WHOIS, RDAP, DNS, IP / ASN / CIDR and Web3 name (ENS, Unstoppable, Handshake) lookups. No API key.
tech.dc5.whois/dc5-whois — Model Context Protocol (MCP) Server
The tech.dc5.whois/dc5-whois MCP server performs network and identity lookups. It provides WHOIS, RDAP, DNS queries, and IP-based lookups covering IP addresses, ASNs, and CIDRs. It also supports Web3 name lookups, including ENS, Unstoppable, and Handshake. The server notes “No API key.”
🛠️ Key Features
WHOIS lookups
RDAP lookups
DNS queries
IP / ASN / CIDR lookups
Web3 name lookups: ENS, Unstoppable, Handshake
No API key required
🚀 Use Cases
Verifying domain or registration details via WHOIS/RDAP
Resolving DNS information for a hostname
Investigating IP ownership and routing data (IP/ASN/CIDR)
Resolving decentralized naming systems (ENS/Unstoppable/Handshake)
⚡ Developer Benefits
Enables context retrieval for identity, network, and naming lookups
Works without an API key, simplifying setup
Captured live from the server via tools/list.
check_aspa_path
Check an AS_PATH against the published ASPA objects (RPKI attestations of which providers a network authorises), following the verification procedure of draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification. The result is valid, invalid or unknown, with the reason and the first hop that broke the path.
Use it to find out whether a path shows a route leak or an unauthorised provider. "Unknown" only means some network on the path published no ASPA; it is not a fault.
Behavior: offline, answered from the local RPKI snapshot. The procedure is an Internet-Draft, not an RFC, and the neighbor-AS and AS_SET prerequisite checks of a real router are left out. Only the path is read; it is neither stored nor logged.
Parameters2
path
string
required
the AS_PATH as seen by the receiver, neighbor first and origin last, separated by spaces or commas, e.g. 3356 1299 14041 194 (every hop is an AS number, with or without the AS prefix). Prepending is fine; an AS_SET {..} is refused
direction
string
optional
upstream (default): the route came from a customer or peer; downstream: it came from a provider
Raw schema
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"path": {
"type": "string",
"description": "the AS_PATH as seen by the receiver, neighbor first and origin last, separated by spaces or commas, e.g. 3356 1299 14041 194 (every hop is an AS number, with or without the AS prefix). Prepending is fine; an AS_SET {..} is refused"
},
"direction": {
"type": "string",
"description": "upstream (default): the route came from a customer or peer; downstream: it came from a provider"
}
},
"required": [
"path"
],
"additionalProperties": false
}
check_lookalike
Check whether one domain or Web3 name is a visual look-alike (homograph): letters from different scripts mixed in one label, or every non-ASCII letter having a Latin twin, so раураl.com reads as paypal.com. Returns the scripts used and the Latin name it imitates.
Use it to screen candidate or incoming names quickly (phishing triage, brand monitoring). lookup_target already includes this warning for the name it looks up, so there is no need to call both for one name.
Behavior: offline and instant; no DNS, registry or network call. It catches script tricks only, not typos or digit swaps such as paypa1.com, so a clean result does not mean the domain is safe.
Parameters1
name
string
required
one domain or Web3 name, Unicode (раураl.com) or punycode (xn--...); a full URL is not accepted
Raw schema
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"name": {
"type": "string",
"description": "one domain or Web3 name, Unicode (раураl.com) or punycode (xn--...); a full URL is not accepted"
}
},
"required": [
"name"
],
"additionalProperties": false
}
check_mail_security
Grade one domain's email authentication and list every check: SPF (single record, the 10 DNS-lookup limit across includes, the all qualifier), DMARC (policy, inheritance from the organizational domain, pct, report addresses), MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, BIMI, DANE and null MX. The level is strong, fair, weak, no_mail (domain declares it sends no mail) or none (no MX, SPF or DMARC at all).
Use it for questions about spoofing, deliverability or a DMARC rollout. lookup_target gives only the overall grade; this tool gives the status and a one-line finding for each check.
Behavior: reads public DNS only and never connects to the domain's mail servers, so it cannot test SMTP TLS, certificates or whether a mailbox exists. Usually under 2 s.
Parameters1
domain
string
required
registered domain or subdomain whose mail setup to grade, e.g. example.com; Unicode or punycode. Not an email address and not a mail server host name
Raw schema
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"domain": {
"type": "string",
"description": "registered domain or subdomain whose mail setup to grade, e.g. example.com; Unicode or punycode. Not an email address and not a mail server host name"
}
},
"required": [
"domain"
],
"additionalProperties": false
}
check_route
Check one (prefix, origin AS) pair against the public records: RPKI route origin validation (RFC 6811), the routing registries (IRR route objects) and how many RIPE RIS peers see that origin for the prefix.
Use it to answer whether an AS is authorised to originate a prefix, why a route may be dropped by networks that filter on RPKI, or whether a registry object matches an announcement. For everything about one prefix or AS use lookup_target instead.
Behavior: offline, answered from local snapshots; the result lists only the datasets this instance has loaded. RPKI "invalid" can be a stale ROA and an IRR object is a claim, so neither is proof of a hijack or of authorisation. A prefix RIS does not see may still be announced to peers it does not have.
