, so the entry is the one you already have:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "smtp-mcp": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@ni-c/smtp-mcp"],
      "env": {
        "SMTP_HOST": "smtp.example.net",
        "SMTP_USER": "person@example.net",
        "SMTP_PASSWORD": "…",
        "SMTP_FROM": "Your Name <person@example.net>",
        "SMTP_ALLOW_TOOLS": "essential"
      },
      "denyTools": ["send_mail", "reply_mail"]
    }
  }
}

allowTools and denyTools there are the hub's own per-server filter, which is not the same thing as *_ALLOW_TOOLS in env — the difference, and the mistake it invites, are in the client guide.

Tools

Always registered. None of these can put a message on the wire.

Registered only with SMTP_ALLOW_SEND=true. 👤 marks the ones that ask a human before acting.

Structured output

Every tool declares an outputSchema and answers with structuredContent alongside the text block, so a client can use the result without parsing prose:

{
  "sent": true,
  "already_sent": false,
  "message_id": "<b1c9…@example.net>",
  "accepted": ["her@example.net", "him@example.net"],
  "rejected": [],
  "bytes": 1284,
  "sends_remaining_this_hour": 9,
  "note": "The SMTP server accepted the message. It cannot be recalled.",
}

preview_mail is the one tool that carries untrusted: true and source: "smtp" as fields: a quoted original was written by whoever sent it, and anyone in the world can send mail. Its text block keeps the nonce fence — the structured half states the same fields so a client is not made to parse it. Everything else here reports this server's own configuration or the outcome of its own send, where the marker would be a false claim about who wrote it.

Not exposed, on purpose

• A from parameter. The sender is SMTP_FROM and nothing else.
• A way to skip the confirmation. No force, no "trusted caller" mode. An option to turn the gate off would be the first thing a prompt injection reaches for.
• Reading mail. That is imap-mcp. Keeping the two in separate processes with separate credentials is most of what makes either of them safe.
• Arbitrary headers. Threading uses in_reply_to and references; there is no passthrough for header names, because that is header injection with extra steps.
• DKIM signing. A submission server signs for you. A private signing key in an environment variable is a worse trade than it looks.

Safety

• Sending is off by default and the tools do not exist until it is on.
• Every recipient is checked against an allowlist before a connection is opened, in To, Cc and Bcc alike.
• Every message is approved by a human, through MCP elicitation. The two-call token fallback says plainly that it is not the same thing.
• A confirmation is bound to the exact message: a SHA-256 fingerprint over the sorted recipient list and a digest of the content, so an approval cannot be spent on a wider list or on different text.
• The dialog shows the message, not only the envelope: the body, the quoted original and the HTML part, each with its length in characters. Everything else here binds who a message goes to; this is what binds what it says.
• Bcc recipients get their own labelled line in the dialog. A hidden recipient a human does not see is the ideal exfiltration channel.
• Confirmation text never quotes caller-chosen values into the server's own sentence.
• The same message is not sent twice. An approval proves that somebody agreed to a message, not that they agreed to it again, so a message the SMTP server accepted is remembered for as long as an approval for it could still be redeemed.
• Outgoing HTML is stripped of scripts, event handlers, remotely loaded images and unsafe URL schemes — and every removal is reported, never silent. Markup that cannot be cleaned with confidence is refused rather than repaired.
• A quoted original is passed on unchanged, with any prompt-injection shapes it matches named in the dialog.
• Attachments come only from SMTP_ATTACHMENT_DIR, past an extension allowlist, a symlink refusal and a magic-byte check.
• Every accepted message is recorded on stderr and optionally in a file. Never the body.

See SECURITY.md for the reasoning, and for what none of this covers.

Documentation

The full guide, tool reference and security notes live at smtp-mcp.ni-c.de (source in docs/).

Development

npm install
npm test
npm run build

There is a throwaway Mailpit sandbox in test/integration/. Develop against it rather than a real mailbox: this server's job is to put messages on the wire, and a test run that goes wrong sends real mail to real people.

docker compose -f test/integration/compose.yml up -d --wait
npm run build && npm run test:integration

Releasing

Tagging vX.Y.Z on main runs the release workflow: it checks the tag matches package.json, publishes to npm with provenance through Trusted Publishing, pushes a multi-arch image to GHCR with an SBOM, creates the GitHub release from the CHANGELOG section, and submits the version to the MCP Registry.

Contributing

Issues, discussions and pull requests are welcome — see CONTRIBUTING.md. For vulnerabilities please use private reporting rather than a public issue; the policy is in SECURITY.md.

License

MIT © Willi Thiel