Parameters2
prefix
string
required
one announced or planned prefix in CIDR form, IPv4 or IPv6, e.g. 1.1.1.0/24 or 2606:4700::/32; host bits are ignored. A bare address or a range is not accepted
origin
string
required
the origin AS number to check the prefix against, written AS13335; a bare number is not an ASN
Raw schema
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"prefix": {
"type": "string",
"description": "one announced or planned prefix in CIDR form, IPv4 or IPv6, e.g. 1.1.1.0/24 or 2606:4700::/32; host bits are ignored. A bare address or a range is not accepted"
},
"origin": {
"type": "string",
"description": "the origin AS number to check the prefix against, written AS13335; a bare number is not an ASN"
}
},
"required": [
"prefix",
"origin"
],
"additionalProperties": false
}
get_tld_info
Facts about one top-level domain from local datasets: whether it is delegated in the root zone, its type (country-code or infrastructure when derivable), the registry's RDAP server, root-zone name servers, whether the root zone publishes a DS record (DNSSEC) and which DS algorithms, and any Web3 namespace that claims the same label (for example .eth, .crypto, .bnb, or a collision such as .xyz).
Use it to answer where to send an RDAP query for a TLD, whether a TLD is signed, or whether a name under it could mean something else on a blockchain. For one domain use lookup_target instead.
Behavior: offline and instant, answered from synced IANA and root-zone data; makes no network call. A field without data is omitted, never guessed. Registry operator and delegation date are not included.
Parameters1
tld
string
required
one top-level domain with or without the leading dot, e.g. com, .de, xn--p1ai or рф. A full domain name is not accepted
Raw schema
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"tld": {
"type": "string",
"description": "one top-level domain with or without the leading dot, e.g. com, .de, xn--p1ai or рф. A full domain name is not accepted"
}
},
"required": [
"tld"
],
"additionalProperties": false
}
list_data_sources
List the local datasets and feeds behind lookup_target (RIR delegations, IANA, Public Suffix List, cloud / CDN ranges, Tor and Private Relay, reputation lists, GeoLite2) with state, record count, generation date and a stale flag.
Use it to judge how current a reputation, RIR, cloud or geolocation answer is, or to explain why such a section is missing from a lookup (dataset not loaded or stale). Registry, DNS and Web3 data are fetched live and are not listed here.
Behavior: takes no arguments and makes no external calls.
Look up up to 10 domains, IPs, CIDRs, ASNs or Web3 names in one call and get one short line per target (type, registrar and expiry, nameservers, network owner, origin AS, cloud, reputation, Web3 status) plus the same facts as structured fields and a details_url for each.
Use it to triage a list, for example the domains in a phishing report or the IPs in a log excerpt. For the full fact sheet of one target use lookup_target.
Behavior: each target is a live lookup like lookup_target and counts against the same rate limit, so a long list can hit it; targets that were refused say so and can be retried later. Up to 3 run at once, the whole call is cut off after about 22 s and targets that did not finish say so. One failing target does not fail the others.
Parameters1
queries
null | array
required
up to 10 targets, each as for lookup_target: domain, IP, CIDR, ASN written as AS15169, or Web3 name. Duplicates are dropped
Raw schema
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"queries": {
"type": [
"null",
"array"
],
"items": {
"type": "string"
},
"description": "up to 10 targets, each as for lookup_target: domain, IP, CIDR, ASN written as AS15169, or Web3 name. Duplicates are dropped"
}
},
"required": [
"queries"
],
"additionalProperties": false
}
lookup_target
Look up one domain, IP address, CIDR block, ASN (AS15169), EVM address (0x…) or Web3 name (ENS .eth, Unstoppable, SPACE ID .bnb, Handshake hns:) and get a compact fact sheet. Domains: registrar, dates, status, nameservers, DNS records, overall mail-security grade, third-party services seen in DNS, possibly dangling records. IPs, CIDRs and ASNs: network owner, origin AS, RIR, cloud / CDN provider, Tor or iCloud Private Relay tag, geolocation, abuse contact, local reputation. Web3 names: registration status, addresses, records, ENS expiry. A 0x EVM address: its ENS primary name on Ethereum, Base, Optimism, Arbitrum, Linea and Scroll (reverse lookup). A look-alike warning is added when the name uses deceptive letters.
Use it first for any question about who owns, runs, hosts or registered something. Prefer check_mail_security when you need each email check rather than the grade, and check_lookalike to screen many names without network calls.
Behavior: queries registries, DNS and (for Web3) blockchain RPC live, usually in 1-5 s, at most about 12 s. If one source fails, the rest is still returned and the failure is listed under errors. Reputation covers local blocklists only: no match is not a clean bill of health. Queries are not logged or stored. The result ends with details_url, the full page with every record and its provenance.
Parameters2
query
string
required
what to look up: a domain (example.com, münchen.de), IPv4 / IPv6 address, CIDR (8.8.8.0/24), ASN written as AS15169 (a bare number is not an ASN), a Web3 name (vitalik.eth, brad.crypto, spaceid.bnb, bonfida.sns, hns:name), or an EVM address (0xd8dA…6045) to find its ENS primary names
namespace
string
optional
optional; force a Web3 namespace (ens, unstoppable, spaceid, sns or hns) when a name could belong to several, e.g. a TLD that is both an ICANN TLD and a Web3 namespace. Leave empty and the namespace is detected from the name
Raw schema
{
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"query": {
"type": "string",
"description": "what to look up: a domain (example.com, münchen.de), IPv4 / IPv6 address, CIDR (8.8.8.0/24), ASN written as AS15169 (a bare number is not an ASN), a Web3 name (vitalik.eth, brad.crypto, spaceid.bnb, bonfida.sns, hns:name), or an EVM address (0xd8dA…6045) to find its ENS primary names"
},
"namespace": {
"type": "string",
"description": "optional; force a Web3 namespace (ens, unstoppable, spaceid, sns or hns) when a name could belong to several, e.g. a TLD that is both an ICANN TLD and a Web3 namespace. Leave empty and the namespace is detected from the name"
}
},
"required": [
"query"
],
"additionalProperties": false
}